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ABSTRACT
WILDLIFE CRIME AND OTHER CHALLENGES TO RESOURCE SYSTEM
RESILIENCE
Patricia A. Raxter
Old Dominion University, 2015
Director: Dr. David Earnest
Although wildlife crime has exploded in Africa over the past decade —“commercial
poaching” now kills an estimated eight percent of the continent’s elephant population
each year—some governments have proven more successful than others at protecting
wildlife and preserving habitats. To explain this variation, this study examines how the
policies of three states (Kenya, Tanzania, and Botswana) have enhanced or
undermined the resilience of the continent’s elephant ecosystem. Using the socialecological system framework, the study illustrates how each state’s changing practices
have either exacerbated the stresses wrought by wildlife crime or successfully protected
local populations from poaching. The study finds that monocausal explanations cannot
explain social-ecological systems outcomes. Cross-level and cross-scale dynamics,
including temporal, geospatial, epistemological, and institutional linkages, explain
variation in system functionality. These dynamics include colonial policies, governance
practices, the international conservation community, and resource use decisions.
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CHAPTER 1
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND INTRODUCTION

The African elephant, once numbering in the tens of millions, teeters on
the edge of extinction due to a massive increase in demand for ivory and a
corresponding commercial poaching crisis. The most current estimates place the
surviving number of African elephants between 200,000- 400,000 across the
continent. Historically populations stood at over ten of million. The current wave
of poaching is focused on Central and East Africa, though as elephants are
poached out in those areas poachers are turning their attention to herds across
southern Africa where an “avalanche” of poaching is expected to occur in the
next several years. As many as 50,000 African elephants are illegally killed each
year.1
Transnational organized crime [TOC] controls the illicit international trade
in ivory. The legal trade was banned in 1989 by the Convention on the Trade in
Endangered Species [CITES].

The monetary and organizational resources

required to direct large scale poaching, consolidate large amounts of ivory,
containerize and ship these massive quantities of ivory, and the complex
shipping routes involved, all point to the involvement of TOC. These organized
crime groups are Asian-run and Africa based, directly connecting end markets in
China, and to a lesser extent other states in Asia, with the illegal killing of African

1

Daniel Cressey, "Nations Fight Back on Ivory: Politicians Take Action on Poaching in Africa as
Tusk Seizures Approach Record Numbers," Nature 503, no. 452 (2013).

2
elephants.2 China emerged over the last decade as the primary market for ivory,
with the illicit market increasing ten-fold since 2005. Poaching levels in Africa
directly correlate with the price of ivory in China. 3
Ivory poaching, when viewed within the context of transnational
environmental crime, threatens both immediate and long term stability in African
states. In the immediate term poaching, when carried out by non-state armed
groups, threatens both populations at the site of poaching and populations
targeted by extremists. Poaching is comorbid with other illicit activities which
include recruitment of child soldiers, human trafficking, mass rapes/sexual
exploitation, and murder.4 Poached ivory finances terrorist and violent
organizations, while increasingly brutal poaching operations create war zones
between poachers and park rangers. Poaching directly threatens the economic
security of rural communities, often heavily reliant on tourism. 5 Poachers are
known to torture and kill anti-poaching personnel.6 Rangers in particular are
under threat, with over 1,000 across 35 countries killed in the last decade. 7
2

Jeffrey Gettleman, "Elephants Dying in Epic Frenzy as Ivory Fuels Wars and Profits," in New
York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/04/world/africa/africas-elephants-are-beingslaughtered-in-poaching-frenzy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&. Varun Vira, Thomas Ewing, and
Jackson Miller, "Out of Africa: Mapping the Global Trade in Illicit Elephant Ivory," (2014),
http://www.bornfree.org.uk/news/news-article/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=1660.
3
Yufang Gao and Susan G. Clark, "Elephant Ivory Trade in China: Trends and Drivers,"
Biological Conservation 180 (2014).
4
United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the United
Nations Regional Office for Central Africa and on the Lord's Resistance Army-Affected Areas,
(New York: United Nations, 2013),
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/297.
5
IFAW, Criminal Nature: The Global Security Implications of the Illegal Wildlife Trade,
(International Fund for Animal Welfare, 2013), http://www.ifaw.org/united-states/resourcecentre/criminal-nature-global-security-implications-illegal-wildlife-tra-0.
6
Christopher Jasparro, Environmental Threats to Security, Stability, and Us Interests in Southern
Africa: Opportunity Knocks- Time for a Comprehensive Regional Defense Environmental
International Cooperation and Environmental Security Assistance Strategy, (Naval War College,
2009).
7
IFAW.
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Environmental crime can spur displacement, either temporary or permanent,
depending on the ecological damage sustained.

Wildlife crimes such as

overfishing, or dumping toxic waste, negatively impact food security, disrupt local
economies, reduce revenues from state coffers, and severely impact health. 8
The illicit wildlife trade also helps spread animal-borne diseases. Ivory is
considered by many experts to be the new “conflict diamonds,” hunted and
traded by militants for weapons, ammunition, food, and other material required to
sew instability.
In the long term poaching, conceptualized as a major transnational
environmental crime and as part of a transnational organized crime
establishment, contributes to the erosion of the state across the continent,
highlighting the ability of countries to control their own borders, resources, and
government policies. As illicit economies grow and political power is looted by
transnational criminal organizations states will weaken further in a viscous cycle
of state degradation accompanied by increased foreign illicit trade.
While TOC clearly plays a role in commercial ivory poaching, it is less
clear how other factors interact to either undermine or bolster wildlife protection
measures in areas where African elephants live, or as a resource managed at
the international level. How TOC combines with other key variables including
governance systems, socio-economic calculations of users, law enforcement,
norms of wildlife conservation, land use practices, expectations of development,
levels of security, and infrastructure development, among other factors, to impact

8

Andre Le Sage, "Non-State Security Threats in Africa: Challenges for Us Engagement," Prism
2, no. 1 (2010).
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elephant populations are key questions with implications for the survival of the
species.
Currently far more resources are devoted to supply side approaches to
fighting wildlife crime than demand reduction strategies.9 The supply side
approach to illegal trades essentially argues that if no illegal goods are moving
from one country to another, than no consumption can take place. This assumes
curtailing supplies is the best way to curb consumption. From the standpoint of
the consumer country, policies focused on restricting supply are far easier, in part
because it allows blame for weak enforcement and increased rates of illegal
killing to be shifted from consumers to suppliers. Because of the emphasis on
supply reduction strategies within policy circles, this study primarily focuses on
challenges related to wildlife management on the supply side, while
acknowledging in multiple instances the key to understanding dynamics
operating across the resource system.
The exponential growth of wildlife crime and the increased penetration of
TOC into the global wildlife sector raise important questions about the future
sustainability of wildlife resources. What conditions exist which allow some states
to better protect their wildlife than other states? How can states in the developing
world withstand the pressures of rising global demand for limited wildlife
resources? This project employs a case study analysis to compare three African
states- Botswana, Kenya, and Tanzania- and their relative success or failure
protecting wildlife. The primary research question revolves around Botswana and

9

Todd Reubold, "Peter Knights: Curbing the Demand for Wildlife," in Ensia.com (29 May 2014),
http://ensia.com/interviews/peter-knights-curbing-the-demand-for-wildlife/.
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its success battling poachers. What group of factors operate together to protect
wildlife and maintain sustainability? Multiple goals animate this research
including, first, to explicate and describe the potential causal factors degrading or
improving SES resilience related to poaching; second, to identify and explain
cross scale and cross level challenges to SES performance; third, to describe
and compare specific case studies utilizing the SESF; and fourth, to contribute to
a critique of present conservation strategies related to social components of the
SES.10
Lacking effective institutional protection at the state and international level,
elephant populations are declining in most of their range beyond reasonable
expectations of viability. For any hope to remain for saving endangered species
researchers and policymakers must understand the complex local/global
interlinkages between the governance systems and resource users making
decisions that impact animals and habitats and the multitude of outcomes flowing
from those decisions. In a world characterized by globalization proximity to a
resource is not required to produce impacts, either positive or negative. When
extinction is so closely related to human activity simple solutions focused
primarily on the natural sciences are bound to fail. To chart a path towards a
sustainable future for African elephants and other species an interdisciplinary
approach is required to identify all of the relevant variables and factors at play to
diagnose which background conditions impact outcomes, and how they can be
altered.
10

Firkhart Berkes, Johan Colding, and Carl Folke, "Introduction," in Navigating Social-Ecological
Systems, ed. Firkhart Berkes, Johan Colding, and Carl Folke (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2008).
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Ostrom et al points out six concerns particular to the international management
of global common pool resources such as the African elephant, illustrating again
the complexity of both diagnosing problems with resource management and
finding and applying effective solutions.11 First, Ostrom et al notes a scaling up
problem related to the number of participants necessary to agree on and enforce
rules for the use and management of a resource.12 Who gets a say in a world
with billions of CPR users?

The second issue relates to the “cultural diversity

challenge” which captures the difficulty of identifying and solving problems across
cultures, in particular when a paternalistic or economic “north-south” conflict
impacts issue areas. Third are problems associated with the simultaneous
interconnectedness of communities across the global linked through shared
global problems like acid rain, deforestation, and climate change, and the
disconnectedness of people within their own communities, with each other, and
with the environment. Fourth, significant changes, even those on a global scale,
can occur far more quickly than in the past. Environmental thresholds are passed
before enough people to make a difference even recognize, or agree that, a
problem exists. Fifth, Ostrom notes the difficulty in achieving unanimity amongst
international actors for collective choice actions. And lastly, CPRs at the global
level are limited and finite. Some decisions and actions are permanent, and
mistakes made by international regimes monitoring resources, whether based on

11

Elinor Ostrom et al., "Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges," Science's
Compass 284 (1999).
12
Ibid.
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politics or science, have real, and sometimes irreversible, impacts on
resources.13
As a global CPR the African elephant SES faces all of these challenges.
At the international level agreement of the scope, scale, or drivers of poaching
has not been achieved within CITES, the primary resource manager. With
culturally diverse resource users, normative concerns and priorities differ
significantly. Global markets link wealthy users and commodities, yet exclude
impoverished locals who cannot affect change or access economic benefit from
use of the CPR. The speed of the assault on wildlife, and the scale over which it
has occurred, decreased the ability of resource managers at any level to stop the
slaughter of hundreds of thousands of elephants.

And lastly, the African

elephant is a finite resource being exploited by an almost infinite pool of users.
The so far ineffective response to the current poaching crisis could result in the
irreversible transformation of a valued global common pool resource- the African
elephant- and its eradication across most of its range within the next decade.
In brief, the study finds multiple interactions and factors contributed to the
resilience or degradation of elephant habitats in Africa, and that while some
factors impacted each case study in a similar way, generalizing across cases
may not be effective due to the heterogeneous nature of social-ecological
systems operating over time and in specific geographic, political, and economic
contexts. Key interactions policymakers should consider when diagnosing
challenges to resource systems are between resource users and governance

13

Marco A. Janssen, John M. Anderies, and Elinor Ostrom, "Robustness of Social-Ecological
Systems to Spatial and Temporal Variability," Society & Natural Resources 20, no. 4 (2007).
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authorities both in the present and in the past. Questions to explain current
outcomes could include how resource users traditionally utilized and interacted
within the system; how norms have been degraded or strengthened by
interactions with governing authorities; how policies either strengthen or weaken
norms; and how policies encourage or discourage, intentionally or not, certain
resource usage strategies. Other key interactions important to understanding
resource use in a system transntiaonl involve the aggregated actions of
geographically removed resource users; their understanding of resource use
impacts on the system, and their role in bringing about those impacts; and
cultural framing of resource challenges across levels.
This study increases understanding of illicit traffics occurring as part of the
illicit global economy, defined by Friman and Andreas as “the system of
transnational economic activities that are criminalized by states in importing or
exporting countries.”14 The growth of illicit economies, in particular that
embedded in transitoanl criminal organizaitons, and entrenched in local, national,
and regional political economies, is impacting states in multiple ways.
As Williams notes, the corrosive influence of transnational criminal
organizations can lead to the capture or criminalization of the state.15 According
to Williams, state capture occurs when “at least some criminal organizations
cloak their power in the mantle of state authority… (and) states continue to carry

14

Richard Friman and Peter Andreas, "Introduction: International Relations and the Illicit Global
Economy," in The Illicit Global Economy and State Power, ed. Richard Friman and Peter Andreas
(Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield, 1999).
15
Phil Williams, "Crime, Illicit Markets, and Money Laundering," in Managing Global Issues, ed.
P.J. Simmons and C. de Jnnge Oudrat (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 2003).
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out some traditional functions while simultaneously allowing criminal enterprise to
continue unhindered.”16 Criminalization occurs when “government personnel are
deeply involved in commission and orchestration of transnational crime…
criminal activities are endorsed or organized by officials … (within a) seamless
web between the state and entrepreneurs in both licit and illicit economies.” 17
Shelley argues the links between transnational crime and terrorism occur
to the greatest extent in areas with high levels of corruption. 18 Corruption is one
of the most effective and pernicious weapons of organized crime. Organized
crime, non-state armed actors, and to some extent armed groups affiliated with
the state, benefit when the state is weakened by corruption.

19

Government

complicity in organized crime undermines the confidence of local populations in
their government.

For example, as a result of government complicity in

transntiaonl crime, in Kenya less than 10% of people expressed any trust in
parliament, the police, or the judiciary.20 Rule of law is undermined through
corruption of law enforcement and the judiciary.

Government officials, when

implicated in transntiaonl crime, are rarely prosecuted, further undermining
government legitimacy.21
Illicit economies impact state revenues in at least two ways. First, transnational
crime robs governments of the funds required to perform primary functions

16

Ibid., 139.
Ibid.
18
Louise Shelley, "Unraveling the New Criminal Nexus," Georgetown Journal of International
Affairs 6, no. 1 (2005).
19
Williams, "Crime, Illicit Markets, and Money Laundering."
20
Peter Gastrow, Termites at Work: Transnational Organized Crime and State Erosion in Kenya,
(New York: International Peace Institute, 2011).
21
Marc Shaw and Tuesday Reitano, "The Evolution of Organized Crime in Africa: Towards a
New Response," Institute for Security Studies 244 (2013).
17

10
related to fighting corruption, guarding borders, and developing the economy,
among other things.

The second affect of revenue loss relates to the distorting

affect of the large amount of illicit dollars floating economies. Criminal groups
inject resources into communities, undermining efforts at local government
capacity building and legitimacy creation.

22

Lesage points out that African

citizens, beset by insecurity and criminality on a day-today basis exhibit what he
terms a “retreat from the state.”

Individuals seek security and welfare from

“nonstatatory arrangements” instead of looking to the state for welfare and the
provision of security.

This contributes to the undermining of the connection

between states and societies- individuals look elsewhere for economic and
physical security.23 Illicit econimiers and traffics provide a source of employment
and represent a large part of developing economies’ income and can sometimes
be the most accessible means to accumulation for impoverished communities. 24
Profits can benefit local communities, which suffer from poverty, unemployment,
and a general lack of opportunity. Allowed to flourish, illicit markets can develop
local institutions and control the narrative around their enterprises to embed in
communities. They can exploit grievances against government policies and
resentment towards lack of development and lack of opportunity.25
Non-state armed groups challenge a state’s ability to control its borders by
corrupting officials and institutions to work around border control measures.

26

The ability of states to monopolize the use of coercive force is increasingly under
22

Ibid., 244.
Le Sage, "Non-State Security Threats in Africa: Challenges for Us Engagement."
24
Williams, "Crime, Illicit Markets, and Money Laundering."
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid.
23
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question as organized crime actors and armed groups impose their will on
communities in areas with weak state institutions.
militias, vigilantes, terrorists, and insurgents.

Non-state actors include

These groups may work in

conjunction with the state or with local communities to provide security, or can be
groups operating outside of state control. Either way, the proliferation of such
groups suggests a loss of the state monopoly on coercion.27 Increasingly, states
cannot protect their citizens or their territory from transnational threats of either a
criminal, terrorist, or other non-state armed group.28 Local and transnational nonstate actors have been successful in wresting control away from the state,
presenting a new challenge to local, national, and international security. These
threats exist above and below the state, and cross boundaries locally and
transcontinentally. 29
The next chapter reviews the literature on explanations for poaching to
identify areas of further investigation, and to explain why a focus on any one
variable alone cannot explain the complex interactions which are required to
facilitate the commercial exploitation of protected species across levels of
analysis.

The following chapter discusses the study’s research design,

describing the social ecological systems framework it adopts as a model; six
hypotheses; and relevant measurement tools. Chapter 4 examines how human
action is shaping the African elephant ecosystem through over-harvesting of
27

Diane Davis, "Non-State Armed Actors, New Imagined Communites, and Shifting Patterns of
Sovereignty and Insecurity in the Modern Worl," Contemporary Security Policy 30, no. 2 (2009).
28
Louise Shelley, "Transnational Organized Crime: The New Authoritarianism," in The Global
Economy and State Power, ed. Richard Friman and Peter Andreas (Lanham: Rowman and
Littlefield, 1999).
29
Davis, "Non-State Armed Actors, New Imagined Communites, and Shifting Patterns of
Sovereignty and Insecurity in the Modern Worl."
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finite resources at the international level and range state level, nested
immediately below. Chapters 5 and 6 provide case studies for two countries,
Kenya and Tanzania that have struggled to protect elephants from transnational
organized crime. Chapter 7 examines Botswana, a country that so far has
successfully protected elephants from over-harvesting. The final chapter
illustrates how the social-ecological systems framework explained outcomes in
the international resource system and the three case studies, Kenya, Tanzania,
and Botswana; review’s the study’s principle findings; and identifies areas for
further research.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

This literature review examines common explanations for poaching to
identify areas of further investigation, and to explain why a focus on any one
variable alone cannot explain the complex interactions which are required to
facilitate the commercial exploitation of protected species across levels of
analysis. At the individual level relative wealth, whether presented as poverty at
the production end or as extreme wealth at the consumption end, focuses on
aggregated individual choices as key factors. The role of conservation norms,
expressed through active decisions on resource use by locals living near wildlife
areas, provide insights on how both background conditions and normative shifts
impact wildlife usage choices.

At the state level of analysis failures in

governance of wildlife resources- including ineffective wildlife law enforcement,
corruption, and unclear authority structures- contribute to explanations for
overexploitation of resources. Explanations which focus on the international level
examine the failure of international regimes to adequately police the trade in
African elephant ivory both from pro- and anti- sales perspectives. Other
explanations at this level consider how liberalization impacts wildlife resources,
again considering both positive and negative implications for sustainability.
Neoliberal models of development promote commodification, market competition,
and diversification and competitive marketing, ignoring externalities that
undermine the resilience of social-ecological systems.

14
All of these factors contribute to the challenges associated with protecting
wildlife resources, and understanding each factor separately provides important
insights. However the majority of analysis on poaching tends to favor one simple
set of variables- such as the rise in demand, or weak conservation normsignoring the interaction of sets of variables across levels and scales in favor of
mono-causal, reductive, and uncomplicated variables. The preference for simple
diagnostics lead to simple solutions, ignoring key variables and temporal and
spatial differences in resources and utilization practices, limiting the opportunity
for policy success for what are generally deeply complex issues.1
The literature review highlights three important findings.

First, scale

dynamics across individual, community, national, and international levels of
analysis impact resource management decisions. Wildlife resource systems are
closely linked into the global political economy. Second, ignoring scale dynamics
impedes the ability of policymakers to assess and diagnose challenges to
resource systems at all levels. For example, an explanation reliant only on the
rise in demand for wildlife products ignores the role of weak conservation norms,
or the politics of land management and its impacts on communities’ perceptions
of wildlife. Moreover, it is important to understand how the interactions between
levels and scales, and the resource users and governance systems embedded in
them, operate together to determine certain outcomes. Third, there is not one
single set of solutions or single correct articulation of a system’s challenges,
1

Elinor Ostrom, "A Diagnostic Approach for Going Beyond Panaceas," Proceedings of the
Naitonal Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 104, no. 39 (2007). Diana
Liverman, "Who Governs, at What Scale and at What Price? Geography, Environmental
Governance, and the Commodification of Nature," Annals of the Association of American
Geographers 94, no. 4 (2004).
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which can be applied at every scale or level.2 Systems evolve through
interactions between and among actors and institutions “and resources
constrained and shaped by a given social-ecological setting.”3 They are
heterogeneous by nature, and are unlikely to respond uniformly to the application
of generic policies.

Successful policy solutions in North America may lack

relevance in Sub-Saharan Africa.
The literature review does not seek to refute any of the identified factors,
but rather to highlight the necessity of a more inclusive analysis, which accounts
for a multitude of factors across levels and scales. The key questions to consider
at each juncture include what other conditions exist which create an opening for
resource users and governance systems to operate as a force to either conserve,
or exploit, species?

Individual Level Factors
Poaching and Relative Wealth

One set of explanations for the rise in poaching looks at the relative wealth
of poachers and consumers to explain both decisions to poach and decisions to
purchase wildlife products.

In origin countries poverty is assumed to be

associated with high levels of poaching, though the actual connection between
2
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poverty and poaching is unclear. The CITES’ monitoring program, Monitoring the
Illegal Killing of Elephants [MIKE], finds poverty correlates with high levels of
poaching, though demand plays a larger role.4
The people often blamed for poaching, those living near wild animals or
those working with them, typically live in marginal landscapes and enjoy few
opportunities for economic success or enrichment. 5 For individuals with short
time horizons, incentive calculations may likely favor immediate use of a
resource.6 Even where powerful norms exist for preservation, such as in Baka
Pygmy communities, people will often make decisions with the current generation
in mind, even when resources cannot be sustained or managed by such decision
making.7
However analysis conducted by TRAFFIC found that improving the
livelihood of harvester communities often failed to reduce their participation in
illicit wildlife trades.8 Similarly the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Develop finds poverty is not a cause of the illegal trade in wildlife.9 In some
communities large percentages of the population, the impoverished and the
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slightly better off, utilize wildlife products to generate income, suggesting the
interaction between poverty and poaching is more complex than a simple
equation of poverty as a cause of poaching.10
Moreover, the trope of the impoverished poacher merely feeding his family
clouds the relationship between organized crime and poaching, and implies a
simplicity related to the decision to poach. Whether fully recognized or not,
poachers are tied to networks of transnational organized criminals. Poachers
may come from security forces, park staff and guards, the conservation
community, professionals, politicians, militia groups, insurgents, terrorists, and
poor farmers and herders. Interestingly in Africa elephant carcasses are typically
discovered with only the tusks taken, indicating that food and other subsistence
requirements are not being satisfied through elephant hunting. The organized
nature of hunts, the massive scale of kill sites, and the failure of poachers to take
the meat of elephants or even all of an elephant’s marketable body parts, further
points to other factors aside from poverty as playing a role.11 While poverty does
not necessarily compel individuals to poach conditions exist in poor areas- lack of
economic opportunity, weak law enforcement, the penetration of transnational
criminal networks, easy access to weaponry, and lack of environmental
education or awareness of laws protecting wildlife, which contribute to poaching.
The type of poaching- commercial or subsistence- must be differentiated
from the outset to determine the appropriate governance reaction. Poverty and
want clearly play a role in the later, but the latter is far rarer when referring to

10
11

Van Song, "Wildlife Trading in Vietnam- Situation, Causes, and Solutions."
IFAW.

18
large species such as elephants.

This is an important distinction because

policies aimed at deterring one type of poaching lack relevance or effectiveness
for deterring the other type of poaching.12

Increased Demand

The rising wealth, and accompanying increase in demand, in ivory
consuming countries, in particular China, Thailand, and Vietnam, is cited as a
direct driver of poaching across media and non-governmental organization
(NGO) reporting. Increases in elephant poaching correspond with sharp
increases in Chinese consumer spending dating to 2006 when savings rates
stalled and Chinese consumption rose sharply.13 Prices of ivory have
skyrocketed in China over the past five years, even as consumption has
increased, tripling from 750$ a pound for ivory in 2009 to over 2100$ a pound in
June 2014.
Historically Asians have considered wildlife as something to be used for
medicine, food, clothing, or as decoration. Asians covet ivory in particular for its
association with wealth, elevated social status, purity, beauty, and tradition. 14
Wild products serve as status symbols through their demonstration of wealth and
expense. Individuals perceive substitutes as not as valuable or as desirable. 15 In
12
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some cases the rarity of a wild product drives its consumption, even to the point
that the impact on the environment itself drives consumption, instead of inhibiting
it.16 For example blood ivory, the ivory taken from elephants in the process of
dying, is considered the most rare and valuable to Chinese collectors.
Consumers also respond to marketing of new uses or methods of display for wild
products, further increasing and driving demand.17
In China the rise in demand in the mid-2000s relates to the designation of
ivory carving by the government as an important intangible heritage. This
designation revived what was an almost dead industry, renewing interest in the
craft from middle class Chinese as well as collectors and investors. 18 Very high
end investors began purchasing ivory at ‘grey’ auctions, stockpiling raw ivory
against rise in prices, as middle class Chinese began purchasing smaller ivory
keepsakes and jewelry.19
Arguments for extending or expanding the trade in ivory often rely on the
assumption that demand is immutable. However, mounting evidence suggests
that Chinese consumers are responsive to education campaigns and changes in
government policy. Surveys by TRAFFIC, WildAid, and IFAW found that when
Chinese consumers become educated on the impacts of ivory consumption they
were less likely to purchase ivory products. A growing number of Chinese
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support a renewal of the trade ban.20 In 2011 the Chinese government banned
large auctions, with an immediate impact on sales of ivory. That year saw a
slight drop in the number of large seizures reported which CITES and others
attribute to the Chinese government’s actions.21
Demand operates at multiple levels, involves a variety of volumes, across
various groups, and is motivated by different factors. Government regulations,
state rhetoric, availability, price, rarity, and understanding of the impacts on
wildlife affect decisions to purchase. Important questions about consumers and
how they make choices should be investigated to guide demand mitigations
strategies.

Community Level Explanations
Conservation Norms

Other explanations for why African states cannot protect wildlife rely on
the assumption that Africans lack conservation norms.22 Under this perspective
local Africans “hate” wildlife and consider animals dangerous competitors for
scarce resources. As such they view wildlife through the lens of human-wildlife
conflict, do not see parks as relevant to their daily lives, and view conservation
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efforts more broadly as relating to colonial, i.e. white, heritage. In the border
zones between parks and settlements human-wildlife conflict is intense, placing
communities in direct competition with wildlife for scarce resources.23 These
competitions can result in crop destruction, damage to farm infrastructure, and
serious injury or death for people. Elephants in particular can be incredibly
destructive, they eat a large amount of vegetation each day, cover a wide range
of territory, raid crops and sometimes kill people.24
This perspective recognizes the unpopularity of conservation areas and
programs in Africa, which follow a long history of exclusion, dislocation, and
political domination.25 The gazetted wildlife parks where most elephants live do
not seem to benefit or serve most Africans, catering largely to Western tastes
and desires to see ‘wild’ animals in Africa.26 Africans who live among elephants
have to endure all the costs associated with their existence and yield none of the
benefits.27
Following these assumptions is the notion that only economic incentives
can drive conservation norm development. Such incentives include hunting
licenses and the sale of ivory and other elephant products resulting from natural
mortality. Essentially, when communities reap the benefits of ivory sales they will
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preserve habitats and be more willing to endure human-elephant conflict.28 The
argument asserts utilization is the best path to conservation and preservation. 29
A related argument asserts that by removing ivory as a revenue generator states
are less able to afford expensive conservation and protection of wildlife. 30 From
this perspective CITES essentially constrains the ability of states to control their
resources.31
African attitudes towards wildlife and conservation have clearly been
influenced by their experiences and interactions with colonialism, race, and
central government bureaucracies and are caught up in contests over political
power.32 Those living in wildlife areas have often lost political and symbolic power
through the process of park construction through expropriation. 33 Under such
conditions parks and wild areas can become sites of resistance to governance
policy, with poaching as an act of defiance.34 Poaching protected and symbolic
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species such as elephants sends a powerful message to decision-makers and
elites directly challenging the coercive power of the state.35
However many Africans deeply value wildlife, elephants in particular, as a
key component of their social, physical, and emotional landscape. Even
individuals living in communities heavily impacted by human elephant conflict
express varied perspectives including “anger, fear, awe, respect, and admiration”
for wild elephants.36 Some clans identify with elephants closely, referring to them
as mythical brothers and sisters.37 In Namibia, for example, elephants are
revered almost as a “first people,” having occupied the land before people
arrived, and thus deserving of respect.38 Elephants are also understood as a
symbol of the economic value of wildlife tourism. In fact Africans are beginning
to view the problem of poaching as a government failure to stem corruption and
as a waste of a valuable resource and as a crime against their national
patrimonies.39 African newspapers, journalists, and activists have become active
in calling out political leaders for their lack of commitment and ineffectiveness in
curbing poaching, viewing the problem as a threat to national security and to the
economy.
35
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Debates over land and resource use, including wildlife, relate to varying
social, cultural political, and economic understandings of legitimate and nonlegitimate uses of wildlife, the role of the state, and the “the power of scientific
and other understandings of nature.”40 At all levels the control of resources,
including wildlife, relates to the control of political power. 41
The way Africans’ attitudes towards wildlife are described may better
reflect the agenda of conservation authorities who shape locals as either wildlife
villains or heroes to fit particular narratives.

By flattening the complexity of

feelings expressed about wildlife, authorities can remove African voices from the
conversation and, importantly, from the decision making process.

Shaping

African norms as not valuing wildlife allow for conservation interests to ignore
local input and disregard the negative impacts that conservation sometimes
metes out on the people closest to natural areas.42 It should also be noted that
attitudes are not immutable but can shift in short periods of time when underlying
human/wildlife conflicts find resolution or other changes in governance systems
occur.
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State Level Explanations
Weak Governance

Other scholars focus on state level factors related to weak governance as
primary factors associated with states’ inability to protect wildlife.43 Weak
governance refers to a lack of capacity within law enforcement, the judiciary, park
security and corruption.
In most elephant range states laws protecting animals are weak, unenforced, or non-existent. Poaching is not always identified as a crime, and
trafficking is considered a low level offence.

In most cases individuals not

actually caught in the act of poaching or in possession of banned products are
typically released because law enforcement lacks the training to charge criminals
on other offences such as weapons charges or trespassing. When levied, fines
for poaching are typically very low, and jail times is minimal, providing little
disincentive to poachers and traffickers who consider these among the costs of
doing business.44 Charges rarely reflect the seriousness of crimes. 45
Weak judicial capacity impacts the ability of courts to sentence even
repeat offenders to significant time in jail. In Kenya a study of wildlife criminals
revealed only 8 out of 224 persons found guilty of crimes served time in jail. The
rest, found guilty, paid small fines and were released.
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airports face small fines before being let go. 46 Police rarely investigate even
when they uncover large shipments of ivory, allowing perpetrators at the highest
levels to continue their activities. Cross-border or international investigations
occur infrequently, and even more rarely result in criminal convictions.
Government officials, when implicated, are seldom prosecuted, further
undermining government legitimacy.47
Corruption amongst state officials creates the conditions necessary for
organized criminals to exploit wildlife.48 First, corruption undermines the creation
and application of laws designed to protect wildlife, eroding the capacity of law
enforcement and the judiciary.49 Traffickers- who may even be members of the
political class- provide funds to politicians to influence the drafting of laws and
regulations.50 Second, politicians are known to utilize wildlife as a sort of payment
within patronage networks.51

High-level government officials, even at times

those charged with protecting wildlife, sponsor hunts and traffic wildlife,
undermining cohesive efforts to monitor and interdict the illegal wildlife trade.
Corruption trickles down to lower levels. Police in some areas are complicit, as
are rangers, soldiers, and other government employees.52 Third, when
apprehended, poachers and traffickers bribe law enforcement and the judiciary to
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avoid prosecution, heavy sentencing, or large fines.

Poaching and other

extractive and exploitive practices, when orchestrated from powerful arms of the
state, can be difficult to eliminate, in particular from a weaker arm of
government.53
Most African states lack the capacity to properly protect their parks and
other wild areas, lowering the risks associated with poaching and trafficking, due
to the high costs, low levels of funding, and lack of political will. Across Africa
rangers lack equipment, weapons, manpower, and investigative skills and tools,
impacting the effectiveness of enforcement measures.54 Small ranger forces are
expected to provide protection for large and remote areas, often lacking basic
necessities to conduct patrols. Rangers may receive little or no training, leaving
them ill equipped to battle organized poaching gangs often comprised of
terrorists, insurgents, and non-state armed militias. Poachers, on the other hand,
typically have access to resources not available to rangers including satellite
phones, GPS, motorcycles and other vehicles, high caliber weapon, night vision
goggles, silencers, and funds.55
Blaming African range states for not being able to control poaching without
acknowledging the strength and organizational capacity of transnational criminal
syndicates; the developing but still nascent conservation norms; the pressure
from the international community to liberalize and privatize economies and
53
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increase foreign trade; and the massive increase in demand for ivory in Asia
shifts all of the burden for regulating the trade onto states.

Elephant range

states, most of which suffer from high levels of poverty and lack capacity in key
sectors are generally the least able to withstand the pressures of the global
market or to act across jurisdictional scales. More importantly, this perspective
oversimplifies the problem and reduces it to one of enforcement only, forestalling
policy measures at other levels and scales which might impact demand but fall
outside of an enforcement strategy such as demand reduction programs or
wildlife education initiatives.

Wildlife and Land Management

Similarly, the role of the management and coordination of wildlife
resources and land management in elephant range states are often cited as
important factors in states’ (in)ability to protect ecological systems.
Dozens of organizations and governance systems, both state and nonstate, can be active in one geographical or issue area in a country, but their
philosophies,

relations

with

local

communities,

projects,

capacity

and

commitments may vary, or can conflict, leading to confusion and a waste of
resources.56 With a multitude of interests and actors at work at each level of
governance determining what agency is responsible for protecting resources is
difficult.57 Under such “polycentric governance” power emanates from multiple
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sources, not simply the state, obfuscating lines of authority and responsibility. 58
Lack of clear chains of authority, and a multiplication of authority, surrounding
wildlife resources creates gaps in enforcement and mismatches between local
needs and international norms.
Moreover, wildlife management in Africa is typically centralized, top-down,
and lacking in local input. Governments establish rules and regulations for wildlife
management without clearly understanding local variations in wildlife populations
or use patterns and often without regard for local input, setting the scene for
intense competition for control of resources.59 States rely heavily on the advice
of science at the expense of input from local communities, which can lead to
unintended, and negative, consequences in regards to resource management. 60
Aggregating data at the national level, and then applying that data in the form of
policies in local communities, can miss isolated problems associated with
human/wildlife conflict, place undue burdens on other resources shared between
wildlife and people such as water and timber, and fail to address local economic
concerns related to the opportunity costs of wildlife management. Solution sets
may not match with problem sets at all scales of the ecological and social
system.
For example in Gabon the President, Ali Bongo, set aside 10% of the
country for national parks, without consulting indigenous communities living in or
near parks. In the past decade Gabon has lost over 60% of its forest elephants
58
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to poaching, in part facilitated by local Baka Pygmy trackers who lead hunters to
elephant populations, and act as porters to carry out large volumes of ivory. 61 On
the other hand, local communities often lack the resources necessary to manage
resources, leaving them vulnerable to over-exploitation either by the community
or non-community users. Successful local controls generally exhibit certain
attributes including a low cost monitoring system; moderate rates of change in
use of the resource; dense social networks must exist within communities to
lower transaction costs; outsiders can be excluded; and users must support the
monitoring and enforcement rules.62 In an era of globalization, mass migration,
and networked transnational crime, it may be unrealistic to expect local
institutions to be able to adequately address the challenges of managing a
globally important resource from an organizational standpoint, in particular when
macro and microeconomic factors impact their choices to exploit resources in
order to survive.63
The

increased

roles

of

intergovernmental

organizations,

non-

governmental organizations, and private conservation organizations in making
and enforcing wildlife policy in many African states further complicate questions
of authority and control of wildlife resources and land use policies.64 IGOs, NGOs
and private conservation enterprises may or may not coordinate adequately with
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all stakeholders, across communities, or at various levels.65 These organizations
wield tremendous power to act as an interface between state departments,
international donors, local stakeholders, wildlife professionals, and media
interests to impose their vision of what “nature” should look like, and how it
should be accessed by people. A few large NGOs dominate the field of
conservation, projecting their largely western based ideals of wilderness
landscapes on non-western societies.66
Together these organizations control billions of conservation dollars
worldwide, enabling them to craft and promote specific conservation narratives
that correspond to their own agendas, crafted in board rooms thousands of miles
away, with little or no input from local communities.67 NGOs often treat wildlife
and resources as though they exist in a vacuum at the expense of social,
economic, and land rights issues, promoting initiatives not locally relevant in an
African context. Practitioners in NGO field offices have a propensity to institute
policies they personally advocate, without regard for local concerns or higher
level policy.68 NGOs may tie aid to the adoption of certain policies, placing
pressure on communities to adopt policies that they did not have a hand in
crafting.69 This can exacerbate conflicts between communities and the central
government, and between communities and wildlife.70
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Understanding the complexity of the governance systems involved in
social ecological systems, how they interact across levels and scales, and how
they react to exogenous factors such as transnational crime, CITES decisions to
allow sales, and the development of infrastructure into previously unopened
territory impact the ability of systems to adapt to pattern changes. A perspective
focused primarily on management practices assumes that a problem as complex
as transnational criminal poaching has a single, rational, scientific solution by
which one management system, applied across the board, can address poaching
when in reality the problems arise from different conditions at different locations
and may be impacted by a variety of normative, political, management, and
economic pressures.

Transnational Explanations
CITES Trade Ban

Economic arguments both for and against the international trade in ivory
focus on the failures of CITES’ regulatory schemes to manage ivory as a primary
cause of the rise in poaching over the last decade. CITES is an international
agreement between governments adopted in 1973 in order to regulate the trade
in wild animals and plants, and to ensure that legal trade does not threaten the
survival of species. CITES divides species into three sections, or Appendices,
depending on their need for protection. Appendix I species are those which
cannot be legally traded internationally because they are threatened by
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extinction. Species on Appendix II and III are considered not necessarily
threatened with extinction but international trade must be regulated to ensure
their continued survival.71
In 1989 CITES banned the international trade in elephant products and
moved African elephants to Appendix I. In the 1990s and 2000s several countries
with large elephant herds have petitioned CITES to ‘down list’ their populations
from Appendix I to Appendix II to begin trading ivory and other elephant parts. In
1997 Botswana, Namibia, and Zimbabwe were successful and their elephants
were moved to Appendix II, allowing limited monitored trade to occur in the form
of monitored auctions. CITES sanctioned two ‘one-off sales’ of ivory, auctioned to
a limited number of approved states.72 Despite the massive increase in elephant
poaching after 2009 CITES has not recognized the sales as a factor.
Those in favor of ending the ban and allowing the regulated sale of legal
ivory argue that CITES current policies of limited “one-off sales” and the sales
ban negatively impact wild elephant populations by restricting legal supplies of
ivory while demand remains unchanged. Pro-sales advocates argue demand
reduction is not possible in a timely fashion, leading to poaching in the absence
of a steady legal supply of ivory.73 By restricting supply the ban increases the
value to a level attractive to transnational criminal organizations.74 According to
this perspective the only way to save elephants is to legalize sales and flood the
market with legal stockpiled ivory. This would stabilize the market, lower prices,
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squeeze out illegal sellers, and slow poaching rates.75 Pro-traders argue that
with adequate controls and increased enforcement, sales of ivory could generate
funds for investment back into communities and conservation programs where it
could be used to preserve elephant habitats and relieve pressure on human
communities forced to co-exist with wild animals. For pro-traders the ban is not
only failing, it is actually making the problem of poaching worse by removing
important sources of revenue from communities, disincentivzing conservation by
restricting the use of elephant products, and creating space and economic value
for criminal poaching syndicates to enter the market. 76
At the same time pro-ban advocates argue the CITES ivory sales are to
blame for the rise in demand and subsequent rise in prices for ivory. They argue
the ivory auctions created an incentive for organized crime to exploit the high
prices of ivory, seriously impacting poaching levels.77 They assert a legal market
cannot be regulated in the current environment of weak law enforcement,
corruption, uneven laws and penalties across range states, and the entrenched
nature of TOC.78 The stocks of “legal” ivory in existence cannot meet the high
demand and massive market for ivory and would not effectively shut out an illegal
market, meaning poachers would continue to profit from illegal ivory. 79 State
authorities cannot easily or cheaply determine where ivory originated, making
75
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determinations of legality impossible while increasing opportunities for criminals
to launder illegal ivory.80
Pro-ban advocates dispute the notion that a stable market in ivory would
emerge with the advent of a legal trade, noting the market for ivory exploded
after the CITES auctions.81 Moreover, the sales did not have the intended effect
of depressing process.82 Prices for raw ivory tripled since 2009.83 The pro-ban
advocates further argue the creation of a legal market through the CITES sale
sends mixed messages to consumers that elephant populations have recovered
and are no longer under threat, increasing consumers’ willingness and desire to
purchase ivory.84 When uncompromised the ban created a moral deterrent for
those wishing to purchase ivory and helped to inhibit the ability to launder illegal
ivory internationally.85 Lastly, those in favour of keeping trade bans in place note
the ban worked slowing the rate of poaching and reducing demand for elephant
products during the period before the ‘one-off’ sales were allowed.86 They argue
closure of legal markets would slow demand for illegal ivory and is the only way
to unequivocally protect elephants.87
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While the decision by CITES to allow the “one-off” ivory actions clearly
impacted the incentive of transnational criminal organizations to take advantage
of exponentially increasing demand, arguments that look at the decisions of
CITES as the primary driver for poaching increases fail to take into account the
variation in implementation of the regime across states; state level political
decision-making processes and political competition surrounding wildlife policies;
corruption; the impact of globalization processes on illicit business; government
policies in consumption countries, the evolving norms and expectations on
development; the speed and flexibility of TOC, and other national and local level
dynamics that impact wildlife conservation. The regime can impact state polices,
reinforce norms either for sales or for a ban, and serve as an arena for debate
about conservation and regulation, but is not a stand-in for national and local
governance of resources or the primary driver of resource user behavior.

International-Level Explanations
Neo-Liberal Trade Policies

Similarly the role of neoliberalism on wildlife policies and conservation is
viewed from competing perspectives. Neoliberalism is credited on the one hand
with creating incentives to preserve wildlife and habitats, and on the other hand
with exploiting and commodifying nature.
Wildlife agendas in African states are increasingly developed within the
context of economic development, driven both by a general global trends toward
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neo-liberal conservation and by the adoption in many African states of neo-liberal
economic and trade policies at the state level.

Liberalism asserts that state

structures restrict individual freedoms and get ‘in the way’ of business. As such,
removing restrictions on trade, lessening regulatory burdens, and allowing the
‘invisible hand’ of the market to act improves peoples’ lives and increases
prosperity across the board. Neo--liberalism impacts social-ecological systems
through the promotion of

principles of privatization, commodification,

deregulation, reliance on market principles, including the laws of supply and
demand, which are based on normative assumptions promoting “continuous
growth and continuous ‘progress’ towards some state of ‘development.’”88
Neoliberal assumptions stress liberal principles can solve a host of
conservation problems by infusing cash into under-resourced conservation
programs, increasing democracy and participation through deregulation, helping
inculcate norms of conservation, protecting and enshrining property rights,
promoting development through eco-tourism, and promoting green business and
environmental consciousness.89 The basic argument follows that when wildlife
pays for itself communities will conserve and protect it to ensure future profits.
By privatizing some aspects of utilization, whether through harvesting animals or
through photo-tourism, wildlife is expected to gain relevancy.
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schemes now almost always include some plan for community development
including the provision of education and heath cares services and employment in
the tourism or services sector.
While community development programs have become recognized as
intrinsic to preservation and conservation, all of the implications of the adoption
of neo-liberal principles within the realm of sustainability are not fully understood.
It is unclear if tying wildlife preservation to economic development creates wildlife
conservation norms. Studies indicate that while people may value the economic
benefits of wildlife, their attitude towards the intrinsic value of wildlife may not
change.90 Scholars raise several concerns related to the impacts marketization,
commoditization, and commercialization have on the long-term resilience of
ecosystems. McAffee argues that neoliberalism encourages viewing nature as a
warehouse or store of products waiting to be commoditized and commercialized,
creating conditions under which “value” is based on exchange earnings at the
expense of intrinsic value.91 The marketability of a species becomes one of the
most important factors in its survivability.92 Consumers subsequently emerge as
key players in the success, or failure, of environmental policies.93
Others note market mechanisms are not well understood in the wildlife
trade, in particular where supply is severely restricted and demand is high. As
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noted above, some species are in greater demand when their rarity and price
increase, driving over-exploitation.94 Some consumers do not want a product
substituted from a legal market.

Additionally, parallel markets could spur

demand from consumers not interested in an illegal market, thus expanding the
market and increasing competition for wildlife products. Another concern relates
to questions about how firms in the wildlife trade act, and what incentives or
disincentives they respond to. Many firms engaged in the wildlife trade are
classified as multiproduct firms that enjoy economies of scale and are able to
absorb profit losses and price wars, meaning they may stay in a trade even if the
price of a product drops.95
The emphasis on market expansion and demand creation under neoliberalism raises other key concerns. Liberalism assumes competition, which
then requires diversification and competitive marketing, which leads to further
commodification to increase demand. Sales ultimately create demand and drive
more sales, placing unsustainable pressure on wildlife populations. Expanding
commodification pushes accumulative tendencies.96
Further, neo-liberalism’s constant drive for expansion and development in
the broader economy push states to open up previously isolated areas for
development, rather than incentivizing conservation. Not only does this decrease
the areas developed to conservation, but it places parks and other protected
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areas in peril by increasing accessibility. By developing infrastructure in remote
areas states facilitate the exploitation of wildlife and forests, literally building the
roads necessary to commercially exploit and extract resources.97 Under
liberalization developing states, and the local communities within them,
increasingly must choose between preservation and development.
Those wary of the role of neoliberalism in conservation further note the
privatization of national parks and wildlife resources in Africa.

Increasingly

African governments call on private entities to run parks, creating what some see
as a new type of dispossession as organizations run parks and other “national”
monuments as businesses.98 Nature becomes another vehicle for ‘sponsorship’
of corporate conservation organization and businesses.99 And as noted above,
local communities may be left out of important decision-making processes as a
result.
Further negative implications flow from neo-liberalism’s impact on
government policies and the allocation of scarce resources in poor countries,
impacting states’ abilities to react to increased illicit wildlife trafficking.
Liberalization has pushed states away from welfare policies through structural
adjustment programs that emphasize the free market, balanced budgets, and
privatization. States contract the delivery of social services and welfare services
to NGOs. Under pressure to compete in the global market place states starve
97
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themselves of taxes, tariffs, and other revenues in order to attract business and
goods. The Global North has far more leeway to assume costs associated with
globalization and competition than the South.100 Neo-liberal policies which
emphasize a reduction of the role of the state in economic development,
liberalization of markets, open trade, fewer protections for agricultural products,
typically the main source of income in developing states, leaves rural peoples
dependent on agriculture and pastoral livelihoods few protections from the
market. With less valuable products to sell they may intensify their use of wild
plants and animals to supplement, or replace, incomes formerly generated
through the state.101
The adoption of neoliberalism also impacts the movement of peoples and
goods. The exponential growth of Asian, in particular Chinese, communities on
the continent has been directly tied to increases in poaching. 102 With less
restrictions on migration more and more Chinese nationals are flooding into
Africa, connecting the primary end-user market directly with wildlife resources. As
Williams notes, Chinese traders are often involved in a range of commercial
activities, which can provide a cover for illicit trades.103 These groups can be
difficult to penetrate based on language and cultural barriers, and are reinforced
by kinship and ethnic ties, which insulate them and provide a defense against the
surrounding communities. According to Gastrow, Chinese nationals were behind
100
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all of the smuggling rings uncovered in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi,
Tanzania, and Kenya in recent years.104
Regardless of its merits, liberalism is now embedded in the conservation
landscape.

Liberalism impacts the development of both conservation and

consumption norms; creates expectations for development and advancement;
impacts which animals and ecosystems are viewed as valuable and are thus
preserved; and how that value should be expressed. How its impacts are
mitigated, or not, depends on several factors including pre-existing norms for
conservation, the history of resource use in a community, the existence of other
non-wildlife based income generators, land-use policies and their fitness and
sustainability; and availability for development of virgin territories and resources,
among others.

Conclusion

Managing local wildlife resources in a global context involves negotiating
social, cultural, and regulatory regimes at every level and scale. Three important
findings emerge from the literature review.

First, decisions on resource

management lie at multiple levels and scales, involving individual, community,
national and international decision makers. Wildlife resource systems are tied
into the global political economy. Second, it is not possible to diagnose problems
across cases without examining factors at all levels and scales. An explanation
reliant only on the rise in demand ignores the role of weak conservation norms,
104
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or the politics of land management and its impacts on communities’ perceptions
of wildlife, for example.

Further, such a reductive perspective ignores a key

dynamic- how the interactions between levels and scales, and the resource users
and governance systems embedded in them, operate together to determine
certain outcomes. Creating an understanding of interactions allows for an
evaluation of points of vulnerability to help explain why resource usage changes
in an area.

Third, there is not one single set of solutions or single correct

articulation of a system’s challenges, which applies at every scale or level. 105
Systems evolve through interactions between and among actors and institutions
“and resources constrained and shaped by a given social-ecological setting.”106
They are heterogeneous by nature, and are unlikely to respond uniformly to the
application of generic policies.
In order to accommodate the multitude of variables identified above, and
to incorporate multiple levels of analysis, this paper will adopt Ostrom’s socialecological systems framework. 107 An approach that recognizes the multi-scalar
and multi-level nature of resource management issues is key to avoid
inappropriate or poorly tailored resource management strategies.108
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH DESIGN

Social-Ecological Systems

Increasingly ecologists and social scientists recognize what the literature
review above clearly illustrates- no ecosystem exists outside of human influence
and interference. Humans are an integral part of all ecological systems, even
remote areas with little human settlement or human wildlife interactions. 1 Human
and ecological realms are intimately interconnected and “co-evolving across
spatial and temporal scales” within social-ecological systems (SESs).2 SESs are
not human systems embedded in ecological systems, or ecological systems
embedded in human systems, but are distinct systems which involve
interrelationships and reciprocal impacts for both human and ecological
systems.3 Natural resource management by its nature involves human claims on
resources blurring the delineations between social and ecological systems. 4 An
SES is a “coherent system of biophysical and social factors that regularly interact
in a…sustained manner” that includes social and ecological subsystems in
1
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mutual interaction.5 SESs involve resource systems, resource units, resource
users, governance systems, their interactions and the resulting outcomes.6
Elephants exist in complex SESs comprised of political, economic,
geographic, and normative features shifting over time and across space.
Everywhere they roam elephants are subject to human actions, and human
decision making, by licit and illicit actors including illegal killing, sanctioned hunts
and culling operations, human encroachment on habitats, fence building, road
construction, and monitoring efforts. Human societies living near elephant
communities are in turn impacted by the invasion of transnational criminal
elements, the commodification of resources, expectations related to the
imposition of international conservation norms, economic losses or gains tied to
wildlife management decisions, contests with animals over scarce land and water
resources, and competing political goals of development and conservation.
As a resource with global relevance, elephants can be conceptualized as
a global common pool resources (CPR) existing in a global SES. CPRs are
“natural or human-made facilities (or stocks) that generate flows of usable
resource units over time.”7 Two characteristics further define CPRs, which relate
to elephant SESs. First, creating institutions that can exclude potential users is
difficult and expensive. The lack of property rights means all users will likely
overexploit because there is no incentive to conserve. Second, the resources
5
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harvested by one user are no longer available to other users. 8 Resource users
must agree to limits on their use.
As a global CPR, African elephants are managed at local, national, and
international levels through tiered and essentially hierarchical regulatory regimes,
connected through laws, rules, regulations, and norms, both formally and
informally. At each level, governance systems interact with social and economic
systems and react to social and economic processes.9 Actions and decisions
taken at one level clearly impact population stability across scales, and
governance and protective measures at multiple levels, setting the conditions for
sustainable, or unsustainable, utilization. As a CPR under ineffective protection
regimes, elephants are subject to overexploitation and ultimately, depletion, by
the potential billions of users within the global common pool.

Framework for Analysis

While dozens of frameworks exist to examine social-ecological systems and
their interactions, this study adopts Ostrom’s social-ecological systems
framework (SESF).10 The framework allows researchers to answer three broad
questions:11
What patterns of interactions and outcomes such as overuse, conflict,
collapse, stability, and increasing returns, are likely to result from using a
8
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particular set of rules for the governance, ownership, and use of a
resource system and specific resource units in a specific technological,
socioeconomic, and political environment?
What is the likely endogenous development of different governance
arrangements, use patterns, and outcomes with or without external
financial inducements or imposed rules?
How robust and sustainable is a particular configuration of users, resource
system, resource units, and governance system to external and internal
disturbances?
Per the SESF the social system is made up of resource users and
governance

systems.

The

ecological

system

is

considered

from

an

anthropocentric perspective as a resource system to be used by humans, such
as water, fisheries, and forests, and the resource units that make up the system,
such as quantity of water, number of trees, and numbers of fish. 12

In this

instance a resource system includes national parks and open areas, wildlife
corridors, and other elephant range habitat; resource units are African elephants;
users in the system include consumptive and non-consumptive users (poachers,
traffickers, tourists, NGOs, etc); and governance system(s) include local,
national, international regimes, non-governmental organizations and private
conservation enterprises as nested tiers.13
The SESF provides a methodology to untangle the relationships between
resources users and governance systems by identifying variables at the sub and
12
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supra levels to discover potential interactions and outcomes, which impact the
resiliency of a system.

This approach can accommodate the location of an

elephant SES at multiple levels as a local resource, state resource and a global
common pool resource.

Figure 1. A Multi-Tiered Framework for Examining Social Ecological
Systems

Source: Ostrom (2007)

Applying an SES framework, as illustrated in Figure 1, allows researchers,
and ultimately decision-makers, to understand how the characteristics of system
“jointly affect and are indirectly affected by interactions and resulting outcomes
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achieved at a particular time and place.”14 The framework further provides the
opportunity to explicate how these characteristics, or attributes, may affect and
be affected by the larger, and smaller, socioeconomic, political, ecological, and
cultural milieu in which they exist.15 An examination of the social and ecological
processes and the linkages between them can answer questions about how an
SES developed into its present state, how it operates currently, and how it might
change in the future.16 The SESF allows analysis to deal with complex problems
through integrative, interdisciplinary approach.17
Five key structural features recommend Ostrom’s SESF to examine the rise
in poaching in Africa.18 First, corresponding to the hierarchical nature of SESs,
the framework examines variables as nested or tiered. The SESF identifies first
level ‘generic’ variables that can then be unpacked to understand how lower-tier
variables affect outcomes.19 Unpacking and comparing variables allows for the
identification of variables and combinations of variables that either contribute to
the development of a sustainable system, or to resource collapse.20 The first tier
includes the four primary variables listed above: the resource system, the
resource units generated by the system, the users of the system, and the
governance system. Second and third tier variables can be abundant and are
flexible, depending on the systems to be examined, encompassing a range of
14
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factors which might illuminate important points of interactions and outcomes.
Ostrom’s original SESF identified thirty nested second tier variables for
assessment and examination, including many of the variables noted in the
literature review above.21 How far a researcher needs to delve to explain
changes in an SES depends on the specific policy or research question they are
trying to answer. The large number of variables identified and examined
contributes to a more nuanced understanding for the relevant factors that impact
an SES’s resilience, adaptability, and transformability, discussed below.
Imagined as nested, each tier of an SES embeds in both a smaller and larger
socio-economic, political, and ecological systems. This is particularly important
for the study of ivory poaching. The concepts of nested tiers of variables allows
for research to adjust focus to evaluate how factors at levels above and below
the research focus impact or explain outcomes.

Policies aimed at reducing

demand, for example, may have a greater impact on elephant survival as a
species than local programs to alleviate human-elephant conflicts, though such
programs may have a greater impact on local animals.22
Second, the SESF acknowledges the multi-scalar and cross level dynamics
that impact SESs, allowing SESs to be understood as complex systems.
Complex systems exhibit “characteristics not seen in simple systems such as
nonlinearly, uncertainty, emergence, scale, and self-organization.”23 Wildlife
SESs, existing at multiple levels, across large geographic scales, reliant on
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decision-making from multiple levels of authority, influenced by a range of
constantly changing normative and economic imperatives, and subject to
aggregated

decisions

of

disconnected

characteristics of a complex system.

resource

users,

exemplify

the

More complex and more connected

systems are more vulnerable to costly errors. Young et al points out in large and
complex systems such as global wildlife SESs when network connections are
random “an increase in the complexity of the network leads almost inevitably to
the destabilization of the system as a whole.”24 In complex systems multiple
subsystems can be observed and should be analyzed simultaneously at multiple
scales and across levels.25
Third, the SESF clearly identifies key interactions impacting systems, as
illustrated in Figure 2. These interactions involve (I1) harvesting levels of diverse
users, (I2) information sharing among users, (I2) deliberation processes, (I4)
conflict among users, (I5) investment activities, and (I6) lobbying activities.
Interactions are the “specific activities that mediate between the social and
ecological elements of the broader SES.”26 The SESF delineates outcomes as
(O1) social performance measures, (O2) ecological performance measures, and
(O3) externalities to the SES. The patterns of interactions and outcomes of
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different users, and historical patterns of interactions and outcomes, help explain
why an SES exists in a particular state.27
Fourth, through its emphasis on interactions and outcomes, the SESF
illustrates how social and ecological systems impact each other, not simply how
human decision-making impacts resources, capturing the reciprocal relationships
between human/environment systems. An analysis of interactions includes how
the depletion or other impacts of exploitation may affect communities
economically, socially, politically, and normatively.28
Lastly, the SESF treats globalization as “a phenomena whose elements
can be disaggregated and analyzed one at a time.” 29 Globalization is a
“transplanetary process or set of processes involving increasing liquidity and the
growing multidirectional flows of people, objects, places, and information as well
as the structures they encounter and create that are barriers to, or expedite,
those flows.”30 These multidirectional “flows” intensified under globalization,
making the distant proximate.31 Globalization impacts all aspects of wildlife
conservation in Africa through increased global flows of information, people,
ideas, and money.
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Figure 2. Second-Tier Variables in Framework for Analyzing an SES

Source: Ostrom (2007)

Globalization is a central feature of SESs because of impacts on the
resilience and vulnerability of systems. 32 It is intimately linked to neo-liberalism,
capitalism, and commodification. Global products, global markets and marketing,
and global communications have facilitated the “expansion and intensification of
commodification” and allowed for exponential growth in wildlife transactions. 33
Four aspects of globalization impact SESs; connectedness, speed, scale, and
diversity. Each aspect operates on two planes, both positively and negatively.
Greater connectedness in all the arenas of globalization- goods, people, finance,
ideology, and information- both increases opportunities for exploitation of species
32
33
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and for the increased integration of large SESs. While larger more closely linked
systems may be able to absorb changes with greater resilience overall, they can
also spread disturbances widely and quickly through the system.

Similarly,

increased speed of interactions can allow for quicker response times to threats,
but also allows for faster depletion of resources. This is particularly true in the
wildlife sector.

At the hyper-speed of globalization communities may not

recognize the threats to resources until too late.

Relatedly, the scale and

impacts of interactions shifts under globalization. Local resource managers and
users are linked to international institutions and the market without the protection
of intermediary layers of management or control as “political, social, and
economic processes and activities” stretch across local, national, regional, and
global scales.34 Individual and aggregated human actions can now impact global
resources and can quickly deplete stocks as has been clearly seen in the recent
explosion of ivory sales.35 Globalization’s impacts on diversity relate to the
tendency to eschew local knowledge in national and international level decision
making, and in biodiversity, negatively impacting the resilience of resources
systems.36

Hypotheses

Based on the factors, which impact wildlife resources listed in the literature
review, and based on the variables noted in the SESF, this study will examine
34
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the hypothesis listed below. Particular attention has been paid to the necessity
to include cross scale and cross level interactions into the hypotheses in order to
more accurately capture the complex nature of threats to social ecological
systems:

Hypothesis 1: In SESs where more modes of authority exist, systems will be less
resilient to perturbations.

Hypothesis 2: The imposition of rules from external organs increase the
resilience of an SES.

Hypothesis 3: When local communities engage in the management of wildlife
industries the SES will be more resilient to disturbances than in cases where
communities engage in the management of wildlife industries.

Hypothesis 4: Resource stress or collapse is more likely to occur in states with
weak wildlife crime legislation and/or poor enforcement of wildlife crime
legislation than in states with strong wildlife crime legislation and effective
enforcement.

Hypothesis 5: In areas where human wildlife conflict is not effectively addressed
the SES will be less resilient than in areas where human wildlife crime is
effectively addressed.
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Hypothesis 6: An SES characterized by fragmentation is less resilient to
disturbances than a contiguous SES.

Per Walker et al. this study will measure SES outcomes through the lens of
resilience, adaptability, and transformability.37

Measuring SES Outcomes

Interactions and outcomes between tiers of nested variables within an
SES can be viewed through the lens of resilience, adaptability, and
transformability (RAT). RAT specifically focuses on measuring vulnerability within
a resource system and how an SES copes with change.38 The RAT provides
researchers a tool to evaluate interactions and outcomes across the nested tiers
of an SES which could ultimately lead to the formulation of relevant and effective
policy.
The RAT considers past regimes, current practices, and successes or failures in
impacting outcomes to increase resilience, and the likelihood of shifting into a
new stable state, to measure and assess a system’s resilience, adaptability, or
potential for controlled or uncontrolled transformation. While resilience theory
stresses the utility of analyzing “slow” variables which push systems to shift, this
study introduces fast variables, such as shifting global demand for wildlife
37
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products and the resulting exponentially increasing poaching rates, to highlight
the speed of regime shifts.39
RAT analysis locates the current state of an SES within the context of its
stability domain in order to determine whether an SES has been irrevocably
altered. The stability domain reflects the state of a system in the absence of
major perturbation. Disturbance and perturbation involve major spikes or
pressures on a system beyond the normal range of vulnerability. Systems might
be vulnerable to certain disturbances and not to others.40 Once certain thresholds
are crossed in any SES structure, functions, and feedback loops change and
undergo a “regime shift” or “flip,” to a new stability domain. 41 These shifts may be
unpredictable and occur very quickly, and “may be reversible, irreversible, or
effectively irreversible, i.e., not reversible on time scales of interest to society.” 42
Shifts can result from either human caused or natural phenomena. 43 Such shifts
may be occurring in SESs in Gabon, Tanzania, DRC, Ethiopia, Chad, the Ivory
Coast, Mozambique, Malawi, and Mali, among others, which have lost the
majority of their elephants.
Resilience is the amount of disturbance or perturbation a system can
absorb without shifting into a new stability domain. 44 More resilient systems can
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absorb larger shocks and withstand more disturbance. A resilient system can
change and adapt while remaining within critical thresholds.45 Long term SESs
may have developed a tolerance to certain disturbances and can continue to
absorb disturbances if they do not change too much over time.46 Whether a
system is considered resilient by policymakers and community members impacts
resources use decisions and can be highly contested. As resilience declines, it
takes progressively smaller disturbances to push the system a new stability
domain, in which its structure and function are substantially different. 47
Interactions between endogenous and exogenous processes contribute to
explanations of the resilience, or lack of resilience, of systems. 48
Adaptability is about the human management of resilience in the system.
Adaptability refers to the ability of an SES to learn; adjust to both internal and
external factors and processes; and to continue developing within the stability
domain.49 Because humans dominate SESs their actions both in terms of
management and utilization determine the adaptability of a system and directly
impact whether a system becomes an “undesirable” system, or not. 50
The ability of the social systems to manage resilience, or adapt to
perturbations, depends on the ability of governance systems and resource users
45
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to control the trajectory of an ecological system, “change the ‘topology’ of the
stability landscape, or change the processes in response to dynamics at other
scales.”51 Different aspects of the social system and specific features of groups
might constrain adaptability including norms, identity, and core values, or
enhance or undermine SES resilience.52 SESs are vulnerable to changes in
governance strategies, in particular those related to changes in socio-economic
processes.53 As the speed of global interactions increases the ability of SESs
(i.e. their human managers) to adapt quickly is paramount.
Transformability refers to the capacity to create a new system. 54
Transformational change involves shifts in norms and values, patterns of
interactions among actors, patterns of use and consumption, and shifts in
organizational and political relationships. When stability domains shift beyond
thresholds and ‘new’ systems emerge one may consider the SES to have
‘transformed,’ impacting both societies and environments. 55 It is important to note
transformation does not have to be uncontrolled and may not necessarily be
undesirable. Transformation may be required when shocks threaten to alter a
system beyond repair.56
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Alternative

stable

states are

possible.57 In

fact

adaptation

and

transformation- social change- are required to maintain ecosystem resilience. 58
As Walker et al. argues there are many examples of SESs becoming locked in
and unable to transform until it is too late (salinized agricultural systems; dams,
floodplains and flood control; forest fire suppression at ever larger scales). 59 For
example in Kenya in the 1980s the ability of SESs to transform and adopt new
governance structures likely saved valuable wildlife populations, and contributed
to a new relationship between community members, wildlife, and the national
government.60

Measurements and Variables
Resource Units

Following Ostrom’s SESF, this paper defines elephants as a resource unit.
Relevant variables include mobility growth and replacement rate, interaction
among resource units, economic value, and spatial and temporal distribution.
Two types of elephant live in Africa, the savannah elephant (Loxodonta
Africana) and the forest elephant (Loxodonta cyclotis). Larger savannah
elephants can be found in 37 African countries with savannah zone habitats.
Forest elephants, smaller and with round ears, live in the rainforests of West and
57
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Central Africa.

Elephant home ranges cross international borders and can

stretch to nearly 6,000 square miles depending on habitat type.
Biological attributes of the elephant (as a resource unit) can affect the
stability of the SES. Population dynamics occur over decades, not months or
years. It may take elephant populations that suffer from overexploitation fifty
years to recover, while others spiral into extirpation.61 The slow replenishment of
elephants, which reach sexual maturity no earlier than ten years, and have
calves only once every four or five years after, expose populations to
perturbation and disruption. In a healthy SES, elephants can reproduce into their
sixties, with healthy populations growing at a natural rate of around 7-8% per
year. Populations under stress from environmental factors or poaching breed
less frequently. In the absence of major disturbances elephants can live to be
over seventy years of age in the wild.
Depending on its size an elephant can eat between 220-400 lbs of
vegetation per day, and drink over 200 liters of water per day. Their dietary and
migration habits can place elephants in direct competition with human
populations and create what has become known as human-elephant conflict
(HEC). Adult bull elephants can grow up to eleven feet high at the shoulder and
weigh over eight tons.

Female elephants are smaller and lighter, with an

average height of over 8.5 feet and weight just over 7,000 pounds.
In some countries, such as Botswana and South Africa, elephants are
abundant, possibly to the point of over-crowding and resource system depletion.
In other areas such as Rwanda and Ivory Coast populations are tiny, isolated,
61
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and not biologically significant. Small pockets of elephants continue to exit in
West Africa, though populations have little or no chance of interacting.
Populations of elephants in the Republic of Congo, Cameroon, Gabon, Central
African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of Congo are increasingly
isolated in dense forests and difficult to reach areas.
Population surveys of forest elephants indicate a decline in populations
between 50-62% in the past decade. In the DRC 95% of forest have almost no
elephants.62 Savannah populations are similarly fragmented and isolated. Some
limited interactions occur between elephants in Kenya and Tanzania and
between Tanzania and Mozambique.
The economic value of elephants has shifted over the years as a result of
international regimes and shifting norms over appropriate usage.
were historically valued for their tusks, hide, hair, and meat.

Elephants

Tusks do not

regenerate and can only be harvested by killing the animals. Ivory values range
depending on which part of the value chain one examines. At kill sites ivory can
fetch as little as $40 per tusk, or be bartered for a few cheap trade goods like
salt.63 Middlemen receive higher prices, around 7-120$ per lb. Tusks weigh on
average 12 lbs each, though they can be much larger, and as populations
decrease, much smaller. In end markets a large carved tusk can sell for more
than $50,000.
Economic value within the licit market generally relates to wildlife tourism,
largely photo safaris, as well as limited hunting and trophy tourism, and limited
62
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legally sanctioned international ivory sales. The direct and indirect economic
contribution associated with wildlife viewing in developing countries are an
important source of revenue generation.

Resource Systems

The resource system(s) elephants interact in exist across Sub-Saharan
Africa. The relevant variables to analyze are the sector, system boundaries,
system size, human-constructed facilities, productivity, equilibrium properties,
predictability of system dynamics, and location.
Savannah elephants range throughout Eastern and Southern Africa.
Human encroachment and poaching have severely restricted the range of
elephants, however the land in many areas could easily support more dense
populations, in particular in forested areas of Central Africa and in the savannahs
of east Africa. Difficult to coral, elephants move between national parks and
private areas, and between states, depending on the availability of water, food,
and security. Historically elephants migrated long distances, though in the past
two centuries those migration patterns have been severely disrupted by poaching
and habitat loss.
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Users

Resource

use

includes

consumptive

and

non-consumptive

use.

Consumptive users may be poachers or traffickers ranging across an array of
communities from wildlife professionals, to impoverished indigenous peoples
acting in the illicit realm, as well as end-market users who purchase and
consume wildlife products both in legal and illegal markets. Key resource users
and focus of this project are transnational criminal organizations. 64 Consumptive
use also includes sanctioned sales of wildlife products between states. Nonconsumptive users of wildlife include photo-tourists, as well as safari operators
and local peoples in tourism related industries from handi-craft sellers to
hoteliers, as well as NGOs and others who utilize animals as symbols for
awareness and fund raising efforts. Other users are those living and working
within a resource system, in particular African communities on the outskirts of
parks, in wildlife management areas, and other protected areas, whose
livelihoods are inextricably linked to wildlife either through community based
conservation programs or as community members forced to endure the
challenges of living near wildlife. In many ways, these resource users are the
most crucial to the success or failure of wildlife management plans.

At the

national level, considering the significance of wildlife to GDPs across Africa, all
citizens in a given country can be considered resource users as recipients of
public services made possible through tourism receipts. And as Young, et al.,
point out, in a global resource system in which resources are considered to be a
64
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part of a common pool, the scope of resource users expands globally.
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Relevant variables impacting outcomes and interactions for all of these resource
users include the number of users, socio-economic attributes of users, history of
use, location of users, leadership and entrepreneurship, norms/social capital,
knowledge of SES, dependence on resource, and technology used.

Governance Systems

Governance systems as nested and decomposable can refer to local,
national, and international systems of management, governmental and nongovernmental. Relevant second-tier governance variables include government
organizations and non-government organizations, network structure, property
rights systems, operational rules, collective choice rules, constitutional rules and
monitoring and sanctioning processes. The proliferation of governance types
increases contests and competition over control of wildlife management policies,
goals, and mechanisms for implementation.
As a resource elephant populations are managed at the national level
through wildlife and land management departments, national legislation, and
local and national enforcement mechanisms. States determine whether and how
legal domestic markets for endangered species operate.

At the international

level the trade in elephants and elephant parts is managed through CITES.
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Why Case Studies

This paper adopts a case study methodology as the analytic frame best
suited to explicating the potential causal factors degrading or improving SES
resilience.

The paper will examine poaching rates in Kenya, Tanzania, and

Botswana, focusing on the parks with the largest elephant populations; Tsavo,
the Selous Game Reserve, and the Okavango Delta, respectively.

SESs in

Tanzania and Kenya appear to be shifting into new stability domains as
elephants are poached out, while the challenge to SESs in Botswana appear to
relate to an over-abundance of elephants. The case studies include both
temporal and spatial scales associated with poaching rates to determine the
relative resilience of SESs.
To control for background conditions these cases were selected in part on
the basis of their general similarities related to colonialism, wildlife and land
management policies, and early attitudes towards wildlife. All three countries
experienced a long association with Great Britain as protectorates and colonies
of the empire. Botswana and Kenya came under Britain’s sphere of influence
after the 1885 ‘scramble for Africa.’ Tanzania became a British protectorate after
World War I and the transfer of German colonies to UN and subsequently British
control.

Colonial leadership initiated the park system in each country, later

expanded under post-Independence governments.
The case study countries all initially adopted wildlife policies based on a
model of state control of wildlife resources, later adjusted to include, (at least
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nominally), community based natural resources management plans of one sort or
another. These plans not only expand community involvement in wildlife
management but also incorporate market based neo-liberal mechanisms to
conservation. Similar plans were introduced in most other African countries
during the same time frame.66
All three states are heavily dependent on foreign tourism which accounts
for a high percentage of GDP and significant employment figures. In Kenya the
total contribution of travel and tourism dollars, generated primarily through wildlife
tourism, accounts for 12.4% of GDP.67 Similar figures are reported for both
Botswana and Tanzania.68 Most travelers to Africa visit for wildlife viewing. 69
Each of the three sates discussed receive between one and two million visitors
per year. All three states devote a large amount of their national territory to
wildlife conservation and management. Tanzania protects the most land, over 40
% of its total area. Botswana sets aside a third of its territory as parks or wildlife
management areas. Kenya, a more populaos state, sets aside just under 8% of
its land in parks.
While Botswana, Kenya, and Tanzania share multiple similarities, the
states diverge in key areas.

Neither Kenya nor Tanzania has been able to

effectively protect its wildlife. Several of the factors blamed correspond to those
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listed in the literature review above. These include corruption, mismanagement of
the wildlife sector, uncoordinated land use policy, conflicting priorities for the use
of land (agriculture vice conservation), lack of involvement of local communities,
unsustainable growth, the influx of foreign workers, development in wildlife areas,
and habitat destruction.70 In both states enforcement is considered very weak,
with corruption, ineffective and weak laws, poor investigative capacity, and lack
of political will to dismantle poaching rings hamper efforts to stop illegal killings of
elephants.
Weak government responses in both countries hampered or completely
forestalled efforts to stop the onslaught. During the last poaching crisis in the
1980s Tanzania get poaching under control. However, during the current crisis
the government in Tanzania has been slow to recognize the poaching crisis and
to acknowledge the extent of the destruction of the country’s wildlife. 71 The
primary initiative launched to fight the poachers, Operation Tokemeza, was
halted by the government over alleged abuses before any ivory kingpins could be
charged. In the midst of the poaching epidemic in 2010 Tanzania proposed
down listing its elephant population to allow sales of ivory. They did not withdraw
the proposal until 2012.72 In 2014 Tanzania agreed to not lobby CITES for at
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least the next ten years to honor the moratorium on sales. Their stockpile is
worth over 50million dollars.73
Kenya’s record on battling poaching is similarly mixed. Kenyan wildlife
suffered high losses in the last great poaching epidemic of the 1970s and 1980s
when the country 90% of its elephant population was slaughtered from 19731987. The population stood at less than 10,000 in 1989 when Kenya led the
campaign to ban the international sale of ivory.74 Conservationists in Kenya
advocated within Kenya and the international community to raise awareness
about poaching and to pressure governments to support the CITES ban,
achieving dramatic results.75 Despite past successes, however, Kenya currently
denies a poaching crisis exists within its borders, skewing the numbers of
poached elephants down to obfuscate the linkages between official corruption
and poaching.

Recent changes in wildlife laws have yet to yield significant

results. Their record on prosecuting wildlife cases is abysmal. Poachers, even
when declared guilty, often go free. In what may be an effort to shift blame, both
countries cite cross-border groups as driving poaching.

In Kenya Somali

terrorists are associated with poaching while in Tanzania the blame is often
placed on Burundian or Mozambiquan criminals.
Tanzania and Kenya were both placed on the CITES “Gang of Eight” list in
2013 for their failure to control poaching or trafficking in their territory. Tanzania is
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both a major transit point and supplier of ivory to illegal markets. Estimates
suggest that as much as one third of the ivory seized in Asia comes from or
through Tanzania. Tanzania loses between 10,000-11,000 elephants per year to
poachers, if not more. Poachers operate within park boundaries, and to an even
greater extent outside of parks in communities.76 Kenya may have lost one
quarter of its elephant (and rhinoceros) population since 2009, contradicting
official statistics which claim the loss of only 302 elephants in 2013.77 The actual
number may be ten times higher.78 Kenya is a major exporter of ivory from
Central and East Africa, most of which exists through Mombasa. The Kenyan
Wildlife Service reports the current population of elephants to be around 38,000,
while the African Elephant Database reports around 26,000 as of 2012. 79 Both
estimates are likely over-estimates.
The trajectory for Botswana, on the other hand, has been one of recovery
from past near decimation. Heavily hunted during the colonial period by the
Boers and other settlers, Botswana had fewer than 8,000 elephants in 1960. 80
Today the country is considered a conservation success story with Africa’s
largest and most secure elephant herd of over 130,000 elephants. Ironically
Botswana’s elephant population is thought to have increased as a result of
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conflict related poaching in neighboring states.

High levels of poaching in

Zambia and Zimbabwe and insecurity Namibia and Angola push so-called
‘refugee’ elephants into Botswana.81
The Botswana government considers poaching a threat to their national
security and treat it as such, training special units of the country’s defense force
to combat poachers. They invoke stiff penalties and fines and have a good
record of convicting those engaged in illegal hunts. The low levels of poaching
that occur in Botswana are blamed on cross-border poachers coordinating with
locals to kill wildlife.82 Botswana, a longtime supporter of international ivory sales,
altered its position on sales in 2013 and no longer supports the ivory trade.
Other significant differences between Kenya, Tanzania, and Botswana
exist which could be important to explain difference in SES resilience including
the relative strength or weakness of their economies, levels of corruption,
security factors, and demographics.

Each of the countries, following African

states generally, moved from state-led economies to a private sector led
development in the 1990s and 2000s. However Kenya and Tanzania remain low
income countries with high poverty rates while Botswana, on the other hand, is
considered an upper middle income country. 83 The perception of corruption
varies greatly between the states, with Kenya and Tanzania viewed as highly
corrupt by their citizens. While Botswana is considered the least corrupt county in
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Africa.84 Kenya, bordering Somalia, has faced numerous terrorist attacks by
Somalis and homegrown terrorists in addition to mass violence associated with
the 2008 elections. Somali terrorists are widely believed to be responsible for at
least some of the elephant poaching in Kenya over the last decade. 85 While
Tanzania and Botswana both border countries, which have experienced war in
the last two decades threats to wildlife are not generally associated with terrorists
or other large, organized non-state armed groups.
Demographically Kenya and Tanzania are heterogeneous societies with
multiple competing ethnic/tribal/racial and linguistic identities.

Strong political

leadership in post-Independence Tanzania created a national identity and
national unity through the adoption of Kiswahili, nationalist curriculum in school,
and

local

empowerment,

depoliticizing

ethnicity

and

tribe.86

Tanzania

subsequently developed a strong “Tanzanian” national identity, and has
experienced little interethnic conflict.87 Kenyans, on the other hand, continues to
relate more closely to their ethnic groups through the use of local languages, lack
of universal curriculum, reliance on appointed ethnic/tribal leaders, ‘tribalist’
political leadership, and the allocation of public goods along ethnic lines (favoring
ethnic Kikuyus over other groups). As a result Kenya continues to experience
84
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political and social conflict, which breaks out along ethnic lines. 88 Botswana,
dominated by one ethnic group, the Tswana, is considered the most
homogenous country in Africa and outside of struggles between indigenous
Basarwa (San people) bushmen and the central government over land use
rights, little ethnic strife exists.89
Case study analysis aligns with the SESF and RAT at multiple points.
First, the case study methodology meshes with the SESF’s emphasis on nested
and tiered variables and sub variables, its inclusion of attributes of users and
decision making processes, and their relationship with interactions and
outcomes. Case studies focus on background conditions and the interactions of
multiple actors and variables across levels, space, and time to explain current
conditions. As the previous sections articulate, elephant SESs in Botswana,
Kenya, and Tanzania operate as nested tiers of a global SESs. Elephant SESs
are by definition transnational in terms of resource movement, resource users,
and governance systems, shifting over time at varying speeds. An examination
of the RAT in any elephant SES requires a multi-scale and multi-level approach,
across time and space, which is possible through the application of case study
analysis.
Second, case study analysis focuses on processes and patterns of
interactions to determine which background conditions or combination of
conditions are required to produce outcomes through ‘process tracing,’ which
dovetails with the SESF applied in this study.
88
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examination of “the chain of events or the decision-making process by which
initial case conditions are translated into case outcomes,” again aligning with the
SESF.90 The conditions of SESs shift and alter between geographies and across
time and are the result of a long history of interactions which process tracing can
reveal. By process-tracing the analysis can examine how the conditions within
the case translate into outcomes.
Third, through process tracing, case study analysis allows the researcher
to focus on multiple data points to establish the cause and affect links between
the independent variables to reveal observable evidence and identify key
background conditions feeding into interactions and outcomes. The SESF allows
for multiple variables and encourages their study across scales and levels. In a
study of complex systems such as an SES a research methodology that limits
variables would inevitably lead to an analysis which flattens and oversimplifies
problem sets to the point of meaninglessness. Lastly, case studies are a good
vehicle for “inferring and testing explanations that define how the independent
causes the dependent variables.”91 Given fairly uniform background conditions
case studies can become a semi-controlled environment. If the case studies
support a hypothesis than the researcher can explore the case further to deduce
and test explanations detailing the operation of the hypothesis.

Case studies

can explain both that hypothesis hold, and why they hold. The case studies
selected for this study share enough background conditions to qualify the study
as ‘semi-controlled.’
90
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Through case study analysis this project will, in addition to exercising the
SESF through qualitative analysis, test theories associated with the causes of
poaching which rely on flattened, uncomplicated, monocausal variables. The
project will also reveal key background conditions and test their importance.
Lastly, it will explain cases of intrinsic importance in the study of poaching and
transnational crime.
With the research design established, the study next turns to an
examination of international factors that impact the elephant SESF in Chapter 4.
This chapter identifies first level ‘generic’ variables- the resource system,
resource users, governance system, and resource units- to unpack and relate
variables across scales and levels to identify key interactions impacting tiers
nested below which either contribute to ecological systems resilience or its
degradation.
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CHAPTER 4
THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL ECOLOGICAL SYSTEM

The purpose of this chapter is to examine how human action is shaping
the African elephant ecosystem through over-harvesting of finite resources at the
international level and range state level, nested immediately below. Per the
analytic framework this study adopts, the social-ecological systems framework
(SESF), the chapter identifies first level ‘generic’ variable interactions that can
then be unpacked to understand how lower tier variables to explored in detail. 1
These are the resource system, resource users, governance system, and
resource units, defined in Chapter 3. Shifts in the social-ecological system (SES)
are linked to complex sets of local processes, and vice versa.2
This chapter begins to unpack and relate variables across scales and
levels to identify key interactions impacting tiers nested below which either
contribute to ecological systems resilience or its degradation. It focuses on
reciprocal relationships and feedback loops between the international and range
state level. As Ostrom notes, it is imperative to understand “how systems are
progressively linked to ever larger systems and how upward and downward
causation linkages occur within an SES as well as across diverse sectors and
scales.”3 In the African elephant global SES, governance failures and the actions
of resource users at the range state level percolate up to the international level
1
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with a corrosive effect on the ability of international institutions to manage
resources in an efficient, effective, and sustainable manner. Similarly, the
tendency towards specific usage patterns and knowledge systems resting at the
international level reflect in patterns and practices at the range state level, with
deleterious impacts on the health of the global SES.
This chapter serves as the first step in the process of tracking impacts and
interactions across all levels of the SES. SESs involve groups of resource users
linked to one another, and to other resources across scales and governance
arrangements. 4

Interactions

The sections below examine how the key generic variables- resource
system, governance systems, resource users, and resource units- interact
together to produce a system which is currently in crisis, potentially transforming
from a system defined by relative resilience into one threatened with collapse.
Interactions between parts of the SES- resources, users, governance
systems, and the system, have largely occurred in the context of an open-access
system, leading to local extirpation of elephant resources and the transformation
of the SES over time. In the current era this is occurring as a result of scale and
level mismatches between governance, jurisdiction, and knowledge systems, in
addition to other scale challenges relating to the ignorance of scale and level
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dynamics and misunderstandings about the role heterogeneity in the SES. 5
Scale challenges are defined as a “situation in which the current combination of
cross-scale and cross-level interactions threatens to undermine the resilience of
a human-environment system.” 6 The three types of “scale challenge” Cash
identifies are “the failure to recognize important scale and level interactions
altogether; the persistence of mismatches between levels and scales in human
environment systems; and the failure to recognize heterogeneity in the way that
scales are perceived and valued by different actors, even at the same level.” 7
Within governance institutions these scale challenges occur alongside of
collective action dilemmas inherent in diverse organizations. Collective action
dilemmas occur when there is “a divergence of what is in the interests of the
individual and what is optimal for the community or larger group.” 8 By definition
CITES relies on the collective actions of parties to protect wildlife, sometimes
resulting in compromise to create a large coalition and move legislation.9 The
requirement to accommodate the variety of parties within CITES and their
varying perspectives on the role of wildlife and the appropriate management
scale for local wildlife conservation, affects the types of policies which can be
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adopted within CITES.10 As a globally linked system the SES is not only large,
stretching across dozens of international borders, but it involves institutions and
people physically located and physically distant from the SES. The SES literature
suggests that the lack of consensus among resource users on appropriate
resource use or conservation strategies weakens ability of the governing
authority to address perturbations in the SES. 11 These dynamics are evident
within interactions between CITES and range states which differ on resource use
policies and conservation goals.
The challenges of scale dynamics and collective action problems are
increasing the vulnerability of the system and limiting its ability to adapt to
perturbations and respond in a way that preserves the system’s resilience. As
Chapter 3 noted, resilience is “a measure of a system’s capacity to cope with
shocks and undergo change while retaining essentially the same structure and
function.” When resilience declines, as is occurring in the SES, progressively
smaller disturbances will have a disproportionate affect on the SES, transforming
it into a new system “in which its structure and function are substantially
different.”12 In the case of the African elephant SES a new system would be
smaller, fragmented, geographically isolated, and would lose many of the
features of an international SES. These smaller systems would, in turn, be
increasingly vulnerable to perturbations at every level and would likely not be
able to achieve resilience.

10
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The international SES experiences the effects of all of these challenges,
with impacts across the SES and inclusive of global resource users.

Jurisdiction/Geographic Mismatches and Collective Action Implications for
Enforcement at the International Level

Scholars have illustrated that preservation of SESs require institutions
whose scale of authority are appropriate to the geographic scale of the
ecosystem. Perhaps more than any social ecological system on earth, by dividing
a continent sized natural habitat among numerous states and jurisdictions, the
rapid and continuing extirpation of elephants illustrates the costs of a mismatch in
scales of resource systems and governing institutions. Large institutions may
prove unwieldy and be too slow to quickly address shifts in usage patterns, while
authorities with more limited geographic and jurisdictional reach lack the capacity
to address perturbations closely linked with international markets and global
resource users. Collective action dilemmas complicate management further, as
states within the system attempt to exert their preferences on the entire system,
or flout system requirements altogether. Other issues related to jurisdictional and
geographic scale mismatches relate to how species are monitored and tracked,
and levels of funding available for conservation. The performance of CITES in
the management of the global elephant SES, as the following discussion
illustrates, provides evidence to support this hypothesis. A more detailed
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discussion of tiers nested below- primarily governance authorities resting at the
range state level, will be developed in the case study chapters.
The notion of geographic/jurisdictional scale mismatch refers to “poor fit
between the levels of authority and size of a system (state control of fisheries or
ranges that extend across zones), and the scale of jurisdiction for solving that
problem.”13 Problems associated with the management of fugitive species which
move into and out of territories and across state boundaries often relate to scale
mismatches.14 As resource systems increasingly operate on a global scale, shifts
in usage patterns and utilization strategies amongst potentially millions of users,
test the capability of large institutions to react and adapt quickly to avert
uncontrolled and unplanned transformation.
Lacking an enforcement arm that operates below the international level,
CITES relies on its ability to identify and sanction state level actors in response to
overexploitation of the SES. However given the accelerated pace of change
Ostrom identifies as a challenge to global SES, the slow pace of CITES’
bureaucracy creates difficulty in quickly identifying and addressing perturbations
across levels of the SES.15
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to continue to decline without action at the international level. Parties only meet
to review policies and implementation of the convention every two to three years
at the Conference of Parties (CoPs).17 The process of introducing an issue,
lobbying, deciding to vote, and voting can take years. When decisions are made
implementation is not necessarily immediate and relies heavily on Parties’
willingness and ability to comply.

States are often given years between

mandates and implementation, leaving species to continue dwindling into
extirpation. Moreover, even decisive actions by CITES, such as moving a
species from Appendix III to Appendix II, may have little or no impact on trade
levels.18
CITES’ bureaucracy makes it difficult for the institution to quickly identify
and engage with states of concern. It took CITES the better part of a decade to
publicly name the “gang of eight” countries of concern, despite early indications
of organized crime, government complicity, and high levels of poaching. 19 The
gang of eight includes the source countries Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, transit
counties, Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines, and destination countries,
Thailand and China. These countries had come to CITES’ attention for their role
in the illegal ivory trade as early as 1998 and were cited every year as key
16
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players in the illicit trade in studies, however no action was taken.20 It took CITES
another year to recognize other key countries in their ‘gang’ of offenders, despite
abundant evidence of their role in the international illicit trade including Gabon 21
and Mozambique,22 important sources for ivory with confirmed severe population
declines over the past five years, weak or unenforced laws, and clear
government complicity in the trade. CITES slow response time enables
transnational criminals who can swoop into an area, decimate resources, and
move items to market quickly, before authorities can respond.23
CITES commitment to regulating a sustainable trade is further undermined
by its failure to ensure states remain in compliance with the treaty and do not
create conditions conducive to the penetration of organized crime into the
market. CITES can invoke sanctioning mechanisms for non-compliance with
reporting; non-compliance with specific requirements under the Action Plan for
the Control of Trade in African Elephant Ivory; and for inadequate domestic
implementing legislation; but rarely does. These sanctions can include barring
countries from trading in any listed species, an action with significant economic
impacts to states.24
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domestic markets, despite evidence that ivory is laundered through them. 26
CITES did not pass sanctions on any of the named countries, instead only
requiring each state to deliver an action plan to address the issue. 27 At the
Standing Committee Meeting on Animals in 2013 CITES only directly addressed
China and Thailand after the official meetings had formally ended, despite their
pivotal roles in the illicit trade. If applied, CITES sanctions could halt the
international trade of over 35,000 plant and animal species to and from offending
countries, a major economic and reputational blow. 28 CITES unwillingness to
apply meaningful sanctions to states in contravention of the treaty’s mandates
contributes to non-compliance, limiting the treaty’s effectiveness.
The most egregious example of this failure is the handling of the second
“one-off” sale to China. CITES did not follow up on the Chinese market after the
one-off sale and has not addressed evidence clearly illustrating the role of the
sale in the rise in poaching or the level of illegal trade, and its rise, after the sale.
Chinese continue to be implicated in ivory trafficking on a regular basis across
Conf. 9.24, (CITES), http://www.cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/news/meetings/IFS-05/IFS05TRAFFIC-paper.pdf.
26
Shruti Suresh, "Cites: Rhetoric and Tiptoeing around Elephant Poaching," in Environmental
Investigation Agency (15 March 2013), http://eia-international.org/cites-polite-rhetoric-andtiptoeing-around-elephant-poaching.
27
Despite an acknowledgement by CITES authorities that Thailand took little or no action to rein
in the domestic ivory trade in the preceding years, the country avoided sanctions at the 2014
meeting, and was allotted more time to affect change in the illicit ivory sector. This is despite the
fact that TRAFFIC found triple the amount of ivory for sale in domestic markets in the year
between the original ‘gang or eight’ designation and the 2014 assessment of action plans. See
TRAFFIC, "Thailand Must Address Illegal Ivory Trade or Could Face Sanctions: Cites," (25 July
2014), http://www.traffic.org/home/2014/7/25/thailand-must-address-illegal-ivory-trade-or-couldface-sanc.html. In 2014 Kenya submitted their plan to CITES and was removed from the offender
list, despite achieving little success in stopping poaching, and despite an ongoing effort within the
government to minimize the level and impacts of poaching. See John Muchangi, "Kenya Escapes
Cites Wildlife Sanctions," in AllAfrica.com (25 July 2014),
http://allafrica.com/stories/201407251100.html.
28
Jonathan Fowler, "Thailand Faces Trade Ban over Ivory Failings: Cites," in Agence France
Press (12 July 2014), http://www.nationmultimedia.com/national/Thailand-faces-trade-ban-overivory-failings-CITES-30238352.html.

85
Africa, and the continuation of large scale seizures throughout 2014 indicate
unsustainable trade to Asia continues.29 The unwillingness or inability of CITES
to hold China accountable for its role in the international trade in illicit ivory and
for the transformation in the SES is repeated across other major consumer states
in Asia and within African range states. At the time of publication CITES has not
sanctioned any state for its failure to control the illicit ivory trade.
These failures are mirrored at tiers nested below the international level.
Membership in CITES does not preclude states crafting harsher penalties for the
illegal collection and trade of wildlife. Parties could implement voluntary
moratoriums on trade in listed species within their borders, or enhance laws
meant to protect species. However, across the resource system, laws and other
controls on wildlife crimes at lower tiers of the SES do not typically reflect the
gravity or scale of wildlife crime. Most states do not have strong laws proscribing
the illegal killing or trafficking of wildlife, many do not enforce the laws that are on
the books, and often lack the capacity or political will to identify criminal
trafficking.30 Changes to legislation to more closely link penalties with the scope
and scale of crimes committed, has occurred slowly, if at all.31 While most range
states are parties to CITES and have agreed to abstain from trading elephant
ivory at the international level they have failed to create or enforce anti-poaching
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and trafficking laws at the state level where poaching and trafficking occurs
before it becomes transnational.32

Challenges to Resource Monitoring across Geographic and Jurisdictional Scales

Governance of the SES relies on effective monitoring of resources and
resource use patterns within the system, challenged by its existence across
dozens of international borders and jurisdictions. Ineffective monitoring of wildlife
resources can lead to ‘information problems.’33 Essentially, information problems
can include assuming an individual population exemplifies population dynamics
at large; ignoring variability between populations; and ignoring the viability of
remaining stocks, all of which can lead decision makers to prescribe policies
incompatible with sustainability.34 However, CITES leaves some of the most
burdensome and technically difficult aspects of monitoring the illegal trade to
states with little capacity or political will to meet the challenge.35 The resulting
data is often faulty, incomplete, or inaccurate resulting in underestimates of
illegal sales and kills in most countries.
32
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Elephants program, commonly known as MIKE, measures trends in illegal killings
and identifies factors related to the trends. The program operates in sixty sites
across 30 African range states. These sites hold between 30-40% of the
continent’s elephants. The proportion of illegally killed elephants (PIKE) is
measured at each site through carcass examinations and is used to indicate
regional levels of poaching36 and produce analysis on trends in illegal killing. 37
Obtaining reliable data across sites is problematic for a number of reasons. First,
the sites do not represent a random sample of elephant range sites. The second
concern relates to the difficulty analyzing and comparing the data provided.
Because patrols vary on areas covered or methods and intensity of patrols, the
chances of finding carcasses vary greatly even within sites. Because sites exist
in countries with a range of resources devoted to wildlife conservation the level of
effort and capacity within staffs can vary greatly across MIKE sites.38 Resulting
analysis of MIKE and PIKE data conducted by CITES underestimated the level of
illegal killing across Africa and influenced decision maker within the body to
continue pursing avenues to expand the legal trade in ivory. Information released
by CITES using its MIKE program often contradicts that released by scholars and
other wildlife authorities.39 Seizures of data of trafficked ivory captured through
the CITES Elephant Trade Information System (ETIS) is similarly wanting. ETIS
reports contain information on seizures relating to countries either directly
36
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involved in the ivory trade or that have been identified as a source, transit, or
destination country for illegal ivory, or whose nationals are considered to be
involved in the illicit trade. Recommendations contained in ETIS reports are used
to mandate assessments of ivory trade controls in countries of concern.40
However, as currently compiled, ETIS reports do not accurately reflect the level
of illicit international trade or even accurately record seizures. Six African
elephant range states have never submitted elephant product seizure records
despite being implicated in seizures.41 Records may not specify the weight of
seizures, but merely pieces of ivory, making quantification difficult. 42 Despite the
information problems evident CITES’s statistics governance mechanisms rely
heavily on this data to inform decision making bodies, impacting the ability of
Parties to make the type of informed decisions on levels of trade necessary to
ensure the responsible management of species at the international level.
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Challenges to Funding Conservation across a Geographically Expansive SES

In an SES a significant institutional mismatch related to the levels of
funding for conservation activities and the funds available for those activities can
undermine the ability of even well formulated policies to positively impact wildlife
populations and trade levels. Within the African elephant SES such a funding
mismatch occurs across levels of governance within the SES, meaning while the
burden of enforcement measures and conservation initiatives are forced down to
lower tiers in the SES, implementation funds are lacking. At every level of the
international SES funding available for conservation is “a fraction of the hundreds
of billions in annual expenditures which would be required to reduce biodiversity
loss significantly.”43 This is despite the fact that African range states within the
SES are deeply dependent on the survival and health if the SES for significant
portions of their national GDPs.
CITES lacks the funds to invest in even core programs and initiatives.
CITES has the power to urge, but not to require, parties to provide funding to
implement recommendations. The institution relies on a trust fund and
contributions from parties to fund the organization and its activities making it
vulnerable to chronic and significant shortfalls. Parties consistently fail to pay
dues to CITES, and often do not contribute to special funds. CITES expected
contributions of nearly $6 million for operations in 2014, but reported less than $3
million received by October 2014. Some states contribute less than $100 per
43

C. Mora, Sale, P.F., "Ongoing Global Biodiversity Loss and the Need to Move Beyond
Protected Areas: A Review of the Technical and Practical Shortcoming of Protected Areas on
Land and Sea," Marine Ecology Progress Series 434 (2011).

90
year while others pledge high amounts and fail to deliver.44 Lack of funding
hampers the ability of CITES to enforce decisions. For example, at the 14 th CoP
in 2007 CITES mandated that African elephant range states create an Action
Plan to provide “coordinated and immediate action.”45 The Fund was not
launched until 2011, with the goal of raising $100 million over three years for law
enforcement programs.46 It raised less than $100,000 the first year.47 The chronic
lack of funds impedes the ability of CITES’ programs to improve enforcement
mechanisms for African elephant range states.
Despite heavy dependence on environmental resources, in particular
wildlife viewing tourism, for GDP growth, range states fail to invest in
conservation proportionally either to the scale of the threat the environment
faces, or the level of return possible on investments. This dynamic will be more
closely examined in the follow-on case studies, which examine cross-level
interactions at the range state level and below. Most range states similarly fail to
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invest in wildlife programs or fund conservation efforts beyond monies earned
through entrance fees and other use fees at parks, despite the potential for
wildlife tourism to boost national GDPs and introduce foreign currency into the
market. The estimated tourist viewing value of an elephant is $1.6 million over its
lifetime. In just one year an elephant is expected to contribute nearly $23,000 to
local and national economies through non-consumptive wildlife viewing.48 In
some countries tourism receipts generate as much as 50% of GDP, 49 while
elephant tourism alone can accounts for as much as 20% of wildlife tourism
receipts.50 Including knock-on effects, tourism has impacts construction,
transportation, telecommunication, financial services, restaurants, agriculture
fisheries, food processing, light manufacturing, handicrafts, and other goods and
services available in the informal sector.51 Range states lose millions of dollars
and future economic value when wildlife is poached, and yet consistently fail to
adequately fund conservation and enforcement programs or to strengthen laws
to protect wildlife. Law enforcement capacity and capacity within ranger forces,
as stated elsewhere in this document, are undermined by weak investment and
lack of material resources by governments. 52 Because CITES rarely and weakly
sanctions states for their inadequate controls, improvements are not forthcoming.
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Uncontrolled transformation of the SES could have devastating consequences in
Africa and irreparably damage its tourism industry.
Regional organizations largely consist of weak and poorly funded
institutions that in many cases only began addressing (ineffectively) poaching in
the later stage of the crisis. NGOs, acting independently or in partnership with
states, are not equipped either through legislation or in terms of funding levels to
conclusively address illegal hunting and the complex problems associated with
the practice. The largest NGOs operate with huge annual budgets in the tens or
hundreds of millions of dollars, operating programs in countries across the globe
while reaching millions of individual members.53 For example, the most well
recognized international wildlife NGO, the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), operates
on an annual budget of over $228 million.54 While significant and necessary
across all tiers of the resource system, NGO funding cannot fill the gap left by the
failure of formal governance structures to invest in conservation.

Cultural Diversity Challenge and Heterogeneity in the SES

What is referred to by Cash as heterogeneity in the system, and by
Ostrom as cultural diversity, challenge management of the SES in two ways.
Both scholars are referring to the challenge of managing resource users and
governance authorities nested in tiers below the international level who may not
agree either on the scale of a perturbation, or its significance. Heterogeneity in

53
54
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how actors perceive perturbations facing the SES relates to how they perceive
the scale of the SES. They may choose to shape a problem as local, national, or
global depending on the response they hope to shape.

55

Cultural diversity

between resource users and governance authorities in the system can create
deep cultural divides, making it more difficult for institutions to identify
perturbations or solutions in a cross-culturally relevant manner. This gap results
from a lack of cross-level interactions in the knowledge systems and a
misunderstanding of how different actors perceive the value of resources. 56
Differences in how parties perceive the scale of perturbations in the
system directly impact their pattern of usage of resources. Range states within
Africa continue to disagree over how best to secure elephant populations,
through a trading regime or conservation and preservationist regime, because
Southern African states shape the problem of poaching as localized
geographically to other segments of the SES. They treat their populations as
separate from the global whole and argue that local abundance can be sustained
even in the face of a massive uptick in poaching. Actors at different levels are
motivated differently and may be compelled or motivated to strengthen or
weaken linkages between scales for political purposes. The drive to shape a
problem as local or global, or at another level, can be understood as way for
governance authorities at tiers below the international level to both simplify the
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problem, and control solutions, which in the case of range states interested in
exploiting their elephant resources is a trade model of conservation.57
Southern African states have consistently argued that a legal ivory trade is
both compatible with conservation and necessary to maintain healthy populations
in the long term. South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Zambia have
all tabled proposals aimed at reopening a regulated trade, though Botswana
changed its position in 2013.58 In 2010 Tanzania and Zambia submitted
proposals to down-list their elephant populations in order to sell stockpiled ivory
and trade in live animals, despite their inability to demonstrate appropriate
enforcement controls and mounting evidence of a poaching crisis, in particular in
Tanzania.59 Considerable dissent surfaced amongst the African range states and
other parties over the proposal. Kenya and India, in collaboration with
international NGOs, lobbied at CoPs and among member states to reject any
opening of the ivory trade, including one-off sales.60 A coalition of range states
voted against the measure and it was defeated.61

Congo, Ghana, Kenya,

Liberia, Mali, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Togo proposed extending the
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moratorium on sales during the same CoP, illustrating the vast gulf between
states lobbying for expanded sales and those seeking to support the ban. 62

Heterogeneity/Cultural Diversity Challenges In Resource Use Patterns

The heterogeneity/cultural diversity challenge helps explain user behavior
in the face of systemic crisis. While globalization facilitates the flow of goods and
people and connects users and markets, even in the context of global
interconnectedness values do not easily transfer wholesale across cultures or
levels. The lack of conservation norms or a deep understanding of SES
dynamics, either in terms of elephant biology or the weakness within nested tiers
of the governance system, partly explains Chines policies to promote utilization
over conservation. Issues facing the SES are framed and shaped according to
political, cultural, and economic expedience by the most veracious resource
users, creating a disconnect between how the system is valued by local users as
opposed to distant users. The governing institutions have not been able to halt
the over-exploitation of the system or to mitigate or control illicit resource users.
Because of the global nature of the ivory trade, the physical distance
between resource users and the absence of cultural norms surrounding
conservation, consumers in China and across Asia have a weak or nonexistent
understanding

of

SES

dynamics,

which

undermines

sanctioning

and

policymaking to preserve the SES. They typically couch the issue as an African
issue not related to Chinese behavior, defining the problem as local and bounded
62
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to African countries, removing the need to respond.63 The most lucrative
segments of the illicit ivory trade are dominated by resource users, primarily
Asian, who have not historically interacted within the SES on a large scale but
are deeply connected through tradition and culture to the consumption of ivory.
They view ivory as simultaneously a cultural symbol and as an investment.

64

Most Mainland Chinese, far from the African elephant resource system, do
not understand the relationship between ivory and poaching, assuming that tusks
simply fall out of an elephant’s mouth, like teeth, without harming the animal.
Their lack of knowledge contributes to a willingness to consume ivory. 65
Traditionally, cultural norms in China have not conveyed protections on wildlife.
Chinese have viewed wild animals as sources of food, clothing, and medicine for
millennia.66

67

Considering the rise in prices for ivory and the seemingly endless

expansion of the market, harvesting or purchasing ivory to the point of
destruction of the SES can be considered a desirable and rational strategy to
maximize both short and long term gains for illicit users. Once elephants become
extinct trade restrictions become unnecessary, allowing for unlimited price rises
on a finite resource.68
In areas where Chinese do interact with the resources system their
proximity-in the context of weak laws and weak capacity within range states, lack
63
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of conservation norms, lack of understanding of elephant SESs, and economic
motivations-drives

consumption.

Improvements

in

infrastructure

and

transportation, increased wealth, recent opening of borders between China and
its neighbors in Southeast Asia, and a general lack of wildlife trade monitoring in
China all contribute to the growth of the wild animal market in China. 69 One
estimate suggests as much as 80% of the world’s wildlife crime is trafficked
through or to China.70
For individual Chinese, and the transnational criminal networks who
control the trade in ivory, ivory acts as yet another resource to be extracted from
Africa for processing and value addition in China. The values of ivory shifts
significantly depending on its location along the supply chain. At the point of
collection in remote areas in Africa ivory prices vary between $50-100/kg ivory,
though the value can be far less. Poachers may kill elephants for as little as a
bag of salt, a share of the meat, or small cash remunerations.71 At consolidation
points where ivory begins its journey overseas the price rises to $250-400/kg.
Chinese markets value ivory at around $2100/kg. In the retail market a large or
intricately carved piece can sell for millions of dollars.72 Based on an average
weight of 5kg per tusk, raw elephant ivory from an average sized set of tusks is
valued around $21,000 at the final point of sale.73 These high values do not
accrue to range states.
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The rise in Asian demand for trafficked wildlife can be linked directly to
poaching increases in Africa.74 Within the ivory trade transnational organized
crime primarily consists of Asian lead, Africa run operations which move large
quantities of ivory from Africa to points in Asia, in particular China. Following the
model, Africans dominate the networks until ivory reaches the stage for
containerization, recruiting poachers and killing and consolidating wildlife, after
which Asian transnational organized crime syndicates take over.75

African

segments of these networks consist of a variety of actors including state security
forces, rebel groups, political officials, businessmen, indigenous people, and
members of the conservation community, in addition to cross-border insurgents
and terrorist, covered separately below.
While other nationalities take part in the Asian segments of the trade,
Chinese have been implicated in ivory-related offenses in almost all African
range states, and in every part of the ivory chain other than the actual animal
killing.76 As globalization has made international travel and trade easier, more
and more Chinese have moved to Africa, directly connecting consumers to the
resource system. Chinese are the primary buyers of ivory in domestic markets
across Africa, contributing to a significant ‘ant trade’ in ivory back to China as
well as to the facilitation of industrial level trading.77 The diaspora links local
markets with international ivory markets through direct trade and facilitation of
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criminal networks. NGO reporting links both Chinese diplomatic and military
missions to Africa with increases in local ivory trade volumes and prices.78
The UNODC estimates two-thirds of the global ivory goes to Asian
markets, dominated by China.79 Wealthy Chinese buyers view ivory as a smart
investment, responding to media hype that ivory investments are ‘risk free’
particularly in light of quickly escalating prices. 80 In a renewed market Chinese
buy ivory as an investment, for its social value as a status symbol, for its art
value, as jewelry or ornament, for religious objects, and for medicinal purposes.81
The knowledge scale mismatch goes hand in hand with a mismatch
between the resource available and resources required to satisfy the market. The
fast-paced rise in demand in China cannot be met by available stocks whether
restricted to natural mortality of elephants, use of state stockpiles for sales, or
through targeted harvesting of problem animals.82 As Cumming notes, “growing a
resilient landscape depends heavily on finding an appropriate match between the
scales of demands on ecosystems by human societies and the scales at which
78
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ecosystems are capable of meeting these demands.” 83 This has not occurred
within the global African elephant SES. The large number of resource users with
conflicting norms on wildlife usage undermines the development of nonconsumptive use conservation norms. The sheer number of resource users
entering the system who lack conservation norms threaten to transform the
system irrevocably.
Under a pro-trade regime the Chinese government views ivory as a
source of revenue and as a vehicle to preserve Chinese ‘identity’ in a crowded
global media sphere.84 While the Chinese have long had a cultural affinity for
ivory its popularity had waned after the 1989 trade ban. When the government
declared ivory carving as an intangible cultural heritage worth preserving in 2006,
it revived the industry.85 The designation allowed the ivory carving industry to
access state resources and was the primary rationale behind Chinese requests
to purchase ivory in the second ‘one-off’ CITES auction.
The CITES sale provided China 62 tons of ivory, expanding the domestic
market for ivory and the structures to support that market. In 2004, 17 companies
were licensed to process raw ivory and an additional 87 retailers the right to sell
ivory.86 By 2014 the number of carving factories and retailers grew to 37 and
145, respectively. Three-quarters of ivory factories are state owned enterprises,
meaning inflated prices and high demand directly benefit the government.87
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Some of the failures of the Chinese government to provide adequate
protections to the African elephant relate to the mismatch in knowledge scales
and the heterogeneity in value systems across resource users. The Chinese
government has failed to demonstrate commitment to elephant conversation and
enforcement of CITES mandates. The government control of the ivory trade
remains lax as measures put in place to manage it are widely subverted. 88 China
failed to secure its ivory stockpile, an important responsibility under CITES meant
to keep ivory form poached elephants out of the market. In 2008 the EIA reported
over 110 tons of ivory- equivalent to 11,000 dead elephants-was missing from
government controlled stocks as early as 2002. The theft was not investigated
and no arrests were ever made.

To reiterate points made above, under lax

Chinese controls up to 90% of ivory in China is illegal, and more than half of legal
ivory factories launder illegal ivory.89 The Chinese arrest few traffickers, do not
regularly investigate illegal activities within ivory carving or retail outlets, and do
not publicly acknowledge a link between the purchase of ivory at the CITES
auction, the rise in demand, or the increases in poaching across Africa. 90
Both the aggregated decisions of individual Chinese to consume, and the
policies of the government to promote the ivory trade and consumption of ivory,
are contributing to the transformation of the global SES.
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The Precautionary Principle and CITES’ Failure to Recognize Scale and Level
Dynamics

The actions and preferences of range states, including their governance
systems and use patterns, impact the ability of the international governance
structure to operate effectively. Disagreements amongst range states and the
inability to achieve consensus among them on the desirability and consequences
of ivory sales facilitate CITES’ position on sales. CITES has consistently left the
door open to trade and continues to insist that a legal trade is possible. The
organization does not acknowledge any link between the one-off sales and either
an increase in demand or poaching. Ignoring scale dynamics entirely, CITES
has not recognized its own role in the growth in the illicit trade in ivory.
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CITES

has failed to acknowledge any links between the one-off sales and the increase
in poaching.92 These failures not only weaken the norm against consumption of
ivory but legitimize discussions around use of other wildlife products, in particular
rhino horn, and the feasibility of legalizing sales.
In the 1980s when trade controls were first established CITES put up few
barriers to continued trade. As currently, they relied heavily on states to set trade
levels and monitor and control ivory sales to maintain sustainable off-takes. The
Ivory Trade Control System established through CITES in 1985 was replete with
corruption
91
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management programs were technically allowed to export ivory; however
counties without adequate management programs simply moved their ivory to
neighboring states for export. The quotas established, reported to the Secretariat
and the Ivory Control Unit, consisted of a report of expected tusk export numbers
per year. States were required to mark ivory for identification purposes.93 The
system did not establish or enforce maximum volumes of trade, relying instead
on range states to determine quotas and their sustainability. 94 In 1987 the IUCN
reported to CITES that nearly 80% of the ‘legal’ ivory in the world market was
from poached elephants. The monitoring system had failed ad populations
plummeted further.95 Moreover, to induce more states to join CITES, the body
provided amnesties allowing states to sell massive stockpiles of illegally ivory on
the international market. Half of Africa’s elephants perished under CITES failed
trading and ivory control regime in the 1980s.96

Despite this, the CITES

Secretariat actively opposed any ban on ivory trading and “lobbied heavily for
continued trade.”97
CITES and range states’ failure to recognize scale dynamics as impacting
the viability of elephants as a species amounts to an abandonment of the
precautionary principle which was put in place to guide decisions in the
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international body.98 The precautionary principle states that in the case of
“uncertainty regarding the status of a species or the impact of trade on the
conservation of a species, the Parties shall act in the best interest of the
conservation of the species concerned and, when considering proposals to
amend Appendix I or II, adopt measures that are proportionate to the anticipated
risks to the species.”99 The principle reflects a commitment to usage strategies
aimed

at

sustainable

use

within

resilient

SESs

and

conservation

in

circumstances of overexploitation.
Since the early 1980s CITES has consistently underplayed the threats to
elephants related to trade, and has over-estimated the ability of states to protect
wildlife and regulate and control trade.100 Trade in ivory has been allowed to
continue despite mounting evidence that trade is unsustainable, cannot be
controlled by existing mechanisms (or those anticipated in the near future), and
threatens elephants in most of their range. CITES clearly did not apply the
precautionary principle in its decision to allow China to purchase ivory, despite
reports from CITES research arm, TRAFFIC, as early as 2004 indicating “a new
emerging consumer market in China was the principal driving force behind the
upward trend” in ivory seizures from 1998.101 Unable to achieve consensus,
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CITES continues to facilitate the exploration of legalized ivory sales. In 2007, in
the midst of the current poaching crisis, CITES commissioned a study to explore
a decision-making mechanism for a process to regularly trade in ivory. The study,
released in 2012, determined trade was sustainable from Appendix II countries
using only natural mortality, despite clear evidence by the time of publication that
elephants face a major poaching crisis in most of their range. It also provided an
outline of how a regulated trade would function under CITES.102 CITES will take
up the proposal at the CoP in 2016.

Short Term Gains to Resource Utilization

While some states have consistently advocated for a resource use strategy
bolstered by consumption, ivory sales as a resource use strategy provide only
short term gains and little economic benefit for range states or local resource
users. Longer term strategies which emphasize resource conservation, on the
other hand, allow range states to benefit from constant and accruing gains to
wildlife resources.
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Range states continue to lose out on the full economic value of their
elephant resources as a result of the illegal harvesting of elephant ivory. While
legal ivory sales not only fail to bring states significant economic value, they
contribute to the increase in demand for ivory, met primarily though illicit
channels. Harvesting increases, as a result, negatively impact states’ abilities to
fully realize the potential of wildlife tourism as a revenue generator.
Following patterns, which remain relevant, in the pre-ban era most states
did not realize significant profits from the sale of ivory, even during periods of
intense harvesting. African states exported from 600 to 1,160 tons of ivory per
year from 1979-1986, however all but seven states reported merchandise export
earnings related to ivory as less than 2 per cent of total receipts. 103 The latest
ivory sales coordinated through CITES continued the trend of low profits for
range states and big benefits for consumer states and criminal organizations
African range states earned $15 million from the sale of 152 tons of ivory in the
two CITES auctions.104 Traders and collectors, in addition to transnational
criminal groups, in China and Japan continue to reap the profits.105
At the same time states lose current and future economic values
associated with elephant viewing, the criminal killing of wildlife reduces security
and stability in already weak states. In areas impacted by cross-border poaching
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gangs- insurgents, terrorists, and other dangerous non-state armed actors,
populations suffer multiple forms of violence including kidnapping, sex slavery,
forced labor, torture, and murder.106 Poaching and other organize crimes
committed by these groups lengthen conflict, destroy local environments,
severely restrict licit economic growth, and sew insecurity across regions. They
contribute to the development and perpetuation of ‘war economies’ and trading
networks which trade all manner of illicit natural resources from coal to
diamonds, to ivory, connecting conflict zones to regional political economies and
licit and illicit actors in government and business.107 Where ivory trafficking is
controlled by members of the political and/or security establishment already weak
institutions are further diminished, contributing to the general breakdown in the
rule of law.108 The concentration of illegal power that accrues to illicit actors
undermines

government

effectiveness

and

legitimacy

and

increases

corruption.109
In 2010 the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimated
120 tons of ivory entered the market each year illegally, totaling $228,610,200
million wholesale, dwarfing state revenues from the legal ‘one-off’ ivory sales.110
The inability of governance systems to protect ivory resources means poachers
and traffickers essentially operate in an open access system with few effective
rules or regulations to limit their resource usage strategies.
106
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The SES as an Open Access System

Through most of its history the SES essentially operated as a de facto
open access system in which “everyone is permitted to harvest a resource” with
no restrictions on resource use until local governance structures emerged in the
late 19th and early 20th century.111 Open access systems typically experience two
forms of ‘free-riding,’ “overuse without concern for the negative effects on others,
and a lack of contributed resources for maintaining and improving” the system. 112
These patterns are evident across the African elephant SES. Resource use
patterns for elephant products, both ivory and meat, have been largely
dominated by market driven resource maximization strategies since the earliest
periods

of

(non-African)

human/elephant

interactions.

These

strategies

consistently resulted in over-harvesting and exploitation of elephant resources, in
some areas to the point of extirpation- local extinctions.

As a result, after

centuries of heavy hunting for ivory, only 4 million elephants remained in SES at
the turn of the 20th century, where historically tens of millions of elephants had
roamed.113
The earliest extirpations of elephants occurred within the context of the
Roman Empire. The Romans sought out elephants for their ivory, for
entertainment, and for their ability to provide services to humans, driving their
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local extinctions in North Africa and in the Middle East.114 European expansion
into Africa from the 1600s onwards drove local population crashes first in
Southern Africa and then in West Africa. For centuries the ivory trade tracked
closely with the international salve trade, as both goods travelled the same trade
routes from remote areas to coastal trading zones where they were sold to
international buyers.115 During this period European and American markets
dominated the trade, importing millions of tusks per year in the 1800s during an
age of industrial ivory production. European markets alone imported 1,000 tons
of ivory per year during the 1800s.116 Ivory acted as a commodity for harvest and
export to the industrialized West for manufacture into billiard balls, piano keys,
hair combs, and other trinkets.117 Then as now the aggregated decisions of
individuals to consume ivory drove the market while international institutions
facilitated the trade. The current demand in Asian markets similarly drives the
trade, and the patterns of use, evident within SESs across Africa, threatening to
permanently transform the SES at the global scale.118
Resource utilization strategies began shifting around the turn of the 20 th
century, transforming interactions between resource users and resources from
consumptive utilization to non-consumptive utilization. Governance mechanisms
emerged to create laws and regulations protecting remaining elephant
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populations.119 Changing fashion trends, the Great Depression, and the two
World Wars further reduced ivory consumption in the West, easing pressure on
elephant populations. In the 1970s Japan emerged as a major international
market, reinvigorating demand.120

In the 1980s public awareness raising

campaigns greatly reduced demand in the West. After the 1989 trade ban was
adopted international sales of ivory plummeted almost immediately, and the
international market for ivory “went into rapid collapse.’121
In the late 1980s and 1990s usage patterns shifted as the international
community drove African governments to adopt neoliberal community based
conservation models.

After the massive poaching epidemic of the 1970s and

1980s, the international community, NGOs, and African governments recognized
that fortress style conservation was inadequate to meet the requirements to
protect a fugitive resource, in particular in light of quickly growing human
populations which inevitably conflict with wildlife.122 Community based natural
resource management (CBNRM) became the preferred strategy to address
poaching and improve management of wildlife outside of parks, where most
wildlife lives.123 Wildlife resources within CBNRM programs in many parts of the

119

Martin Meredith, Elephant Destiny: Biography of an Endangered Species in Africa (New York:
Public Affairs, 2001). Brown, Blood Ivory: The Massacre of the African Elephant.
120
Meredith, Elephant Destiny: Biography of an Endangered Species in Africa.
121
Duffy, "Global Environmental Governance and North–South Dynamics: The Case of the
Cites." Orenstein, Ivory, Horn, and Blood: Behind the Elephant and Rhinocerous Poaching Crisis,
63.
122
Dan Brockington, Fortress Conservation: The Preservation of the Mkomazi Game Reserve,
Tanzania (Oxford: James Currey, 2002).
123
Kadzo Kangwana & Chrstine Brown-Nunez, “The human context of the AMboseli elephants,”
in The Amboseli Elephants: A long term perspective on a long lived mammal. EDS Cynthia J.
Moss, Harvey Croze, and Phllis C. Lee. University of Chicago Press: Chicago and London, 2011.

111
SES became targets for elite predation and rent seeking as values to wildlife and
land increased with liberalization.124
Utilization strategies shifted again in the 2000s as markets expanded in
Asia with preferences oriented towards consumption. Following earlier trends,
market driven exploitation began threatening to transform the SES around 2002
before heating up in 2006 and 2009, and exploding from 2010. 125 As much as 57% of the elephant population is being slaughtered annually, and the rate is
increasing, “shrinking the timeframe for elephant survival across most of the
species’ range to within 10-15 years.”126 Since 2010, when poaching rates first
outstripped birth rates, elephant populations have been in net decline. 127
Pressure from the massive international market continue to shrink the SES
across the continent, transforming some local SESs. The SES has not adapted
in response to these perturbations, degrading resilience, which will, if unchecked,
decrease the ability of the SES to “reorganize in the wake of change.” 128
With the exception of the brief period following the international trade ban
from 1989 to the early 2000s when poaching rates had declined, the governance
system and licit resource users have not been able to protect African elephants
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from market demand for ivory.129 The governance system has consistently failed
to “establish rules curtailing resource use in the interest of long-term
sustainability” throughout the SES.130

Roving Bandits in the Open Access African Elephant SES

What Ostrom refers to as “roving bandits,” in this case transnational
organized criminals trading in ivory, operate across the SES with impunity, linking
resource users across the global SES with wildlife products.131 In a globalized
SES, markets develop so quickly that illicit actors can move in, exploit a
resource, then move out of an area at an accelerated clip before authorities can
mount a response.132 Ostrom identifies ‘accelerating rates of change’ as a key
challenge to the management of global SESs. Accelerating rates of change
refers to how quickly environmental thresholds are passed compared to how long
it takes governance authorities or others to notice. The speed with ivory
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traffickers are able to exploit resources challenges the ability of governance
authorities across levels to react in time to halt the transformation of local
SESs.133 In a largely open access system, these criminal poachers adopt a
resource maximization strategy meant to realize gains as quickly as possible
through whatever means necessary.134 Criminal networks trafficked as much as
170 tons of ivory between 2009-2014, representing as many as 229,729
elephants illegally killed.135
The United Nation’s Convention against Transnational Organized Crime
defines transnational organized crime in terms of crime groups. Crime groups
include more than three people, operating for a period of time, with the intention
to commit criminal actions for profit.136 Crimes become transnational when:
their activities take place in more than one country;
are planned in one country and executed in another; involves an
organized crime group that engages in activities in more than one state;
and
when the effects are felt in more than one state. 137
TOC involving wildlife is often referred to as wildlife crime or environmental
crime. Environmental crime involves five areas including the illegal trade in
endangered species and wildlife; illegal trade in ozone depleting substances;
illegal dumping, trade and transport of waste and hazardous substances; illegal,
133
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unregulated, and unreported commercial fishing; and illegal logging and trade in
protected woodlands.138 Wildlife crimes cost the world economy between $70
and $213 billion per year. 139
The large scale of ivory seizures, complex shipping routes, expense related to
organizing and carrying out hunts, the sophisticated weapons used, and the
organizational capacity to coordinate, containerize, and move large amounts of
ivory clearly point to the involvement of transnational organized crime. Since
1989 authorities seized at least 55 large shipments of ivory (over 2.3 tones). 140
Between 1989 and 2010 approximately 21 tons of ivory were seized each year,
with some spikes in 2002, 2006, and 2009. From 2011-2014 the rates
approximately doubled to around 40 tons per year.141 As a low-risk, high-profit
enterprise transnational criminals use ivory to generate hundreds of millions of
dollars in revenue per year. While in some areas illicit ivory syndicates have
operated for decades, transnational organized crime became most heavily
involved in the illegal trade in ivory in the 2000s. 142
Transnational ivory trafficking illustrates how globalization can impact
resilience and vulnerability of SESs. Criminal networks cross state boundaries in
the SES and operate as global multinational businesses, connecting local
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resources to global markets through complex and interlinked networks. They
penetrate institutions in the business community and in government, including
those tasked with protecting wildlife. They coordinate through harvesting, trading,
and transporting networks to subvert national and international laws and move
the ivory and other wildlife products to market.143 Harvesting networks are
directed by a financier who can supply weapons and material to poaching
parties. These individuals are often well connected politically, as evidenced by
the near complete lack of trafficking convictions across Africa or Asia. 144
Harvesting networks can include poor villagers, park rangers, professional
hunters, conservation authorities as well as large poaching gangs such as rebel
groups or insurgents working under the direction of a financier.145 Involvement by
the political elite in poaching syndicates greatly increases the number of illegal
kills and can directly contributes to high rates of poaching.146
Once harvested, ivory enters one of many sophisticated transportation
networks. Ivory is typically trucked to points of debarkation for consolidation and
for containerization for shipment to the Far East.

Transportation networks

encompass a range of licit and illicit actors including professionals in the travel
industry, ‘conservation’ professionals, attorneys, border agents, shipping clerks,
businessmen, and government officials. These individuals provide services to
criminal and terror networks to move illicit ivory from its point of origin to
143
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destination.147 These networks move ivory through the blackmarket as they
would other illicit goods such as weapons, drugs, minerals, or counterfeits. 148
Trading networks further involve a wide range of actors, intersecting with other
illicit networks including weapons, human smuggling, and the illicit traffic in
minerals. Criminal gangs trade weapons and cash with insurgents and terrorists
for ivory.149

150 151

In this way they supply armed groups with more weapons and

material used both to sustain conflict and poaching activities. 152 The emergence
of armed groups as players in the international SES further complicates solution
sets by adding a national security dimension to governance challenges. At the
consumer end in China and other Asian destinations illicit ivory may be
laundered into the legal system through trading networks or carved in blackmarket factories owned and operated by ivory trafficking networks. 153
Organized criminal networks are the physical manifestation of conceptual
linkages between remote landscapes and wildlife in Africa and the international
markets decimating them.
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Shifts in Governance and Usage Patterns

After years of inaction, threats at the international level of the SES have
begun to drive change in both usage patterns and governance systems across
the SES, with impacts trickling down to lower tiers across the system. Shifts in
governance reflect what may be a movement towards new management
structures, which more closely combine and coordinate governance authority
across a variety of actors at multiple levels.154 These shifts can be attributed to
greater awareness of SES dynamics and the global scale over which these
dynamics occur.

Non-Governmental Organizations and the Management of Wildlife Resources

International NGOs play an increasingly important role in the governance of
wildlife resources, augmenting formal governance structures across levels of the
SES. NGOs play a key role in in raising awareness on wildlife issues and in
establishing an agenda at the international level focused on coordinated action to
halt the transformation of the international SES and to protect specific local
SESs. Their efforts are gaining in momentum and achieving important goals, in
particular as regards Chinese consumption of ivory and attitudes embedded
within the Chinese government.
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International conservation NGOs provide further physical manifestations of
the global interconnectedness of wildlife areas and international consumers and
users of wildlife resources. They connect international consumers (nonconsumptive) of wildlife resource users with the local populations across the
global elephant SES through fund raising initiatives, local programming, and
awareness raising campaigns. They exert influence both on state wildlife policies
and on communities living near wildlife, holding a unique position of authority in
the international community to set and shape wildlife agendas.155 They
coordinate internationally, join coalitions, and attempt to impact public opinion,
shape international institutions, and influence international and national laws.156
International wildlife NGOs shape awareness on wildlife issues by
regularly conducting serious studies of wildlife populations and factors
threatening them which are shared with states, released to global media outlets
and are available freely online. NGOs conduct research and investigation,
provide expert scientific and legal interpretations, perform monitoring services,
and publish regular reports on environmental issues and surrounding
circumstances to ‘name and shame’ authorities at multiple levels.157 NGOs
widely publicize important scholarly works focused on wildlife population
dynamics, using hard data and science to underlie arguments for conservation.
Some international conservation NGOS conduct surveys of elephant populations
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to accurately report figures. Others examine ivory markets and explore drivers of
the wildlife trade.158
NGOs have successfully framed wildlife crime and the ivory trade as an
important issue at the international level. For the past three decades NGOs have
lobbied CITES to provide further protections for elephants and to reject bids for
further one-off sales.159 NGOs were instrumental in instituting the ivory trade ban
in 1989.

The lobbying efforts of EIA and the US based African Wildlife

Foundation (AWF) brought attention to the elephant poaching crisis in the late
1980s and were instrumental in shifting public attitudes away from ivory
purchasing.160 A consortium of NGOs played a critical role in the Ivory Trade
Review Group (ITRG) and its report on the devastating impact on poaching,
submitted to CITES prior to its formal decision to halt the international trade. 161
The report had a major impact on decisions by the US, the European
Community, Switzerland, Australia, Canada, and the UK, which all announced
full or partial ivory bans after its release.162 During the latest poaching crisis
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NGOs spotted trends in wildlife crime before CITES or range states recognized
either the scope or the scale of the crisis, in some cases as early as 2000.163
In recent years investigative reporting by NGOs uncovered the link with
terrorism and insurgency, the militarization of poaching, and the role corruption
plays in facilitating the trade.164 In many cases without NGO reporting to
supplement CITES reports little substantive research would exist.

Key

international wildlife scholars and NGOs began raising the alarm about the
increase in elephant poaching while CITES research and analysis arms
continued to claim poaching had not increased as a result of the first one-off sale.
For example in 2007 scholars argued ivory from over 37,000 elephants was
entering the market each year, years before a poaching crisis was acknowledged
by CITES.165 According to Princen, “NGOs appear to be key actors in moving
societies away from current trends in environmental degradation and toward
sustainable economies.”166

Increased Awareness of the Globality of the SES

Increased awareness of the interconnected nature of the SES and the
“planetary consequences” of resource use decisions is beginning to influence
Chinese governance policies on the utilization of ivory resources as well as the
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actions of individual resource users.167 Ostrom argues that communities no
longer need to be small or physically co-located to monitor each other’s’
activities, that the internet, communications technology, and other aspects of
globalization, has not only created larger communities but also contains the
mechanisms by which individuals can hold others within the SES accountable for
overusing resources.168 Until this period, resource users and the governance
system had failed to recognize or acknowledge important scale and level
interactions, i.e. the link between increased demand and the impacts of overharvesting at a high rate over a short period.169
Evidence suggests Chinese government and consumer attitudes may be
changing away from a preference for utilization and consumption of ivory, due in
large part to the work of international NGOs which have been increasingly
successful in linking transnational environmental crime and its lasting impacts on
wildlife and communities with government policies and individual decisions to
consume wildlife products After intense lobbying by IFAW and other international
wildlife NGOs in 2011, China adjusted laws on the illegal wildlife trade, and shut
down live auctions of raw ivory,170 thought to be a major market for poached
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tusks, in addition to participating in some international level law enforcement
actions aimed at illicit wildlife trafficking.171
In light of the global nature of the ivory market, and the unsustainable level
of demand demonstrated by users in China and other Asian states, international
NGOs place a particular focus on reducing demand for wildlife products.
Demand reduction strategies in China attempt to link iconic African species with
iconic Chinese species to alert consumers of the impact of their choices through
familiar imagery. Wild Aid is spreading their ivory demand reduction message“When the buying stops, the killing can, too” across China, reaching a billion
people per week.172 The International Fund for Animal Welfare’s (IFAW) “Mom, I
got teeth” campaign, which depicts a baby elephant telling his mother about his
tusks, was seen by 75% of urban Chinese.173 Strong and effective demand
reduction programs can create a norm against use and inculcate a zero tolerance
norm for any consumption. These campaigns clearly link Chinese consumer
behavior with the survival, or disappearance, of iconic species. Evidence
suggests Chinese attitudes are shifting on ivory as a result of such campaigns. 174
NGO appeals aimed at the Chinese government are two pronged, at once
highlighting China’s role as an emerging world leader and focusing attention on
the immediate impact the Chinese can make in stopping poaching and shaming
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the country in the international media for failure to take substantive action. 175
After intense lobbying and local recruitment of Chinese elites, NGOs have been
successful in pushing the government to enforce some laws against trading in
endangered species which appear to have impacted levels of poaching in Africa,
though poaching continues to occur at unsustainable levels.176 In 2011 China
began strictly enforcing sales of ivory at ‘grey market’ auctions. This action had
an immediate impact on sales and prices of ivory, which dropped by 20-30%.
The ban limited liquidity in the ivory market, removing some incentive to invest
and speculate in ivory.177 In 2014 the government implemented changes in its
wildlife protection laws to make it illegal to knowingly consume or purchase
poached wildlife.178
Prosecutions for wildlife crimes, though still low, are increasing in China,
with the maximum penalty of life in prison for wildlife crimes. China increased
local enforcement through the National Inter Agency CITES Enforcement
Collaboration Group (NICECG) of China, which mobilized over 100,000
enforcement officers specifically focused on wildlife crime. It initiated both
Operation COBRA I and COBRA II, large scale international efforts, to bust
wildlife trafficking rings. The operations resulted in hundreds of arrests. 179
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Following an international trend, the Chinese government burned six tons of
illegal ivory in January 2014.

China has also stepped up aid to African

governments battling poachers and increased efforts to educate Chinese migrant
workers in Africa.180

New Institutions to Address Segments of the SES

The efficacy of governance systems shifts over time. As Young notes, an
institution that at one time operated effectively may later no longer serve the
needs of the SES. 181 Range states are adapting to weaknesses in the current
governance mechanism by creating new institutions and adapting existing
institutions to address wildlife issues.

Shifts in how range states are interacting

to adapt to perturbations in the SES are a reflection of the need to bolster
governing authorities and perhaps realign jurisdictional scales to more closely
correspond to regions and areas. These adaptations are meant to address a
fundamental challenge of the global SES- the mismatch between levels of
jurisdictional authority and enforcement capabilities inherent in a large
international system. By scaling down governance structures from the entire
international SES to discrete regional sections range states can focus not only on
illegal trafficking of wildlife but on long term conservations strategies to sustain
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wildlife resources. Increasingly supra-state coordination on wildlife management
within the resource system occurs through regional intergovernmental bodies,
transfrontier park management authorities, and issue specific regional bodies
focused on anti-poaching. These organizations do not provide further authority
on the trade in species, but do play a role in in promoting sustainable
management practices of shared resources.
Range states are turning to existing bodies to enforce governance
agreements on the conservation of the SES. The Southern African Development
Community (SADC), the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS), and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)
also encompass broad mandates to coordinate environmental policies within a
framework of regional integration. These bodies generally establish common
approaches to wildlife and land management across a region. 182 Supra-state
management authorities with specific mandates to conserve and protect wildlife
resources are also emerging across the SES. Gabon, Cameroon, and the
Republic of Congo coordinate in the TRIDOM,the Tri-national Dja–Odzala–
Minkébé landscape,of the Western Congo Basin Moist Forest Ecoregion
(WCBMFE). Cooperation in TRIDOM, formalized in 2005, includes a tri-national
governance structure over seven total protected areas and over 20 million
people.183 A transfrontier park operates between Burkina Faso, Niger, and
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Benin.184 Greater Virunga Transboundary Collaboration, made up of parks in
three countries, spans Uganda, Rwanda, and the DRC.185 Tanzania and Kenya
share the Amboseli- West Kilimanjaro and Natron- Magadi landscape where they
coordinate to conduct periodic aerial censuses.186 The Tanzania-Kenya
borderlands span 16 protected areas ranging from Serengeti-Mara to TsavoMkomazi and support the largest bushed savanna elephant population in Africa.
Further, in 2012 the East African Community Transboundary Ecosystems
Management Act sets up a commission to oversee the conservation and
sustainable development of important East African trans-border ecosystems. 187
Several trans-frontier parks exist in Southern Africa, the largest being the Greater
Limpopo Trans-Frontier Park stretching between South Africa, Mozambique, and
Zimbabwe.188 Other trans-frontier parks exist across the continent. Cross-border
agreements include strategies to address environmental degradation, antipoaching, tourism development, land use strategies, and other issues which
transcend physical borders and threaten SES performance. 189
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Other important international initiatives instituted by range states revolve
specifically around the increased threats to wildlife and poaching. The 1996
Lusaka Agreement on Co-operative Enforcement Operations Directed at Illegal
Trade in Wild Fauna and Flora, includes states in Central, East, and Southern
Africa.190 The agreement facilitates cooperation amongst the states for
investigations of wildlife crimes and was integral to the success of the
international police action, COBRA II.191 In 2013 Botswana hosted the African
Elephant Summit to gather leaders of African states and wildlife experts to
discuss urgent measures required to stem the growing illegal ivory trade and its
impacts on elephant populations in Africa. Attending states adopted 14 ‘urgent
measures’ to contribute to elephant survival. The measures presented ivory
poaching as a national security priority.192 That same year ECCAS adopted an
Extreme Emergency Anti-poaching Plan (PEXULAB) to combat poaching. 193
Under the plan member states created an inter-state coordination mechanism for
the fight against poaching and urged individual countries to create national units
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involving all the administrations involved in wildlife criminality. Cameroon, Central
African Republic and Chad agreed to develop a mixed operational unit to fight
poaching, conduct joint patrols, focus more on investigations, improve
intelligence gathering and utilization.194 In 2014 Tanzania hosted the Regional
Summit to Stop Wildlife Crime and Advance Wildlife Conservation, a forum
primarily focused on transnational wildlife crime in the region.195
In most instances cooperative agreements are in the nascent stages of
development and have not yet proven effective at stemming the illegal ivory trade
or poaching, or in achieving consensus amongst states on the viability or
desirability of a legal ivory trade. However, they signify a willingness and interest
in addressing perturbations holistically and in coordination in the near term
outside of CITES mechanisms, an important shift not evident in other
international institutions. These organizations offer the potential to operate as an
important vehicle to address perturbations at the regional trade level where
policies can be crafted to address specific threats on an appropriate time-scale.
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Social-Ecological System Performance

Ostrom notes the social performance of an SES can be described through
a variety of terms such as accountability, efficiency, and equity. In the African
elephant SES the social performance- the performance of the human
components of the SES- can be described as lacking accountability and equity.
The system is inefficient and slow, and operates as a de facto open access
system.
Accountability refers to whether “the central actors can to some extent be
held responsible” for actions impacting the SES. 196 At the international level the
primary resource users, states and transnational criminals, have not been held
accountable by CITES for the transformation of the global SES. CITES has not
held itself accountable for its failure to uphold the precautionary principle and the
increase in poaching across Africa related to the increased demand and the ‘oneoff sales.’ As an international authority on wildlife trade, CITES retains the
institutional authority to shape international opinion on the ethics and viability of
international trade in species. However, the organization has not asserted that
authority to effectively shift norms around elephant conservation, instead opting
to defer to technical definitions and mandates in the treaty.197
At tiers nested below the international level range states and consumers
cannot agree on the existence of an existential threat to elephants within the SES
196
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and have failed to craft a plan of action. Even in the midst of a poaching crisis
ranges states fail to bolster or enforce laws protecting wildlife, invest in wildlife
conservation and in measures to protect future economic gains related to wildlife
viewing. While range states have expressed a willingness to create and join
regional organizations devoted to coordinated action to protect wildlife, and have
participated in the organization and running of conferences devoted to raising
awareness on threats to wildlife, few concrete outcomes can be tracked.
Consumer states in Asia have begun to address wildlife crime as a serious issue,
however continue to value cultural interpretations of the utility of wildlife and rely
on range states to bare the greatest burden of enforcement. Of the stakeholders
identified within the governance system, international NGOs have accepted the
greatest responsibility in investigating wildlife crimes and shifting consumer and
government behavior.
The governance system and licit resource users have proven inefficient in
addressing threats to the SES. Coordinated action at the international level only
rarely occurs and does so on a slow schedule not accordant with the pace of
destruction within the ecosystem. Information is not effectively gathered or
shared across the SES, limiting the ability of policy makers to scope
perturbations in the system or to craft policies to address effectively the
perturbations. Funding to protect wildlife consistency fails to reach needed levels.
CITES’ seeming acephalous organization, political wrangling in the CoPs, overreliance on unreliable scientific metrics, and inability or unwillingness to enforce
sanctions on states not in compliance with the treaty limit the Convention’s ability
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to fulfill its mandate and quickly address wildlife crime. The Convention has not
adequately addressed the increase in illicit trade, and has even continued to
pursue the development of a mechanism to regulate a legal trade in ivory.
African range states, despite the development of cross-border mechanisms, also
fail to address international trade and have not effectively addressed the illegal
trade outside of Southern Africa. And even there, poaching rates have increased
and are expected to increase further in the coming years in the absence of more
meaningful controls put in place, and as resources are poached out in the rest of
the continent.
As currently functioning the SES is not equitably structured in terms of
apportioning benefits or costs. The range states bear the greatest cost in both
economic, environmental, and security costs related to the loss of wildlife. The
removal of elephants and other wildlife limits the ability of states to attract
tourism, a major income earner and job creator. Impacts on the environment
may be far reaching as elephants play an important role in dispersing seeds,
excavating waterways for other animals, and checking the expansion of forest
into grasslands and savannahs. Aside from reputational costs, consumer states
and individuals within them enjoy the continuation of cultural traditions which left
unhindered may have died out along with high pecuniary returns.
Ecological performance measures relate to how the resource system and
resource units react to interactions with the governance system and resource
users. Overharvesting, the unsustainable off-take of wildlife, characterizes the
ecological performance of the African elephant global SES. The resource system
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could easily support more dense populations, in particular in forested areas of
Central Africa and in the savannahs of eastern Africa.
The inability to adequately control trade at the international level through
CITES, and the attendant increase in demand that accompanied the ‘one-off’
sales in 2002 and 2008, are transforming the global SES. Without adaptation at
the international level, begging to occur, elephants will be locally extirpated
across much of their range.

Conclusion

This chapter demonstrates that interactions between endogenous and
exogenous processes contribute to explanations of both vulnerability and
resilience of the African elephant SES. Both actions of international resource
users and range states weaken the ability of an essentially open access system
to combat illicit resource use. The chapter identifies important scale and level
dynamics impacting the ability of the system to respond to perturbations at the
international level, as well as revealing how collective action dilemmas impact the
ability of the SES to effectively respond to perturbations.
Several scale challenges are identified. First, as Cash notes, is the
jurisdictional/geographical mismatch between levels and scales in the SES.198
Mechanisms at the international level lack enforcement capabilities, these
deficiencies are mirrored at the tiers nested below in state enforcement systems.
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As a result, the scale of criminal activity has not been met with an attendant
increase in capacity for enforcement. Again, these failures are mirrored and
repeated at tiers below the international SES. Laws restricting trade are
essentially unenforced at all levels. A second scale challenge emerges from
institutional challenges over the funding required to fully address the illicit
trafficking in ivory and the funds available. Neither the governance systems
involved nor non-consumptive resource users adequately fund measures to
protect wildlife from the current scale of exploitation. Third, the value/knowledge
mismatch, what Ostrom refers to as a cultural diversity challenge, create
conditions in which actors’ favor their own preferences for usage despite
outcomes to the system. 199 As a result CITES as an international governance
authority is limited in its ability to protect species by lack of consensus amongst
parties on the political, economic, and cultural valuations of endangered species.
Related is the mismatch between scale of resources required to satisfy the
market and those available. The ecosystem is clearly not capable of meeting the
demands of the market and remaining resilient, or possible even extant. 200 These
scale mismatches are complicated by the collective action dilemmas apparent
within CITES and amongst range states. Their inability to achieve consensus on
the desirability and viability of a continued ivory trade impact the ability to identify
or address problems of illicit resource use and overexploitation of resources. In
the absence of effective rules and regulations the system operates as an open
access system, with the potential for transformation.
199
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This chapter demonstrates how globalization acts as a central feature of
SESs because of impacts on the resilience and vulnerability of systems. 201 As
concatenations increase between the SES and global markets the system has
become larger, includes more resource users with varying norms and history of
use, adding uncertainty and complexity to the system. 202

Globalization,

increasing speed of interactions, increasing the flow of information, facilitating
global travel and trade, allows for the faster depletion of resources and the
amplification of ‘mismatches’ between levels of governance and scope and scale
of resource use across the system. As in the past, the current SES, at every
level of analysis, exists within the context of the global political economy and
cannot be conserved without reference to dynamics at play at multiple levels.
In the absence of effective mechanisms to adapt to the increased level of
perturbations across the system, the international African elephant SES could
transform uncontrolled, shrinking and shifting to a more geographically limited
space in Southern Africa. Currently the level of harvesting and the decimation of
local SESs nested below the international level are severally impacting the
resilience of local systems and that of the whole. Adaptation in response to these
threats has not occurred on the temporal scale necessary to halt the change at
the international level.
Because human actions dominate SESs, adaptability in a system is a
function of the individuals and groups managing that system across levels. As a
nested and tiered system, governance authorities below the international level
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affect both local SESs and the international SES. The following case studies will
examine how three states- Kenya, Tanzania, and Botswana- are adapting their
SESs’ to meet the challenges facing their national SESs in the context of
perturbations across the entire social-ecological system.
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CHAPTER 5
KENYA

Problem Statement

In 2014 after multiple gruesome poaching incidents within Kenya, the
nation’s media and international NGOs called on the Kenyan government and
wildlife management authorities to declare poaching a national disaster.1
Conservationists shaped the issues facing Kenya’s social-ecological system
(SES) as a poaching crisis on par with what Kenya experienced in the 1980s,
when continent wide about 100,000 elephants were poached each year. 2 This
simplistic assessment of perturbations facing Kenya’s SES ignores entirely other
key factors transforming Kenya’s SES, as well obfuscates Kenya’s role as a
trafficking hub in the international level social ecological system. Applying the
social ecological systems framework (SESF) reveals that Kenya’s SES is
exposed to “multiple, interacting perturbations,” 3 facing threats across levels and
scales of the SES and from various users and practices. Combined these
threats, if not addressed, could transform the Kenyan SES in an uncontrolled
fashion while continuing to degrade the international level SES. 4

These

perturbations relate not only to Kenya’s position within global ivory markets as a
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trafficking hub and source for ivory, but also stem from legacy conservation and
land management laws and policies which have proven inadequate to address
threats, and in some cases exacerbated threats, to the SES.
Kenya’ primary role in the international SES relates to its emergence as
an international ivory trafficking hub. Criminal networks link SESs in Central
Africa to global markets through Kenya. Mombasa is considered the continent’s
most important ivory trafficking hub.5 Kenya’s weak laws, lack of enforcement,
and connectivity to global shipping enable illicit traffickers and users. 6 Corruption
and mismanagement within the KWS exacerbate the problem further, allowing
criminals within the wildlife establishment, in the political sphere, and powerful
businessman deeply involved in the wildlife trade to continue operating even in
the face of growing international scrutiny.7 Poaching of wildlife within Kenya
creates another layer of threat to the SES. Reportedly, around 500 elephants
are officially reported poached each year, though the number could be far
higher.8 However illegal killing has not reached the scope or scale which could
threaten SES transformation outside of other factors, as in Central Africa or
Tanzania.
The greatest threat to Kenya’s national SES likely resides at tiers below
the international and national level SES, with deep roots in colonial era
conservation and land use policies. Local resource users within the system are in
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the process of shifting livelihood strategies, pursuing short term goals of resource
maximization, which contribute to the fragmentation, degradation, and potential
destruction of large swaths of the SES.9 In the absence of adaptive strategies,
this transformation could lock the SES into new patterns. SESs shift into new
systems when fundamental change occurs, like desertification, salination, or
forest fire suppression at a large scale, or as in this instance, fencing, intensive
agricultural practices, and intensive pastoralism. 10 Current usage patterns are
driven by the absence of national land use policies and effective wildlife
management mechanisms which include participation of local communities in
decision-making, undermining the resilience and adaptability of the Kenyan SES.
Centralized national policy and postcolonial institutions have marginalized
stakeholder participation in efforts to manage the SES and combat poaching.
Since the colonial era, government policies have excluded local communities
from the decision-making process and from the ability to enjoy economic gains
from wildlife, undermining the development of conservation norms, and
contributing to land use practices incompatible with conservation. 11 The open
access nature of trust lands in particular have increased human-animal conflicts
and undermined efforts to combat poaching. Subdivision of communal lands has
further weakened ties between stakeholders as well as the ties of stakeholders to
the SES. This undermines norms of caretaking for the SES. Together, these
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factors create strong incentives for stakeholders to overexploit the SES rather
than conserve it.
Kenya has responded to perturbations in the resource system, both those
related to long-term trends of land use, and shorter term upticks in poaching
related to rising demand for ivory, by adapting resource governance through
state mechanisms, primarily the Kenya Wildlife Service; revision of land use
policies and land tenure regimes; and through the integration of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) across the spectrum of conservation. By
updating wildlife laws and adopting land use reforms at the national level, the
Kenyan government put in place structures to address all aspects of the
challenge to Kenyans resources from overuse to illegal exploitation. Operating
independently and in tandem with the government, NGOs bolster community
support for conservation initiatives by acting as a force multiplier within wildlife
dispersal areas, augmenting most of the services provided by the government.
Through both the government’s deliberative approach and the more ad hoc
nature of NGO involvement, the SES may be able to avoid uncontrolled
transformation. Adaptation of the governance system in Kenya has the further
potential to impact the international SES by disrupting illicit trade routes and
complicating the international traded decimating Central African elephant
populations.
Following the SESF, this chapter first describes Kenya’s resource system
and units, highlighting the small size of Kenya’s protected areas and the unique
nature of its system, which depends on the ability of human and wildlife
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populations to coexist. The following section examines the governance system
in Kenya and key interactions between the state and resource users, which have,
over time, contributed to the development of livelihood strategies not conducive
to conservation.

The following section examines the steps the governance

system has undertaken to address threats to the SES, which, if successful, could
guide the transformation of the SES at the national and local levels and decrease
the role Kenya plays in degrading the international SES.

The conclusion

highlights the utility of the SESF in tracing patterns and processes that
contributed to the development of the SES.

The Resource System and Resource Units

The small size of Kenya’s protected areas, the fugitive nature of wildlife
resources, and the unproductive character of the landscape in general present
challenges to the management of the SES. 12 Compared to most other African
countries, Kenya sets aside a relatively small portion of its landscape for
conservation. Kenya’s parks and game reserves occupy 7.5% of the country’s
landmass, a total of 43,673 km, almost entirely within areas known as arid and
semi-arid landscapes (ASALs). Protected areas include 22 national parks, 28
national reserves, and five national sanctuaries, in addition to four marine
national parks and six marine national reserves. At the same time, most of
Kenya’s wildlife exists outside of protected areas, in communally held lands and
12
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private property, creating conditions under which conflicts between wildlife and
humans are inevitable.13 Between 80-85%, live outside of the park system in
wildlife dispersal areas within the ASALs, along with approximately 10 million
people.14
The competition between human and wildlife populations is made more
intense by the poor quality of the landscape. The ASALs are fragile
environments, experience low and erratic rainfall, periodic droughts, and low
organic content.15 Despite the poor quality of the land, human population
densities remain high in the ASALs at 49.7 per sq/km, increasing each year
through high birth rates and migration.16 This landscape is important to Kenya’s
indigenous people and communal landholders, in particular the Maasai, who
depend on the landscape to preserve their livelihoods and culture.17
While nearly half of Kenya’s total land area could sustain elephant
populations fragmentation of habitats is increasing and accelerating as more
people move into the ASALs, reducing the available resources for elephants and
other wildlife.18
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results in the division of large, continuous habitats into smaller, more isolated
remnants.”19 These smaller and more isolated parcels, even with ideal localized
conditions, are not as efficient as larger areas of contiguous habitats where
elephants are free to roam.

Elephants cannot successfully exist in small or

confined areas because they will, with population growth, negatively impact
resource availability.20 Elephant habitat decreases and fragments everywhere
human habitation increases.21 Intensive human use of the SES is also resulting
in the loss of wildlife dispersal areas and migration corridors to agriculture and
development, degradation, commercial and subsistence poaching, and humanwildlife conflict (HWC).22
The primary contiguous elephant ranges still in existence include the
northern coast, the Tsavo-Chyulu-Amboseli-Kilimanjaro complex, the AberdareMt Kenya-Laikipia-Samburu-Northern Area complex, the Nguruman-MaraSerengeti complex, and Nasolot-Romoi-Kerio Valley. Tsavo is Kenya’s most
famous wildlife area, home to the country’s largest population of elephants. 23
Amboseli boasts the continent’s longest studied elephant populations and is
considered one of the best places in Africa to view elephants. The park was
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declared a UNESCO Man and the Biosphere Reserve in 1991.24 Three key transfrontier populations exist along Kenya’s borders with Tanzania, Uganda, and
Somalia.

25

The Tanzania-Kenya borderlands span 16 protected areas ranging

from Serengeti-Mara to Tsavo-Mkomazi and support the largest bushed
savannah elephant population in Africa.26
The current poaching crisis is the second one to hit Kenya in the past forty
years. From the 1970s until 1990 Kenya’s elephant herds declined from 167,000
elephants to less than 20,000. In some areas the poaching epidemic depleted
populations by as much as 85 percent.27 The current crisis is not thought to
include anywhere near the volume or proportion of illegally killed elephants,
though actual numbers of both extant populations and the levels of poaching are
in dispute. Kenyan government estimates place the current population of
elephants at around 35,000 total, with only around 500 poached yearly.
Conservationists argue the population hovers around 25,000, with potentially
thousands killed in recent years.28 Individual elephants in Kenya, some of the
largest in the world, are targeted by organized gangs for their massive tusks,
some operating transnationally and potentially connected with terrorist groups.
Two of Kenya’s most iconic elephants, Mountain Bull and Satao, were killed by
poaching gangs within months of one another in 2014. Another elephant with
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over 100 pounds of ivory so far has survived four separate attacks. 29 In one of
the worst poaching incidents in the current epidemic, a Somali gang killed 11
elephants in Tsavo East national park in one episode.30 Despite these events,
the KWS has denied there is any wildlife decline, either through poaching or
otherwise, despite clear evidence that as much as 30% of its wildlife in total has
disappeared since 1985.31
In Kenya the domestic and international trade in elephant parts are
proscribed, meaning the economic value to Kenya of its elephant population
relates primarily to its tourism viewing value. Tourists travel to Kenya specifically
to view the large free-flowing populations of animals, in particular elephants.32 At
least 12 “hundred pounders,” elephants with tusks weighing over 100 pounds per
side, live in Kenya.33 Individual elephants can be major tourist attractions whose
loss extends beyond the individual and can impact the community and the
tourism industry generally.34
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The Social System: Governance System and Resource Users

As the SESF literature suggests, examination of the social and political
history of a resource system can reveal underlying dynamics, which drive current
processes and patterns of governance and resource use.35 The laws, rules,
regulations, and investments a state makes for its resource system reflect the
values held by decision makers and resource users within the system, with
rippling impacts over time.36 These dynamics are clearly illustrated in this case
study. The governance system and resource users in Kenya interact within a
system shaped and defined by colonial era policies centralizing state control of
wildlife and restricting and limiting community input on wildlife utilization. These
policies continue to inform local norms on wildlife as well as state legislation. In
Kenya, the SES has been shaped by the interactions between the local
indigenous Kenyans and colonial leadership; the post-Independence leadership;
the conservation community, largely white and Western; and nongovernmental
conservation organizations. These interactions have taken place over time within
the context of a waxing and waning global ivory trade, currently on an upswing.
The social systems have been slow to adjust, within formal structures, to
changes within the SES related to social interactions including demographic
shifts, changing land use and livelihood strategies, and increased illicit resource
use. Colonial era policies and politics of conservation continue to impact
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conservation norms and the development of land use strategies, impeding
adaptation of the SES to threats, natural and human.
Two primary legislative areas, wildlife conservation and land use,
influence the decisions on conservation and development strategies within the
SES which state and non-state organizations must either reconcile or work
around to protect wildlife and habitats.37

This section first narrates early

conservation strategies in Kenya which continue to influence polices and norms
on wildlife. It then briefly discusses concepts of land tenure and land use policy,
central aspects of SES governance which impact both development and
conservation decisions amongst Kenya’s resource users. It also examines the
governance structures, resource users, and important interactions impacting the
health of the SES.

Colonial Era Governance

Kenya’s current governance structure is rooted in colonial era wildlife
policies, which ignored local SES dynamics in favor of central control of wildlife
and wildlife management and the exclusion of local communities. From the
earliest period of British colonial rule, government policies on wildlife operated
from the notion that wildlife populations could be best preserved in the absence
of human populations. Under colonial authority, wildlife was initially viewed as a
nuisance not compatible with large scale agricultural enterprises. Wildlife,
including now nearly extinct species, was regularly cleared from land prior to
37
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development. Colonial policies eventually developed to adopt a preservationist
stance on wildlife which valued preserving species over economic utilization. In
the late 1800s Kenya created its first wildlife reserve with the goal of protecting
wild animals for future hunting.38

These game reserves were created by

removing indigenous peoples from their traditional rangelands. Maasai, Kikyu,
Kalenjin,

Smaburu,

and

Pkot

peoples,

among

others,

suffered

mass

displacement as they were shifted onto their own “reserves” to make space for
wildlife, as well as for large-scale European agriculture ventures.39 Policies and
practices established by the colonial authorities in the indigenous reserve system
were incompatible with livelihood strategies and cultural practices, resulting in
degradation of the landscape and chronic resource deficiencies for both human
and wildlife populations.40 Under British rule, all wildlife became the property of
the Crown. All hunting by indigenous people was proscribed and no mechanism
was created for local communities to utilize wildlife resources through nonconsumptive means.41
By establishing the state as sole owner of wildlife, colonial authorities
removed responsibility for conservation from local communities, ignored local
epistemologies,

including

indigenous

methods

of

conservation

or

conceptualizations of the relationships between wildlife and human communities,
and damaged indigenous norms for conservation. These policies of exclusion
38

Yeager and Miller, Wildlife, Wild Death: Land Use and Survival in Eastern Africa.
Focus on Land in Africa, "Rise and Fall of Group Ranches in Kenya,"
http://www.focusonland.com/countries/rise-and-fall-of-group-ranches-in-kenya/. Lotte Hughes,
"Rough Time in Paradise: Claims, Blames and Memory Making around Some Protected Areas in
Kenya," Conservation and Society 5, no. 3 (2007).
40
Yeager and Miller, Wildlife, Wild Death: Land Use and Survival in Eastern Africa.
41
Mungumi Bakari Chongwa, "The History and Evolution of National Parks in Kenya," The
George Wright Forum 29, no. 1 (2012).
39

148
and displacement were continued in the post-independence period and removed
important connections to wildlife, the sense of local responsibility to protect, and
any potential to sustainably exploit wildlife within relevant local contexts.42
At the end of the colonial period parks were the exclusive haunt of Europeans
and settlers. Locals were excluded from decision-making and were not allowed
to utilize wildlife resources. Early post-Independence polices sought to alter
these realities, however, policies of centralization, state ownership of wildlife, and
exclusion of local communities continued.43

Land Use Legislation

Because Kenya’s parks and reserves cover only a fraction of wildlife
habitats, the land use strategies of those living in wildlife dispersal areas and
government policies to guide those strategies have important implications for
conservation. Two aspects of land use are relevant for wildlife management and
conservation; land policy, and land use policy. Land policy relates to issues of
legal ownership and tenure.

Land use policy refers to rules and regulations

established to protect land and water resources from degradation as a result of
development or other utilization.44
Land tenure in Kenya is rooted in colonial era policies and the indigenous
reserve system, set up to remove indigenous people from more productive
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agricultural zones and wildlife areas. In Kenya, land tenure is classified as either
public, private, or communal. Public land is held by the government and includes
Kenya’s protected wildlife parks and game reserves.

Private land is held

individually as property. By far, most land in Kenya is communally held Trust
Land in areas formerly set aside as indigenous reserves under the colonial
authority.45 Nearly all of Kenya’s protected areas and wildlife exist within Trust
Lands.46
Trust Lands consist of group ranches and conservancies as well as
unincorporated and unregistered lands.47 Nearly all of the pastoralists living in
Northern and Eastern Kenya live on Trust Lands.48 Group Ranches are the only
legally recognized mechanism to manage land communally. Group ranches exist
primarily in Maasai areas in Kajiado, Narok, and Amboseli, though they have
spread to Laikipia and Samburu.49 All of Kenya’s communally held group ranches
and about 50% of the total livestock population, representing millions of cattle,
sheep, goats, and camels,50 exist in the trust lands abutting Kenya’s parks and
game reserves.51 Conservancies can refer to a sanctuary on either private land
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or within a group ranch or trust land area managed for the purpose of wildlife
conservation.52
Over time trust lands have evolved into “open access” systems difficult to
protect from predatory elites or to manage in a way conducive to conservation.
Trust Land is managed by County Councils with legal requirements to consult
communities in decisions dealing with land allocation. However, in practice these
bodies exclude community members from decisions on resource and land
management choices. As a result, communities possess “no rights to exclude
outside users, to make and enforce land governance or allocation decisions, or to
enter into third-party agreements pertaining to land use.” 53 Additionally, as noted
below, no provisions within the wildlife law outline a framework for communities
within trust lands to collectively develop wildlife conservation areas, limiting the
potential for economic development related to wildlife tourism. The lack of
protections for community rights and challenges associated with developing
conservation programs drives land use practices that are often incompatible with
wildlife conservation.54
The second concept relates to land use policy. Land use policy deals with
the management of land and natural resources aimed towards sustainable use,
with tenure issues as secondary concerns. In Kenya, no national land use policy
existed until 2009, leaving a multitude of statutes and acts to govern resource
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management through provisions in legislation dealing with agriculture, forestry,
water, and other areas of land use. These statutes and acts are not only
disparate, identifying multiple authorities across government to address land use
practices in an uncoordinated fashion, but additionally often lack provisions on
sustainable use of the environment or minimum requirements for biodiversity
preservation. Where such provisions exist for sustainable use practices, they are
largely ignored and/or unenforced.55
In the absence of protections for communal land owners, or a national
policy creating universally applicable standards and usage guidelines for
environmental resources, protections for the SES are piecemeal and subject to
arbitrary change.56

Post-Colonial Wildlife Management

Post-colonial wildlife legislation attempted to redress past grievances and
create a more inclusive governance authority. The first attempt in post-colonial
Kenya to codify a national wildlife policy was a 1975 Sessional paper outlining a
comprehensive wildlife management strategy.57 The document moved away from
solely preservationist policies of colonial Kenya, identifying the primary goal of
55
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wildlife conservation to optimize returns from wildlife through aesthetic, cultural,
scientific, and economic gains.

Economic gains were to accrue both from

tourism and hunting. The policy noted the importance of the equitable
disbursement of wildlife returns, and the provision of compensation for losses
due to human wildlife conflict. 58 It identified the state and wildlife authorities as
partners with communities abutting parks and reserves in the development of
compatible land use strategies. In practice, however, the state retained central
control of wildlife and largely excluded local communities from either decision
making or revenue sharing.59
The Wildlife Conservation Management Act (WCMS) passed in 1976 to
implement the policy, creating the Wildlife Conservation and Management
Department (WCMD) under the Ministry of Tourism to manage the state’s
parks.60 Though initially it issued hunting licenses and allowed some limited
trade in wildlife on private lands, that right was rescinded in 1977 under pressure
from the international community concerned about uncontrolled poaching. The
state again became solely responsible for the management of wildlife and all
costs related to wildlife conservation.61

The WCMD managed the country’s

wildlife during the massive poaching epidemic of the 1970s and 1980s when
Kenya lost 85 percent of its elephants and 97 percent of its rhinoceros. With
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revision to the 1976 wildlife law, the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) replaced the
WCMD in 1989.62

Current Governances Structures

Kenya’s current governance structures, consisting of the Kenya Wildlife
Service (KWS) and hundreds of non-government organizations, operate across
the SES to protect the country’s wildlife and promote sustainable development
and conservation practices. However structural weaknesses in the KWS, weak
wildlife laws, corruption and mismanagement within the KWS, structural barriers
to the inclusion of local communities in conservation, and lingering distrust of
conservation NGOs impact the effectiveness of conservation efforts. These
issues are exacerbated by the continuing legacy of colonial wildlife policies,
which relied on exclusion of local communities and a strict preservationist
philosophy to create the nation’s parks.63
The KWS is the lead agency for the implementation of international
conventions and domestic legislation aimed at conserving, protecting, and
managing the country’s wildlife across all lands, whether held publically, within
the trust land system or privately.64 The KWS carries out wildlife policies to
include all functions related to running the country’s protected wildlife areas, from
manning gates and marketing Kenya’s wildlife attractions to running community
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education and development programs to enforcing wildlife crime legislation. 65
The service consists of multiple departments focused on conservation and
management within protected areas; conservation and management in areas
outside of protected areas; public awareness and education; regulation of the
wildlife industry; and establishment, managing, and marketing of economically
viable

wildlife-based

enterprises.66

Their

primary

responsibility

is

the

management of the country’s parks and reserves, with important law
enforcement functions including the reduction of poaching; security personnel
and conservancy ranger training; and securing park borders, infrastructure,
personnel, and visitors.67
The KWS also plays a role in intelligence gathering, investigation and
prosecution of wildlife crimes, and analysis of poaching and trafficking trends. 68
They work with other law enforcement agencies, including Customs, the national
police, INTERPOL, the Lusaka Agreement Task Force, Kenya Airports Authority
and Kenya Ports Authority, in addition to NGOs, conservancies, and community
governments to enforce wildlife laws.69 They monitor wildlife populations through
PIKE and MIKE mechanisms as well as through independent research projects
and biodiversity and habitat assessments. 70 Initiatives aimed at the reduction of
poaching also involve large-scale operations to remove illegal grazers from parks
65
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and wildlife dispersal areas, placing KWS rangers in situations of armed
conflict.71 The KWS considers itself a strong advocate for wildlife issues
generally. The organization lobbied the government for stronger laws and greater
capacity within the judiciary and across agencies to bolster penalties for wildlife
crime. It maintains a firm stance against the ivory trade and support the CITES
ban.72
Park management further includes all administrative functions, from
manning gates to booking safaris and marketing wildlife programs and amenities.
Community development projects, public awareness raising, and educational
initiatives are core functions of the KWS.73 KWS engages in community building
projects both as a donor and as partner in revenue generating enterprises in
tourist areas.74 It is charged with addressing issues of human wildlife conflict.75 It
further bear responsibility for managing critical water catchments which provide
the country’s drinking water as well as its hydroelectric power. The KWS is
responsible for 90 percent of safari tourism to Kenya and approximately 75
percent of the total tourism receipts. Tourism accounts for nearly 10 percent of
Kenya’s

GDP

and

is

the

third

largest

earner

after

agriculture

and

manufacturing.76
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Wildlife NGOs in Kenya, both native and international, are some of the
strongest in Africa, and operate across the spectrum of conservation. The KWS
lists over 100 other organizations at the local, regional, and international level as
partners in caring for Kenya’s wildlife. Reflecting more general international
trends in the last two decades NGOs in Kenya moved from service delivery to
“direct action, advocacy and involvement with setting government policy agendas
and other political decision-making.”77 NGOs engage in a range of activities from
awareness raising, education, monitoring of wildlife, intelligence gathering, antipoaching, and infrastructure support. These groups augment the KWS by
conducting education and awareness raising programs; funding emergency
wildlife veterinarians; patrolling areas adjacent to parks; removing snares; and
other services to aid wildlife and enforcement.78 Some specialized NGOs focus
on tracking wildlife criminals; assist with prosecutions; study trends in illegal
killing; and contribute to investigation, intelligence, emergency management and
data management.79 NGOs operating outside of parks and reserves contribute
to poaching arrests in addition to monitoring the landscape for snares, poison,
and other illegal trapping and killing mechanisms. 80 NGOs are deeply involved in
driving the development of community based natural resource management
(CBNRM) schemes, in particular conservancies, over the past two decades.
Conservancies operate in communal areas for the purpose of setting aside land
77
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for wildlife conservation.81 Increasingly NGOs engage in direct payments to local
peoples

to

augment

human

wildlife

conflict

compensation

funds

to

conservation.82 NGOs link the local and national SES to the international
information landscape, influencing opinion leaders in Kenya and internationally. 83

Challenges within Governance Authorities

Multiple issues challenged the ability of the governance system, both the
KWS and NGOs, to react to perturbations within the SES including weak and
largely unenforced wildlife crime laws; the lack of legislation supporting
community conservation; structural weaknesses within the KWS; and distrust of
conservation NGOs. Failures within the Kenyan governance system affect not
only the health of the local SES and its subsystems, but also impact the ability of
the international SES to respond to perturbations in the system.

Wildlife Legislation Failures

Until recent revisions, Kenya relied on the Wildlife Conservation
Management Act (WCMA) passed in 1976 as the basis for all wildlife polices,
including penalties to address illicit resource use and community management of
81
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resources. The WCMA proved to be a weak mechanism for addressing the
numerous threats to the SES in Kenya, with further implications for the health of
the international SES as Kenya developed into a major trafficking hub for Central
African ivory
Before revision to the wildlife law took effect in January 2014, in Kenya
wildlife crime legislation was weak or unenforced, creating an environment of
impunity for traffickers and poachers as well as opportunity for corrupt officials.
Under the WCMA the application of penalties and fines for wildlife crime was not
commensurate with the value of wildlife products. 84 Wildlife trafficking and other
wildlife crimes were treated like low-level offenses or misdemeanors.85 Few
perpetrators served time in prison for wildlife crimes, including those involving
high-value elephant and rhinoceros products. The law did not levy financial
penalties commensurate with the value of wildlife products. Most arrests
centered on low-level offenders and did not include kingpins, allowing for
powerful players in the international trafficking of ivory to go unpunished.86 In this
climate of impunity, wildlife officials involved in poaching avoided all criminal
penalties despite evidence of complicity in poaching and trafficking. Lack of
investigative capacity and official acts of corruption hindered the ability of law
enforcement or the judiciary to address adequately the scope or scale of wildlife
crime.87 Weak laws undermined actions by the KWS and NGOs working to
84
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safeguard wildlife in Kenya, and allowed the international trade through Kenya to
flourish largely unhindered.88
Though not at the level apparent in neighboring countries, both wildlife
officials and law enforcement officials in Kenya engage in poaching and
trafficking of wildlife. Considerable evidence suggests that high-level officials,
including in the KWS, are tied to poaching and regional trafficking rings. 89 One
ring is thought to control the entire rhino horn trade in Kenya and to be
responsible for the mass killing of 11 elephants in Tsavo.90 Members and former
members of the KWS have been implicated in poaching rhino and elephants,
hiring killers who use inside information to target animals. KWS officials have
been accused of framing conservationists with the possession of ivory. 91 Though
not reflective of the numbers of officials involved, at least 17 KWS officials have
been arrested for involvement in wildlife crimes since 2009,92 while other security
forces are thought to take bribes to cover up illegal trophy hunting. 93 Police
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officers have been arrested with ivory,94 and have obstructed and interfered with
arrests and investigations.95
Another key weakness in the legislation was its failure to map out a
framework

to

promote

and

protect

community-based

natural

resource

management (CBNRM) programs. 96 While recognizing community participation
as a goal, and economic utilization as a key component of conservation, the
legislation did not outline a clear path for community groups or private business
owners to create conservation-based businesses on private land.97 There is no
legal definition for what a conservancy is in Kenya.98 The KWS and conservation
organizations could encourage community conservation of wildlife but offer no
guarantees of state support.99 In what Didi refers to as “silent devolution”
communities created conservancies and sanctuaries in communal areas in the
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absence of any wildlife or protected area policy or law as not for profit
companies, trusts, and community based organizations.100
Other limitations of the wildlife legislation include a lack of compensation
for victims of human wildlife conflict, with limits both on the levels of payments
and restrictions on the circumstances under which individuals could request
compensation. Human-wildlife conflict (HWC) refers both to injuries to humans
caused by wildlife and to threats wildlife face during interactions with humans.
Wildlife, in particular elephants, threaten human populations through crop raiding;
environmental degradation; general insecurity to people; property destruction;
injury and death to livestock; and injury and death to people.101 Human-wildlife
conflict also refers to the opportunity costs to conservation or development,
borne respectively by both humans and wildlife.102 The WCMA did not allow
payments for infrastructure or crop loss, stoking the animosity of populations
towards wildlife and feeding into the perception that the KWS and other
conservation authorities cared more for wildlife than people.103 The law failed to
reduce human wildlife conflict.104
Weak laws protecting wildlife and the lack of coordinated land tenure and
land use policies limit the potential of state and non-state actors to coordinate
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responses to perturbations in the SES. Instead, the absence of coordination has
allowed for ad hoc responses to land use challenges to develop. The increased
levels of poaching; clear mismatch between the level and number of wildlife
crimes committed and convictions achieved; and the inability of the government
to integrate, harmonize, and enforce land use policies to conserve wildlife and
habitats necessitated revisions to the law. 105 While legislation passed to address
land tenure and land use issues and to strengthen wildlife laws since 2009, as
discussed below, the impacts of these shifts are not yet known.

Structural Weakness in the KWS

The wide range of responsibilities, which fall to the KWS stretch the ability
of the service to ensure conservation goals are met. Poor management, weak
capacity, and corruption within the KWS have at times limited the effectiveness of
the service, with impacts for the domestic and international SES.
In its own publications the KWS identify problems in the organization to
include high leadership turnover; corruption; loyalty to a person and not to the
organization; poor reporting; information suppression; low staff morale; low
revenue; tribal divisions among staff; low investment; lack of implementation of
recommendations; low donor support as a result of mismanagement; lack of
strategic leadership; poor governance systems; negative corporate image; lack of
structure; and a feeling that NGOs have too much influence on the
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organization.106 Despite some initial success slowing the rate of illegal hunting in
the 1990s, the KWS experienced a decade of high turnover and poor
management at the highest levels, with 13 directors in 14 years, in addition to
“low staff morale, lack of clear direction and a poor public image... (and) political
interference, poor governance, inadequate management systems and structures,
and low revenue occasioned by fraud.”107

KWS rangers often lack basic

necessitates such as food, boots, fuel, weapons, and ammunition.
cases poachers are far better equipped.108

In many

The KWS is supported almost

entirely by ticket sales and foreign donations, despite its wide ranging mandate
and contribution to the economy. KWS rangers are expected to patrol vast
landscapes; monitor wildlife; address illegal grazing; and initiate and coordinate
community development projects in addition to performing menial duties such as
manning park entrances and performing administrative duties.109 As noted
above, KWS officials and others in the wildlife establishment have been involved
in the domestic and international trafficking of ivory and elephant poaching.
A major failure of the Kenyan government and the KWS relates to their
unwillingness to collect and share important information on the health of wildlife
populations, or to publicly acknowledge the scope and scale of elephant
population decline. Governance of the SES relies on effective monitoring of
resources and resource use patterns within the system. Without effective
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monitoring, decision-making at the local, national, and international level of the
SES are challenged.110 Public officials are loath to reveal the actual level of
illegal killings or to declare poaching a national emergency.111 They deny a
poaching crisis exists in Kenya. The last comprehensive summary of the status
of Kenya’s national herd of elephants dates to 2002 and is likely inaccurate.
Other trend data is only reliable for a few well studied populations in Tsavo,
Amboseli, Meru, Masai Mara and Samburu/Laikipia. The KWS relies on statistics
dating to 2008, at the latest, to determine elephant populations in the country’s
parks.112 The KWS tightly controls information on poaching incidents within the
state’s parks, leading to questions about the veracity of collected data and
limiting the ability to craft effective policy.113 Despite publishing statistics form an
elephant census in Tsavo which indicated a decline of 1,500 elephants in three
years in one park/ecosystem, the KWS continues to publish figures stating that
country-wide only between 300-400 elephants are poached each year.114

Distrust and Criticism of Conservation NGOs

Distrust of conservation NGOs further hampers the ability of organizations
to collaborate to protect wildlife and participate in conservation initiatives.
Distrust stems from racial imbalances within early conservation structures, both
110
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under colonial authorities and post-Independence, and how those racial
imbalances played out in relation to the development of the park system.
For decades, conservation in Kenya was generally viewed as the purview
of white Europeans. Early wildlife policies built the parks by excluding local
peoples and creating preservation zones for the use and enjoyment of wildlife by
non-Africans. Conservation professionals showed little sympathy for Africans
displaced by wildlife. Through the 1980s most conservationists were scientists
with little interest in the people and communities living near wildlife areas. White
Kenyans and expats continue to exert a heavy influence on the conservation
community in Kenya, and while many are sympathetic to African causes, they are
accused of lacking understanding of local culture and politics. As the park system
became more popular with tourists and developed into an important economic
resource, the politics of race with white conservationists, white tourists, and white
beneficiaries of wildlife preservation juxtaposed against black Africans receiving
little economic development mirrored earlier policies under colonialism of
exclusion from land and marginalization in decision-making processes.115
Other criticisms relate to the development of conservancies, largely
pushed by NGOs over the past two decades.

Conservancies are owned by

indigenous people and leased to managers, often from old colonial families who
run lodges and safari operations to accommodate foreign tourists. They may be
not-for-profit ventures or operate as for-profit concerns. At their best CBNRMs
employ local people, provide development, educational, and other social services
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while protecting wildlife and habitats.116 At their worst conservancies are accused
of all of the ills associated with wildlife and land management in Kenya more
generally. Multiple examples illustrate the tendency of conservancies to leave out
local stakeholders in primary decision-making processes, and the failure to take
into account indigenous conservation norms, 117 mirroring the exclusionist policies
of the central government. They can exacerbate ethnic conflicts if not managed
properly.118 Despite promises of economic gain, revenue sharing schemes and
direct payments promised by conservancy founders are often small, inequitably
distributed, viewed as hand-outs, and are subject to manipulation by community
councils.119 It is unclear if the livelihoods of Kenyans have been improved by
participation in CBNRM programs.120 Conservancies are increasingly criticized
as being elite vehicles with poor track records for sharing revenue or conserving
wildlife.121
Challenges within the governance structures impact the ability of those
structures to react to interactions between licit and illicit resource users within the
resource system. As a result, those interactions have proven to be detrimental to
the system and incompatible with long-term conservation of habitats or wildlife.
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Resource Users, both Illicit and Licit

Applying the SESF, this section identifies patterns and processes which
developed in the Kenyan SES since the colonial era to understand why Kenya’s
SES is threatened with transformation.122 Social interactions among resource
users and the system in Kenya are impacting the resilience and adaptability of
the system.123 Key factors include changing demographic patterns in terms of the
numbers of people living in wildlife areas; political and social institutional shifts
away from communal management of land resources towards individual
ownership and accumulation; and cultural shifts including in the valuation of
wildlife and valuation of particular livelihood strategies.124

Together these

changes have resulted in shifts in land use patterns which, if continued, could
transform the landscaped and impact permanently the resilience of the SES to
absorb perturbations.

Resilience in this context refers to both social and

ecological systems within the SES because the changing land use strategies are
damaging to the point, in some areas, that over time the land will become less
productive for all living things it currently supports.125

If the Kenyan SES

becomes locked into a new system unable to support large amounts of wildlife,
impacts will reverberate at the international level of the SES. 126
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In Kenya both licit and illicit users within the system contribute to its
degradation. Licit users negatively impact sustainability of the SES through land
use strategies which maximize short-term gains at the expense of long term
sustainability for both human populations and wildlife. Illicit users take advantage
of the weaknesses within the governance system, in particular weak laws and
lack of capacity within the KWS, to exploit wildlife, both poaching elephants in
Kenya and trafficking massive quantities of wildlife harvested elsewhere through
Kenya to points in Asia.

Licit Resource Users

The use patterns of the resource users in Kenya’s SES, indigenous
people and more recent immigrants living on Trust Lands in wildlife dispersal
areas, have been shaped by colonial policies of exclusion, state ownership of
wildlife, and weak protections for communal landholders. Carried over into the
modern era these policies and attendant use patterns, characterized by shifts in
land tenure from communal to private ownership, have resulted in serious
degradation of the resource system for both communities and wildlife,
threatening the uncontrolled and unplanned transformation of the SES. The
lifestyle and land-use shifts occurring among Kenya’s resource users at lower
tiers of the SES considered collectively and in aggregate may result in
transformational change of the SES, in this instance in an uncontrolled and
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unplanned manner.

127

As the SESF literature indicates, examining and

understanding cross-scale social interactions can help explain why resource
usage changes in an area.128
As noted in the section above, colonial authorities purposefully established
indigenous reserves and wildlife reserves in areas outside of key agricultural
zones that whites heavily utilized, meaning the costs and burdens of
conservation were born by local Africans from the earliest period of
conservation.129 As Yeager and Miller write, “it was the technologically least
adaptable African societies that were compelled to make room for the new game
sanctuaries,” including Maasai and other groups reliant on pastoral lifestyles.130
They were excluded from management of wildlife resources and not granted
rights to exploit resources, whether those resources existed on public, private, or
communally held territory.
The forced removal of indigenous people from their traditional communal
lands and the designation of the state as sole owner of wildlife damaged the
traditional tolerance and value on co-existence felt for wildlife, removing
important local and traditional connections to wildlife, the sense of the
responsibility to protect, and any for local communities to practice sustainable
exploitation.131 Maasai in particular remember forced evictions in terms of illness,
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death, and destruction and, importantly, betrayal by governmental authorities. 132
For example, the Maasai did not traditionally hunt elephants, or other wild game,
due to social taboos, except in rituals initiating manhood. 133

They consider

elephants to be the only other animals besides humans to have a soul.134 Forcing
the Maasai off their lands wakened the link between the people and their land
and “wildlife became someone else’s property and responsibility.” 135 Despite
mythical associations and traditional beliefs, many Maasai and others currently
express a “not in my backyard” approach to conservation, they believe in it and
support it, as long as it does not impact their lives directly. 136 As a result, the
conversion of public goods into state property without accommodations for equal
access or utilization policies aggravated “the situation of communities … that
have been subordinated for long and result in great poverty and exploitation
without the achievement of conservation or equity.”137 Communities over time
eschewed responsibility for wildlife management and conservation, after being
excluded from the process for decades.138
By centralizing policies on wildlife, the government alienated wildlife from
communities, negatively impacting indigenous conservation norms and
removing responsibility for wildlife and the environment from local
communities, with impacts lingering into the present era.139
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Shifts in Land Tenure

Because of the unique nature of Kenya’s SES in which most wildlife lives
outside of protected areas in trust lands and group ranches, the land use choices
and lifestyle strategies of those living within these areas will impact the
sustainability of wildlife populations. Some land use choices, such as pastoralism
and ranching, are more conducive to wildlife populations than others, in particular
dense settlement and intensive small farming.140 Lacking a national land use
policy or protections for land tenure, and in the context of weak conservation
norms, the inability to utilize wildlife, and a history of exclusion from decision
making or revenue sharing within conservation areas, Kenya’s resource users
follow a resource maximization strategy built around the subdivision of
communally held lands with serious negative implications for wildlife and the
future of conservation.
Multiple factors have driven shifts in land tenure from communal
ownership to individual ownership in trust lands over the past decade. Lacking
the authority to develop and enforce formal rules and regulations for land use,
and lacking adequate protections at the federal level, trust lands essentially
existed as “open access,” subject to the predation of elites, illegal land grabbing,
and exploitation.141 Uncertainty about the future for communal land holders who
lack adequate protections through the government and have suffered for
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decades from land grabbing elites, have created incentives to overexploit.142
Shifting land tenure from communal to private holdings provides some
protections for communities, and has become widespread in group ranches in
southern Kenya and has spread to trust lands in the north. Immigration from
more overcrowded rural and urban areas placed a premium on land within the
ASALs, despite their unsuitability for intensive agricultures.143

Shifts in

indigenous lifestyle choices related to increased access to Western education
and the spread of Christianity as well as a desire to diversify income strategies
by pursuing intensive agriculture in addition to pastoralism have further driven the
trend towards sub-division of communal lands.144 The absence of legislation
establishing

a

framework

for

the

development

of

community

based

conservancies further removes incentives for communal management of land.
Under individual ownership, land holders can utilize the land any way they deem
fit, irrespective of whether or not wildlife also may depend on resources. 145 The
shift to individual ownership of land ushered in “land subdivision, fencing and
conversion for other uses, particularly agriculture, infrastructure and urban
development.”

146 147

When human populations were scattered through game

animal territory these impacts could be more easily absorbed.148 At intensive
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levels these practices transform the landscape and can lead to precipitous
declines in many species.
Sub-division has proven disastrous for human populations and wildlife in
group ranches. Farming replaces wild plants and grasses, reducing an area’s
biodiversity by focusing on a small number of crops. The millions of cattle, sheep,
and goats within pastoral communities reduce grazing area available for wild
animals, block their traditional migration paths, and negatively affect large
predators, creating a situation in which domestic and wild animals compete
directly for food and water, setting up communities for conflict with government
policies aimed at protecting wildlife. Irrigation, fertilization, firewood collecting
and charcoal production further deplete limited resources.149 The conversion of
wetlands to farmlands degrades soil, increases use of pesticides and chemicals
and thus run-off, and requires far more water than human and animal uses, 150
destroying critical habitats.151 It should be noted indigenous people retain larger
herds of livestock with reduced amounts of seasonal migration on their small
farms, displacing wildlife directly and impacting wildlife indirectly through
reduction in forage and slower recovery of forage material after dry periods.152
Subdivision increases the numbers of stakeholders in a community, multiplying
149
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the number of land holders necessary to negotiate with in order to create areas
with the critical mass needed to protect wildlife. 153
Moreover, human wildlife conflict (HWC) intensifies in densely populated
areas, with greater numbers of people, crops, and wildlife impacted. Until the
passage of the new Wildlife Bill, like most other African countries, Kenya did not
pay for crop, livestock, or infrastructure losses related to human wildlife conflict.
Loss of life received a small remuneration, between $500-$1,200.154 By not
compensating victims of HWC adequately, the KWS created the impression that
animals’ lives were more important than humans, a perception which continues
to damage wildlife norms.155 These increased conflicts further lessen the
possibility of successful conservation efforts, already degraded by increased and
altered land use practices.156 Poaching and the destruction of “problem animals”
increases in areas of intense HWC as locals attempt to clear the land of what
they consider damaging animals.157 The removal of elephants and other large
herbivores, meanwhile, has contributed to a shift in vegetation from grassland to
bush land and scrubland, limiting forage opportunities for livestock.158
Privatization of communal lands is occurring as a short-term resource
maximization strategy. Decisions are made with the current generation in mind,
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even when it is acknowledged that the decisions are damaging for community’s
long-term economic prospects and are unsustainable for wildlife. As Acheson
notes, however, the question of sustainability only applies if one cares about the
future. In the developing world, for many people the only important factor is the
ability to sustain oneself in the present, not a vague concern about future
generations.159 The tendency to maximize short-term gains is increased by the
lack of knowledge on how land use strategies impact the environment. Even
where locals noticed negative effects of land use- decreased water quantity,
decreased access to resources, impacts on wildlife, impacts on livestock,
increased competition among resource users, and decrease of the overall area of
the swamps, they express support for immediate exploitation of resources
because they lack a long-range understanding of impacts.160 The requirement to
provide for the immediate basic needs of families and households override
“appropriate long-term survival strategies that may be more sustainable for rural
landscapes.”161 For example, Maasai around Amboseli increasingly shift to new
livelihood strategies including subdivision and intensive agricultural usage 162
despite acknowledging these strategies are inappropriate for large scale animal
husbandry or agriculture.163 Economic pressure also discourages conservation
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as individuals may be more worried about their current circumstances than any
future eventualities.164
The shifts in land tenure towards individual ownership in Kenya’s trust
lands, if left unchecked, threaten to transform the SES in an uncontrolled and
unplanned manner.

The fragile ASALs will be unable to support intensive

agriculture for an extended period of time, placing large human and livestock
populations at risk from food and water shortages and the effects of
desertification and soil depletion.

Wildlife populations, lacking access to

necessary resources, migration corridors, and safety from human wildlife conflict,
will continue a fast and steady decline.

Illicit Users

In Kenya illicit actors associated with trafficking and poaching of wildlife
are embedded in networks of criminals, corrupt government officials and
businesspeople, and non-state armed groups which link local SESs to global
resource users. These networks also connect to harvesting and facilitation
networks across the continent decimating wildlife populations in Tanzania and
Central Africa.165

Weak protections for wildlife and the lack of enforcement of

trafficking laws enable this trade to occur.166
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Mombasa has emerged as the primary hub for moving ivory from central
and east Africa to Asia by air and by ship.167 In 2013, Kenya seized over 13 tons
of ivory, likely representing only about 10 percent of the ivory flowing through the
country.168 Estimates suggest as much as $300 million worth of ivory flowed
through Kenya in 2013.169 According to Vira, Ewing, and Miller, “a significant
amount of evidence suggests the collusion of Kenyan state, security, and political
officials in the ivory poaching trade.”170 Without the complicity of individuals in
government, in the conservation industry, or the assistance of local communities,
poachers would be unable to “find and poach so many elephants so quickly.”171
Multiple reports have been released indicating links to the highest levels of the
political establishment. Members and former members of the KWS have been
implicated in poaching rhino and elephants, hiring killers to target animals using
inside information.172

At least 17 KWS officials have been arrested for

involvement in wildlife crimes since 2009.173 Security agencies are accused of
accepting bribes to cover up illegal trophy hunting.174 At the same time, the KWS
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has investigated the role conservancies may play in poaching.175

High-end

resorts are thought to engage in illegal trophy hunting.176
The ivory trade in Kenya follows the continental model of Africa-based,
Asian run transnational crime described in more detail in Chapter 4. 177 Asian
transnational criminal networks, dominated by the Chinese, are thought to be
responsible for most of the ivory trade in and through Kenya. 178 Africans kill
wildlife and transport ivory and other wildlife products to consolidation points.
Once the animals are killed, poachers coordinate through middle-men with
brokers and consolidators who prepare the ivory for shipment overseas. 179
Locals receive little pecuniary benefit and experience most of the risk associated
with illegal killing of wildlife.180 They may poach opportunistically, or as part of
small organized poaching gangs with specific targets.181 Poachers target the
largest bulls with the biggest tusks as well as smaller elephants, including
juveniles, with very small tusks. Poachers engage in mass killings when possible,
as evidenced by multiple instances in which entire families of elephants have
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been gunned down in a single episode in both Tsavo and Amboseli. 182 Ivory
kingpins in Kenya profit considerably more than low-level poachers; however
scholars calculate even when profits reach into the millions those numbers
represent about 6 percent of the profit of Asian traffickers.183
Poachers include local indigenous people, transnational poaching gangs,
and corrupt officials. Kenyan poachers both adapt old technologies and take
advantage of new technologies to kill and traffic wildlife. They use cell phones to
communicate with handlers and other facilitators to track and kill wildlife, and to
coordinate transportation and consolidation.184 While poachers continue to use
automatic weapons when possible to kill wildlife, they have also adapted to new
monitoring techniques and sensors placed in parks.185 Electrocution, poisoning
by food and water, spears, and poisoned arrows kill the majority of elephants in
Kenya.186 Poachers also target other valuable species, in particular rhino, for
export from Kenya. Porous international borders allow poachers from Tanzania
and Somalia to enter Kenya to kill wildlife illegally. Some evidence suggests that
Al-Shabaab, a terrorist group based in Somalia, poach elephants and traffic ivory
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to support their violent conflict activities.187 According to Vira, Miller and Ewing,
“Kenyan poachers are particularly notable for their high levels of violence when
confronted with ranger forces. Shootouts, ambushes, and ranger casualties are
no longer uncommon, while poachers appear equipped with increasingly better
information, equipment, and weaponry.”188
A considerable amount of poaching in Kenya is attributed to illegal herders
and grazers invading the group ranches and conservancies where most elephant
poaching in Kenya occurs. They both poach wildlife and harbor poachers as well
as provide a cover for their illegal activities. 189 These herders sew insecurity
through armed cattle rustling and banditry. Heavily armed, illegal herders often
pose a significant and overt threat to park security,190 in particular when park
security and other law enforcement officials seize portions of their herds. 191
Herders degrade the landscape further by bringing in tens of thousands of
livestock to conservation areas in search of forage and water. In the worst cases
they are known to attack park infrastructure, destroy fencing, and set fires. 192
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Illegal herders plague conservation areas across the country, and in some areas
are the primary parties responsible for poaching.193
While licit users of the resource system contribute to immediate and largescale damage and to the transformation of the SES, illicit users play a more
pernicious role through illicit trafficking of wildlife, illegal harvesting, and intensive
and unsustainable use of fragile ecosystems, contributing to wildlife declines,
insecurity and corruption.

Resilience, Adaptation, Transformation

In response to the perturbations facing the Kenyan SES as a result of
increased trafficking, poaching, and shifting land use strategies, the governance
system is adapting and transforming in an effort to maintain resilience in the
SES. Per the SESF, systems can transform either in an uncontrolled manner, or
utilize crisis as an opportunity to adapt and adjust systems and structures to
meet challenges.194 Transformation draws on adaptation and the management
of resilience occurring at multiple levels and across scales.195

As illustrated

below, the Kenyan governance system appears to be adapting to manage the
SES to avoid uncontrolled transformation. Examples of adaptation within the
governance system include reshaping laws, rules and regulations to react more
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quickly to perturbations in the system, as well as altering the balance between
central and local control of resources in order to manage them at the appropriate
level.

Adaptations which create a more resilient SES among users include

adjustments to land use strategies to ensure conservation of the resource for
both human and wildlife communities. Because the effects of system dynamics
can take years to ripple through the system the success of some shifts will not be
immediately obvious to observers.

For example, the results of devolution of

authority to stakeholders in the community will take years to emerge.

Other

shifts in governance, such as alterations to legal codes and changes in law
enforcement practices, can be judged effective or ineffective in the short-term
through the study of arrests and convictions.
Whether ultimately successful or not, adaptation and transformational
change in Kenya is occurring as stakeholders recognize the failure of policies
and the imperative to adopt new thinking and new strategies to avert uncontrolled
transformation.196 Within the international level of the SES, CITES sanctions and
the spotlight provided by international NGOs on issues facing Kenya’s SES are
driving change. At the same time the strong national wildlife establishment, made
up of the KWS and NGOs, has been instrumental in raising awareness on issues
facing wildlife in order to adapt and transform the system.
This process is occurring in Kenya both through deliberative shifts on
governance polices and through ad hoc solutions developed piecemeal by
resource users within the system. At the national level, legislation to address
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challenges facing wildlife, both in terms of enforcement and within the broader
context of land tenure and land use, have passed and are in the process of
implementation. At the community level conservation programs have grown in
the absence of formal legal mechanisms and now occur across large swaths of
Kenya’s trust land. If the reforms Kenya has embarked on have the intended
effect, changed land-use strategies, strengthened laws, effective resource
controls, and national land policy, they will contribute to the transformation of the
SES to a stronger system able to absorb disturbances by addressing the
linkages between levels and scales of the SES. 197 As Cash notes, management
plans that address scale issues and linkages across levels are more successful
at both assessing problems and finding sustainable, politically palatable,
solutions. 198
Both immediate and longer-term shifts are occurring. These shifts have
occurred with progressively increasing urgency over the past five years and
include actions ranging from the creation of a CITES mandated Action Plan;
passage of a strong wildlife conservation management bill; development of a
robust and inclusive National Elephant Management Plan; increased and
proactive oversight of the KWS by national authorities; increased cross border
collaboration; successful public awareness raising initiatives; actions to mitigate
HWC; and importantly, legislative movements to devolve authority and address
contentious land tenure issues.
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Kenya cut poaching levels and increased enforcement of anti-trafficking
measures to include arrests and seizures of ivory and other illegal wildlife
products. In 2014 poaching of elephants decreased fifty percent over the
previous year.199

CITES and International NGOs

CITES named Kenya in the ‘gang of eight’ in 2013, contributing to a series
of shifts in governance through public “naming and shaming.”

Along with

Uganda, Tanzania, Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand, and China, CITES threatened
sanctions and instituted requirements that each state develop a national action
plan to address both poaching and trafficking. CITES required action plans to
address “legislation and regulations, national and international enforcement,
outreach and public awareness.”200 Within one year of being so tasked, Kenya
drafted an action plan meeting most of CITES requirements. Of the fourteen
actions Kenya identified under the framework, CITES rated six as “substantially
achieved,” five “on track” for achievement, one “challenging” and two were rated
as “unclear.” CITES noted Kenyan achievements in legislation and regulations,
enforcement at the national level and inter-agency collaboration, outreach and
public education, and reporting.201 According to the KWS, after the national
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action plan was put in place seizures of trafficked ivory in East Africa, in
particular Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, increased 80 percent. 202 Kenya was
removed from the ‘Gang of Eight’ list after only one year.203
International and national conservation organizations have loudly called
out Kenya for its role in trafficking and its weak wildlife laws. One devastating and
influential report shed light on Kenya’s role in the international trafficking of ivory
and the clear complicity of officials in the act.204 Adding to the pressure to adjust
tactics meaningfully, Wildlife Direct published a scathing report detailing the
inefficacy of Kenya’s outdated and weak wildlife laws. These laws essentially
allowed poachers and traffickers to operate with absolute impunity, impervious to
even small fines or minimal jail sentences. For their part the KWS, in a series of
papers published in the George Wright Forum, on their website, and in their
published strategies, recognize and acknowledge threats related to habitat
fragmentation, overcrowding in fragments, loss of biodiversity, and increasing
threats from poaching as well as shortfalls in the management and capacity of
the organization. Lastly, the multitude of NGOs operating on the ground across
Kenya’s conservancies and group ranches provide invaluable information both to
the Kenyan government and the broader international community of the threats
facing the SES.
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Increased Capacity within Wildlife Crime Legislation and the KWS

By bolstering wildlife crime legislation and strengthening the KWS, the
Kenyan government is attempting to address perturbations within both the
domestic and international level SES.
Debated for years, Kenya passed the Wildlife Conservation and
Management Act (WCMA) in December 2013. It came into effect in January
2014 and addresses shortfalls in every aspect of wildlife crime legislation and
enforcement. The law increased penalties for poaching and trafficking, 205 with
penalties up to life in prison for poaching elephants or rhinos.206 The law reduced
the period traffickers wait between prosecution and trial, increased efforts to
report wildlife crime, and strengthened local law enforcement capacity. 207 The
law increased collaboration between law enforcement agencies and established
an Interagency Anti-Poaching Unit that combines elements of the national police
and KWS, deployable to poaching hotspots and border points, and provided
funding to recruit and train 1,000 new rangers.208 Kenya instituted training for
members of the judiciary and prosecutors.209 In an effort to bolster investigative
capacity, Kenya developed networks of informers and reached out to the public
205
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to report wildlife crimes.

210

The introduction of sniffer dogs at entry and exit

points into Kenya has increased the seizure rate of ivory and other illegal
trophies immediately. With funding from Google and in partnership with the
Consortium for the Barcode for Life, an international NGO, Kenya is in the
process of upgrading and updating its forensic lab to aid in investigation of
wildlife crime. 211 This effort will increase investigative capacity and allow Kenya
to monitor more closely its ivory stockpile through DNA analysis.212 Regulations
specifically targeting illegal grazers were included in the 2013 WCMA, allowing
the KWS and other law enforcement agencies to act with authority to expel
people and livestock from protected areas.213 The KWS cracked down on illegal
grazing, pushing out large numbers of cattle from Tsavo, Amboseli, and other
key wildlife areas.214 In the first six months of 2014, over 250 poachers were
arrested,215 and the most prominent trafficker in Kenya was arrested in
December 2014.216
Under increased scrutiny from international organizations, the Kenyan
government is actively managing the KWS to ensure shifts in the law and the
capacity-building measures put in place are implemented. After allegations of
mismanagement within the KWS emerged in 2014, the national government
210
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initiated an investigation into the agency’s shortfalls, established a committee to
investigate the problem of poaching within the country’s parks and dispersal
areas, and committed to hiring hundreds more personal for the service. 217 The
committee identified multiple areas for improvement including the budget,
payment for rangers, fencing policies and infrastructure, lack of equipment,
shortfalls within intelligence, community engagement, and corruption within the
procurement sections of the KWS.218

The government increased the KWS

budget by 13 percent, though the service continues to rely on revenue generating
schemes within the park system and donors for the majority of funding.219

Addressing Human Wildlife Conflict

Both through legislative changes and proactive actions by NGOs, the
governance system is working to address human-wildlife conflict. In response to
changing trends in conservation and a recognition of the disconnect between
Kenyans and their national wildlife, the KWS’s strategy to address human-wildlife
conflict evolved over time from one focused primarily on safeguarding animals’
lives to an approach focused on prevention. Current approaches to addressing
HWC consist of both compensation payments for losses, and increased
opportunity for economic gains to offset opportunity costs related to conservation.
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The 2013 WCMA revised compensation schemes to allow for communities
and individuals to apply for remuneration related to the loss of crops and
livestock.220 The bill greatly increased the amount of money available for claims
to KSH5 million for death and KSH2-3 million for permanent injury or death.
Claims for compensation of crop, livestock or infrastructure loss can be made
through the local County Wildlife Conservation and Compensation Committees
(CWCC) for adjudication and ruling.221 Investments in equipment and technology
are steadily reducing HWC. 222
Other strategies to prevent or address HWC include a focus on protecting
crops and infrastructure through fencing and moats to prevent conflict in
agricultural areas. In the worst cases animals may be translocated to prevent
conflict, or be eliminated. The KWS instituted a mobile rapid response team
specially trained to address HWC, equipped to deal with problem animals to
swiftly respond to community complaints.223 Through extensive conflict mapping
the KWS has identified high conflict areas where large populations of human
populations intersect and interact with wildlife populations in order to anticipate
and prevent problems. They monitor HWC through a database to track incidents.
224
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Conservation

organizations

and

conservancies

increasingly

offer

compensation due to livestock or property loss, in addition to opportunity costs
related to not utilizing land for alternate uses.225 Insurance funds contributed by
the government, commercial tourism operators, NGOs and or local stakeholders
are seen as a way to provide finance and, literally, stake-holder buy-in to the
process.226 They further mitigate HWC through community education outreach
programs,

eco-tourist

development,

direct

payments

for

livestock

and

infrastructure loss, direct payments for opportunity costs, and through multiple
mechanisms to separate physically humans and wildlife.227 For example, to
prevent elephants from over-grazing in certain areas and degrading the
landscape for humans and wildlife once traditional migration routes were cut off,
a group of conservancies and trusts, along with the KWS, created an elephant
migration corridor with an “elephant underpass” to allow elephants to safely pass
under a roadway and to other parts of their habitat.228 Successful ventures are
credited with reducing human/wildlife conflicts as well as mitigating other
resource conflicts within communities.229 This reduction is important because
when communities feel like they cannot address human/wildlife conflict
successfully they are less likely to support conservation initiatives and may in fact
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actively

oppose

the

presence

of

wild

animals,

hindering

efforts

for

conservation.230
While compensation programs are criticized for being reactive, inefficient,
and not financially secure, increasingly the KWS and the conservation
community believe the best way to stem HWC is by increasing the opportunities
for communities to benefit financially from wildlife resources and through a
process of devolving authority to local communities. 231

Land Use Policy Changes

Over the past five years Kenya has significantly altered legislation and
policy to address deeply rooted issues of land use, land tenure, and rights to
wildlife utilization, in an effort to create a more inclusive wildlife governance
system and to foster long-term utilization strategies. The 2009 National Land
Policy, the 2010 Constitution, and the 2013 WCMA all provide mechanisms to
increase community participation in wildlife management through the devolution
of some authority to lower tiers of the SES. By addressing gaps and failures in
legislation at the national level, Kenya may be able to overcome scale challenges
and adopt policies which address both the needs of local users and long term
goals of sustainability within the SES. These shifts, while ambitious, are likely to
prove the most challenging because they attempt to dismantle tendencies
towards
230

centralization

of

decision-making

authority

which

have
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institutionalized within Kenya’s SES from its earliest period. As evidenced below,
it is unresolved whether devolution is occurring ‘in name only’ or if central
authorities are actually creating avenues for significant stakeholder input in
decision-making processes.
Issues impacting resource users in dispersal areas include the lack of
protections for communal landholders and the lack of legislation to frame the
creation of private conservation organizations in communal lands.

Kenya is

addressing these challenges through formalized devolution of some aspects of
wildlife and land management and by strengthening land tenure laws. Devolution
“refers to the relocation of powers to lower levels while a related concept of
decentralization refers to the relocation of administrative functions from central
location to lower levels.”232 The goal of devolution is to enhance citizen
participation, increase the power of local communities and individuals to make
decisions, and strengthen state-society relations across sectors.233 Devolution of
authority to local communities creates avenues for communities to contribute to
decision-making on wildlife issues and benefit financially from wildlife resources,
both important for encouraging land-use practices conducive to conservation.
Devolution also has the potential to re-embed indigenous conservation norms
into decision-making on wildlife policies at the local level.234
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Until the constitutional reform of 2010, the Kenya’s constitution did not
directly address wildlife or provide guidance on conservation. 235 Under Kenya’s
new constitution, important aspects of environmental management are being
devolved to provincial and district levels. The KWS decentralized authority over
the country’s eight conservation areas, Western, Mountain, Tsavo, Southern,
Coast, Central Rift, Northern, and Eastern.236 Provincial and District Environment
Management Committees are responsible for protecting water sources; carrying
out impact assessments; promotion of environmental awareness and mitigation
strategies to prevent environmental degradation; and coordinating between
NGOs and government agencies; among other key tasks formerly controlled by
the central government.237
The 2013 wildlife law, in line with the constitution, legislates opportunities
for local participation in wildlife management. The bill directs the KWS to set up
County Wildlife Conservation Committees (CWCC) responsible for developing
management plans, registering community and private conservancies, and
ensuring that the costs to wildlife do not outweigh benefits.238 The new law also
allows for local communities to create Community Wildlife Associations (CWA) to
advance community participation in wildlife management and facilitate conflict

235

Litoroh et al.
Kenya Wildlife Service, "Overview - Parks and Reserves". Yeager and Miller, Wildlife, Wild
Death: Land Use and Survival in Eastern Africa. Other organizations with an interest in
conservation include international wildlife organizations based in Kenya, operating out of Nairobi
a base of operations for activities across East Africa. The UNEP and IUCN have headquarters in
Nairobi. In 2014 INTERPOL recently opened its Environmental Security office in Nairobi. These
organizations have funded major programs in Kenya to facilitate land management and efficient
use of land resources and protection of wildlife.
237
Litoroh et al. 18.
238
Nigel Hunter, "Kenya Has a New Act - the 2013 Wildlife Conservation and Management Act,"
in Maliasili Initiatives (18 June 2014), http://www.maliasili.org/kenyahasanewact/.
236

194
resolution within specific regions. In addition, the bill provides a mechanism for
local communities to apply for licenses to partner with the KWS and investors to
utilize wildlife resources through bio-prospecting, a potential income generator. 239
These partnerships, if successful, could provide incentives to focus on long-term
preservation.240
To create greater protections for communal land holders and to
disincentivize the privatization of communally held land, Kenya passed a National
Land Policy (NLP) in 2009. The NLP simplified land categories into communal,
public, or private lands, giving each land tenure category equal recognition under
the law and providing protections for customary land tenure.
“repudiates

the

focus

on

converting

customary

tenure

into

The policy
individual

ownership.”241 Importantly, it provided, along with shifts in the WCMA, the legal
framework necessary for communities to create community-based conservation
organizations allowing economic benefits from wildlife utilization. The NLP
acknowledge customary and traditional resource management rules and
practices, and requires land use regulations to consider conservation and not
simply opportunities for economic exploitation. The policy asserts that
investments in community lands must benefits local communities and their
economies.242 The NLP is supported by the 2010 Constitution, which adopts
provisions securing community land rights, greater accountability, and increased
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decision making authority.243 Land ownership and management was a key issue
driving Kenya’s new constitution, adopted in 2010.244
It is unclear to what extent these changes in law and policy will impact
resource users within the system. Following past patterns, even the devolved
authorities are delegated and limited, with most authority remaining with the
central government. An assessment published in 2014 indicated governance of
natural resources and environmental policies had not fully devolved to the local
level in all counties due to institutional weakness and limited capacity. 245 In
terms of environmental regulations, county governments are assigned an
implementation role, not a policy setting role, undermining the basic tenets of
devolution. 246
Similar issues have surfaced over implementation of the NLP. The
Constitution requires legislation to provide for the establishment of community
lands to be passed by 2015. The Community Land Bill, under development, and
other supporting legislation, serves to implement the NLP. The Community Land
Bill is meant to codify protections for communal landholders and to develop
institutions for community input; however the institutions so far developed are not
representative of community membership and have not developed decisionmaking processes conducive to community involvement. The bill further fails to
outline clearly rules for conversion of land from communal to private ownership, a
243
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major problem facing wildlife conservation currently.247 The law does not require
communal councils to have land-use plans, another shortfall with impacts for
conservation.248
Under the constitution and the WCMA the national government remains
responsible for the protection of the environment and wildlife,249 remains the
owner of all wildlife in Kenya, and retains most of its management rights over
wildlife. On matters relating to wildlife and the environment, national laws
override county laws.

By the distribution of functions, wildlife management

remains the purview of the central government, not local governments. 250
Critics have seized on key aspects of devolution mechanisms to highlight
the challenge in mitigating centralizing tendencies. Didi argues aspects of wildlife
law actually weaken opportunities for participation by implementing strict
registration, permitting and licensure requirements. 251

Under the WCMA

communities may not undertake any tourism initiatives, educational initiatives,
filming, or commercial photography without a license from the KWS. All nonconsumptive wildlife utilization schemes must be registered with the CWCCs and
obtain a permit from KWS. Under the WCMA the KWS retains the authority to set
up CWCCs and to staff them with multiple representatives from the central
government, skewing their makeup towards the KWS and the central
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government, with fewer positions allocated to local participants. Though locals
create the Community Wildlife Associations (CWAs), all CWAs are subject to
licensure by the KWS and registration through the CWCC, again placing
authority within the central government. Lastly, prior to the bill’s passage local
authorities managed the land and tourism aspects in national reserves, while
KWS undertook the bulk of wildlife management activities. The Wildlife Bill
moves all national reserves to national parks, eliminating the role of local
authorities in the reserves. While the new wildlife bill does provide a legal
framework for the development of conservancies, it does not ultimately devolve
authority to them. The KWS retains authority to oversee tightly their management
plans. The fear among supporters of devolution is that the KWS will simply not
create the councils and not implement the primary avenue for devolution and
decentralization. 252
Ultimately, while the Constitutional Reforms, the NLP, and Wildlife Act
together provide greater opportunity for community involvement, it is limited to
“co-management” and not to autonomous or devolved authorities.253

While

authority is not devolving to the extent originally intended, communities are
increasingly able to take a part in conservation strategies and to benefit
economically from wildlife. Expanding the roles and responsibilities of
communities living near wildlife to include the conservation and preservation of
wildlife and habitats has the potential to increase the success rate of
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conservation programs in unprotected dispersal areas outside of the national
park or reserve system, where most wildlife lives. 254

Increased Cross Border Collaboration

Because of the global nature of the SES and the regional linkages
between Kenya’s resource system and that of neighboring countries, crossborder collaboration remains a priority.

Managing cross-border elephant

populations is a particular concern, addressed though agreements with Tanzania
to count and monitor populations in the Amboseli-Kilimanjaro, Tsavo-Mkomazi
and Serengeti-Masai Mara ecosystems, all of which span borders. To address
trafficking, in 2014 police commissioners from several East African states met in
Nairobi to participate in training to improve intelligence gathering, combat
terrorism, and intercept contraband, including ivory.255

Late in 2014 it was

announced Kenya would house the Environmental Security Office of Interpol in
Nairobi, responsible for increasing collaboration between police organizations
focused on wildlife trafficking across the region. The expansion of Interpol in
East Africa is in part meant to stem the rising tide of poaching and other wildlife
crime.256 At the international level, Kenya increased collaboration with China to
enforce wildlife laws, conduct investigations, and raise awareness amongst
254
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Chinese nationals in Kenya about the ramifications of ivory consumption. 257 In
terms of cross-border collaboration, funding from private organizations increase
the ability of conservation stakeholders to address perturbations in the SES and
to increase the capacity of local and national services to protect wildlife. In 2012
representatives of government wildlife organizations from Kenya and Tanzania,
community

based

resource

management

programs,

and

community

representatives from across the region met to discuss wildlife management
issues, in particular poaching. 258

The 2012 National Elephant Strategy

In response to the complex threats facing the SES, in 2012 Kenya
developed its first National Elephant Strategy. Past policies focused on a narrow
subset of threats, primarily associated with poaching. Acknowledging the more
complex problems facing the SES currently, the new strategy addresses threats
related to “a growing population, climate change, wildlife crime, and abuse of the
environment,” creating conceptual linkages across levels and scales of the
SES.259 The strategy explicitly notes complex issues specific to Kenya which
impact the SES including the large numbers of elephants living outside of
protected areas; the increase in human populations in those areas; the lack of
257
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coordination in terms of land use planning; the movement beyond Kenya’s
borders of some elephant populations; and the lack of capacity resident within
government

agencies

to

adequately

implement

complex

conservation

initiatives.260
The strategy lays out goals to devolve authority to local communities;
increase collaboration with neighboring states where elephant populations
interact; focus research on elephant behavior; and increase capabilities of
monitoring efforts.261 It also identifies important threats to elephant conservation
including poaching; degraded habitats; fragmentation of habitats; HWC; loss of
wildlife corridors and buffer zones; lack of national land policies; negative
attitudes towards elephants; increased demand for agricultural land; lack of
economic incentives to conserve; and insecurity. The document lays out a
pathway to combat each threat with clearly laid out roles and responsibilities,
actions, and measurable objectives. While it remains to be seen whether or not
the strategy can achieve its goals long term, the document provides an honest
assessment and baseline from which government actors and NGOs can
collaborate deliberatively.262
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Increased Public Awareness of Wildlife Crime

Recognizing that SES perturbations can have local and global causes and
outcomes is key to addressing both jurisdictional and informational challenges in
the preservation of the SES.263 Governance authorities in Kenya painstakingly
connect local SES challenges to global markets through public awareness raising
campaigns integral to shifting scalar thinking on the SES. KWS uses Twitter,
Facebook, and a functioning and sophisticated website to educate Kenyans and
the world on wildlife issues facing Kenya. Public awareness raising campaigns
included some sponsored by the First Lady Margaret Kenyatta such as the “Ivory
Belongs to Elephants” and “Hands Off our Elephants” campaigns, and
celebrations for Word Wildlife Day.264 Kenyan authorities reach out to local
communities to conduct anti-poaching campaigns as well as holding interagency
awareness and sensitization training. NGOs, conservancies, and game ranches
maintain their own media presence through social networking sites and websites,
providing both scientific information on the SES as well as real-time reports on
poaching, illegal grazing, trafficking, and efforts to combat these wildlife crimes.
The information sharing made possible through these combined efforts allow for
a nuanced and informed understanding of all aspects of challenges facing the
SES, and creates opportunities to find creative solutions.
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Conclusion

By applying the SESF to the Kenya case study, linkages emerge across
levels and scales of the SES, illustrating how interactions at the domestic level,
such as legislation and the actions of resource users, can impact the
international system, while international level factors such as increased illicit ivory
use and CITES’ enforcement actions can shift outcomes in the domestic SES.
Kenya’s weak laws and lack of enforcement enable international ivory traffickers
to penetrate its porous borders and move massive quantities of ivory to
international markets, with impacts rippling across the international SES as
elephant populations in Central Africa are poached to extirpation. By failing to
strengthen domestic legislation before the international poaching reached crisis
proportions, Kenya not only failed to protect its portion of the international SES
but contributed to the degradation of the entire system. Similarly, at the domestic
level the slow response to changes in the resource system driven by shifting
resource utilization strategies within the SES will impact the health of the system,
and its ability to absorb perturbations and disturbances.
By applying the SESF the chapter illustrated how changes to the modern
SES relate to policies and practices stretching into the earliest colonial era,
deepening understanding of the challenges it now faces. The lack of a national
land use policy or an effective land tenure policy has undermined the resilience,
adaptability and transformability of the Kenyan SES.

As a result much of

Kenya’s trust land operates as open access, degrading the landscape for both
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humans and wildlife, increasing human/wildlife conflict and undermining efforts to
combat poaching. The subdivision of communal lands which has occurred in the
absence of policies conducive to private conservation weakened ties within and
between communities, creating barriers to future conservation efforts and
undermining conservation norms. By centralizing wildlife policies the government
has marginalized stakeholder participation in efforts to manage the SES and
combat poaching, damaging indigenous conservation norms and removing the
responsibility conserve and protect from local communities.
Tensions continue to exist within Kenya between the centralizing tendencies of
the wildlife establishment and the ethics and rhetoric of decentralization
espoused in public policy.

If Kenya cannot resolve these tensions resource

users will continue to make decisions that best benefit their immediate needs, not
the longer terms requirements for resource conservation.

Together, these

factors create strong incentives for stakeholders to overexploit the SES rather
than conserve it. The politics of partial reform now evident in Kenya, whereby
rules and regulations skirt reform, but do not fully enact it, may ultimately
undermine attempts at controlled transformation of the SESF.
This analysis of the SES in Kenya also provides a detailed understanding
of the range of policy prescriptions, both through official channels and as a result
of “silent” processes, that are helping the SES adapt to maintain resilience.
Kenya is attempting to address the entire range of issues facing the SES from
the immediate problem of poaching and trafficking to longer term and more
complex issues surrounding land reform and livelihood strategies. Instead of
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applying a “panacea” approach that disregards the complexity of the problems
facing the system, linked through usage patterns to the global SES, Kenya made
concrete changes in response to perturbations within the system. Because of the
nature of these shifts, including deep institutional and cultural changes, evidence
of their efficacy may only slowly materialize.
The next case study, focused on Tanzania, illustrates the impacts of
uncontrolled transformational change as the result of corrupt enabling
mechanisms within nested tiers of the system and failures at the international
level to monitor and address threats within the SES. Despite Tanzania’s early
adoption of devolved authority over wildlife, community based natural resource
management programs, and far larger system of protected areas, the country
faces both a poaching crisis and widespread negative conservation norms,
degrading the SES’s ability to adapt effectively in the short and long-term. Some
areas of Tanzania’s elephant SES have already transformed, perhaps
irrevocably.
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CHAPTER 6
TANZANIA

Problem Statement

Tanzania has one of the largest systems of protected wildlife areas in
Africa. Unlike in Kenya, authority over wildlife was devolved to local communities
through pilot programs and later through clear legislation by 1998. Considerable
donor funds support the implementation of community based natural resource
management programs as well as all other aspects of conservation. Because of
Tanzania’s early recognition of the role of communities in conservation, the
development of legislation to protect communal land rights and the supporting
policy to enable community wildlife management, the country was in many ways
better positioned to protect wildlife than Kenya. Yet, the country is both a major
source of ivory and trafficking hub for ivory exports from Central Africa to Asia.
One third of all illicit ivory seized globally came from Tanzania between 19892009.1 In 2009 half of all the ivory seized in the world originated from Tanzania. 2
The country has lost half of its elephant population, the largest in East Africa and
second largest on the continent, since 2006.3
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While typically blamed on corruption, as the SES literature makes clear,
the resource management failures in Tanzania cannot be related to one factor or
a few inter-related factors existing at one level of analysis. Instead, one must
understand them in terms of factor interdependence “and the way that various
complex factor combinations cause resource-management attempts to fail.”4 The
interplay of exogenous globalizing forces, including the hyper consumption of
Asian consumers; connectivity of global markets; adoption of neoliberal
conservation, and the state’s subverting of many of its tenets, impacts the
resilience and vulnerability of the SES. Additionally, endogenous processes
including corruption, rent seeking, severely degraded conservation norms, and
patterns of conflict between users and authorities, further contribute to
vulnerability and perturbations within the SES. 5 These factors interact to create
conditions under which commercial illicit exploitation of wildlife has occurred with
impunity, with severe and negative consequences for the social and ecological
components of the SES. Moreover, Tanzania’s response to the current crisis, as
well as longer term threats, represents a repeat of past patterns and processes,
challenging the state’s ability to regain resilience.
SESs

are

dynamic,

ever-changing

systems,

coevolving

through

interactions between and among actors and institutions “and resources
constrained and shaped by a given social-ecological setting.”6 In Tanzania,
movement is occurring towards uncontrolled and potentially irreversible

4
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transformation.7 Failed efforts to reform wildlife management have resulted in
the degradation of conservation norms to the point that many communities view
conservation authorities and the conservation process, both government and
NGOs, with distrust and suspicion; consider protected area (PA) expansion a
new form of dispossession; and actively engage in defensive techniques to
prevent the expansion of PAs.8
The models of conservation adopted in Tanzania, first fortress style
conservation and later neoliberal conservation, as implemented, ultimately
reduced local communities’ say in resource use and management rules.
Communities feel they bear all of the costs of wildlife conservation, while
enjoying few, if any, benefits. Instead of a source of income, inspiration, or pride,
wildlife is perceived as a burden and a threat. 9 Local communities have come to
associate Tanzania’s policies of wildlife management with dispossession and
exploitation. Hence, local communities not only tolerate poaching and
overharvesting of the SES, but in some cases the loss of livelihood practices
pushes local communities into actively participating in poaching, trafficking or
corrupt practices. Under these circumstances the primary objective of creating
and expanding protected areas, the conservation and protection of wildlife, is
paradoxically undermined.10 At the same time, the largest elephant populations in
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Tanzania have plummeted to the point their recovery, or even survival, is
questionable.
Following the SESF, this chapter first describes the resource system and
units, highlighting the large size of Tanzania’s protected areas and the significant
perturbations faced by elephant populations in the Selous Game Reserve and
neighboring systems. The following section examines the governance system in
Tanzania and key interactions between the state and resource users, which
have, over time, severely erode conservation norms, leading to significant levels
of resistance to conservation.

The following section examines the steps the

governance system has undertaken to address threats to the SES, which are
largely dependent on outside donors and track fairly closely with current policies
and practices. The conclusion illustrates how the SESF, applied to Tanzania,
links local processes and cross-level, cross-scale interactions to ecological and
social outcomes in the SES, defined in Tanzania by exploitation and, potentially,
resource collapse.

Resource System and Resource Units

Tanzania sets aside a larger percentage of its territory for wildlife than
almost any country in Africa, nearly 39 percent,11 but remains exposed to
“multiple, interacting perturbations,” some of which are bringing on fast change

11
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within the system.12Threats included large-scale commercial poaching; habitat
fragmentation due to increased human settlement near parks and in wildlife
corridors; human-wildlife conflict; and “rapid agricultural expansion, unplanned
land use, and road construction.”13 Increased population density around parks
corresponds to the greatest threats to wildlife, in particular in terms of poaching.
In the vicinity of Western Serengeti alone, there are thought to be between
52,000-60,000 illegal bush-meat hunters.14 Despite the expansion of PAs since
2000, elephant range has shrunk by ten percent during that same period. 15
Increasing the amount of territory under protection, from less than ten percent in
2000 to about forty percent currently, is not enough to imbue the system with
resiliency.16
Protected areas can be broken into six categories, based on how land and
wildlife is protected or utilized. The country boasts 16 National Parks, 38
Game Reserves,

the

Ngorongoro Conservation

Area (NCA), 44 Game

Controlled Areas, 38 Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) and several Forest
Reserves.17 The PAs fall within six eco-systems including the Tarangire-
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Manyara,

Serengeti,

Selous-Mikumi,

Ruaha-Rungwa,

Katavi-Rukwa

and

Moyowosi-Kigosi.18 In the national parks, game reserves, and NCA, the largest
percentage of protected area, human settlement and usage of resources is
strictly prohibited.19 Game controlled areas, wildlife management areas (WMAs),
partial game reserves, and forest reserves receive less protections, and can be
utilized by both human populations and wildlife. 20 New protected areas are being
created both on land and within maritime areas, through evictions and the
restrictions of use rights of inhabitants.21
In terms of geography, around 74 percent of Tanzania is considered semiarid rangelands, while the rest of the country outside of coastal areas is
dominated by savannah and bushlands, as well as tropical and subtropical forest
ecosystems.22
Elephants are found throughout Tanzania’s PAs and in unprotected
dispersal areas.23 Around twenty percent live primarily in unprotected areas. 24
Large populations of elephants still exist in the Selous-Mikumi, the Ruaha
Rungwa, and Moyowosi-Kigosi Game Reserve, though they all face intensive
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poaching pressures.25 Important trans-boundary populations of elephants exist in
both the north and south of the country. The Selous-Niassa ecosystem,
extending across southern Tanzania and northern Mozambique, is one of the
largest trans-boundary wildlife areas in Africa.26 Three important ecosystems
operate across the border with Kenya, the Serengeti-Mara, Amboseli-Kilimanjaro,
and Tsavo-Mkomazi. These areas are world famous for the wildebeest migration
and for the elephants, as well as being the stronghold for East Africa’s Maasai. 27
The Serengetti, Kilimanjaro, the Selous Game Reserve, and parts of the
Ngorongoro Conservation Area, are UNESCO World Heritage Sites.28
Along with Kenya, Tanzania experienced heavy poaching during the
1970s and 1980s, losing over 100,000 elephants from 1977-1987. In the Selous
Game Reserve within three years, from 1986-1989, elephant populations
plummeted 70%, from 100,000 to 30,000. Black rhinos were largely extirpated. 29
As a result of losses to poaching and the inability of wildlife management
authorities to bring poaching under control, Tanzania lobbied hard for the ban on
international ivory sales within CITES in 1989.30
Under the ban, Tanzania’s elephant populations recovered. Until recently
Tanzania held 47 percent of East Africa’s elephants, and was considered to be
25
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globally important within the international elephant SES. 31 The Selous Game
Reserve and broader ecosystem alone held half of the elephants in Tanzania,
and was the second largest population in on the continent.32 In 2006, the year the
current poaching crisis began in Tanzania, estimates suggest the country held
over 142,000 elephants. By 2009 that number dropped to 109,022, a decrease of
33,776 elephants, or over 11,000 per year.33
The decline occurred primarily within the Selous Game Reserve, broader
Selous-Mikumi, and cross-border Selous-Niassa ecosystems. 34 Between 20092013 populations in the reserve declined by another 66 percent. 35 In one largescale seizure of 11 tons of ivory, all of the elephants came from the SelousNiassa ecosystem, representing over 1,600 elephants.36

Selous ivory is

considered particularly valuable, according to media reports, “making the gross
value

of Selous’ elephants

businesses, organized

crime

worth

billions

networks,

and
corrupt

thus

attracting illegal

officials,

terrorist

groups and others to risk poaching.”37 According to the EIA the “trafficking chain
from the Selous to the main markets in China has emerged as the single largest
conduit for ivory in the world.”38 Another poaching hotspot developed around the
Ruaha National Park and surrounding ecosystem. From 2008-2014 the area lost
31
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10,000 elephants.39 An unpublished report from the Great Elephant Census
suggests Ruaha lost 50 percent of its remaining elephants, around 4,000, in
2014, while as many as 12,000 were killed outside the park.40 Most recent
estimates suggest Tanzania has lost at least half of its elephants since 2007,
placing the population around 70,000, though it could be as low as 40,000.41 As
much as 90% of elephant mortality in Tanzania is related to poaching. 42 Under
acute threat by commercial poachers, without significant shifts in governance and
usage of resources within the SES, the SES will become progressively less able
to absorb disturbances or recover.43
While overall Tanzania has lost a significant percentage of its elephants in
the last decades, those losses are relatively isolated to southern Tanzania.
Parks and conservation areas in the north of the country have seen an increase
in elephant populations.44 For example, a 2014 census revealed elephants in the
Serengeti-Mara ecosystem increased by 266% since 1986. The population in the
ecosystem is around 7,500 elephants.45 In northern Tanzania the largest
populations of elephants exist in the Tarangire–Manyara ecosystem, which
includes Tarangire National Park.46 Conservationists fear that poachers will move
across Tanzania to other populations of elephants once those in Southern
39
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Tanzania have been depleted, making the seeming security of the northern
circuit parks illusory.47
Tanzania is heavily dependent on the elephant SES for foreign revenue
generation. Tourism accounts for 17 percent of the country’s GDP, around $2
billion per year, and employs more than 300,000 people.48 Approximately one
million tourists visit Tanzania each year, up 80 percent from the early 1990s. 49
The government recognizes tourism as a leading engine of growth and an
important tool to fight poverty.50 The wildlife sector provides about 40 percent of
Tanzania’s foreign exchange earnings.51
Tanzania places a premium on the ability to utilize resources, and does not
discriminate philosophically against consumptive use.52 The government actively
promotes hunting of wild animals, and at the international level proposed the sale
of its stockpiled ivory until international pressure and the revelation of large scale
losses from poaching forced a retraction in 2013.53 The largest in the world,
Tanzania’s stockpile contains 34,000 tusks worth $230 million on the Chinese
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black-market.54 The domestic trade in ivory is proscribed, though large illegal
domestic markets continue to exist.55

Governance System and Resource Users

The SESF provides several lenses useful for examining Tanzania’s
complex SES.

The SESF stresses how examinations of past and present

patterns of interactions within the SES explain the current state of the system. In
Tanzania governance authorities and resources users have interacted in the
system through a pattern of centralization, exclusion, and exploitation developed
during the colonial era and continued post-Independence.56
The SESF stresses the importance of cross-level and cross-scale
interactions, and the role of endogenous and exogenous factors, in shaping the
SES. Tanzania’s SES cannot be understood without examining interactions
between exogenous factors, including shifts in the international conservation
agenda over time, from fortress style conservation to liberalization, devolution,
and community based conservation, and endogenous factors such as the deepseated corruption within Tanzania’s wildlife governing authorities. 57 Liberalization
and devolution, tools to increase the values of wildlife and land and incentivize
conservation, have actually sped up degradation of the resource system and
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created perverse incentives for recentralization, further exclusion, and rent
seeking. Liberalization has created incentives for park and PA expansion and for
the exploitation of wildlife resources by government officials. Devolution,
implemented through poorly managed community-based conservation (CBC)
initiatives across the country, has led to intense conflicts between communities
and conservation authorities, and between communities and wildlife.
As the SESF notes, rules, regulations, laws and investments surrounding
wildlife conservation reflect how governing authorities value wildlife. Despite
accepting considerable donor aid for conservation, Tanzania continues to pursue
policies aimed more squarely at centralization of resources, and exploitation of
resources, and has pursued every effort to capture the increasing value of wildlife
made possible through liberalization at the central government level. As
implemented in Tanzania, regulatory mechanisms meant to conserve wildlife
have imperiled it, creating the impression that exploitation and accumulation, not
conservation, are the preference.58

Colonial Governance Structures

Colonial governance of wildlife under both German and British rule
followed the general model of colonial wildlife management across Africa, which
emphasized centralization of control over wildlife, state ownership of land and
wildlife, and exclusion of local peoples from the utilization of land and resources
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and from the decision-making processes guiding management. 59 The strategies
for managing people and resources within the SES crafted under colonial
leadership have shaped both how the SES is currently managed by conservation
authorities, and utilized and valued by resource users.

The emphasis on

economic gains to wildlife and the capture of revenue by central authorities help
explain resource depletion in the SES.
German colonial authorities developed two major avenues for protection of
wildlife, mainly restricting utilization by native peoples, and creating a system of
protected areas.

60

61

They created fourteen PAs before the First World War.

While communities were still able to live in these areas, their ability to utilize
wildlife was significantly diminished.62 After WWI ended the British took over
control of the colony, further centralizing control of wildlife resources. The British
established first Game Department in 1919, and in 1923 the transferred all land
and wildlife resources to the Crown. 63

By 1930 Tanzania’s most famous

protected areas had been set aside- the Serengeti, Ngorongoro Crater, the
Selous, and Mt Kilimanjaro. 64
Under both the Germans and the British the international conservation
community, at its most nascent stages, emerged as an important force in shaping
wildlife legislation and priorities in Tanzania.65 The German Frankfort Zoological
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Society (FZS) was instrumental in creating the Serengeti and the Ngorongoro
Conservation Area (NCA).66 This work was supported later by a British
organization, the Society for Preservation of Flora and Fauna of the Empire. 67
Sustained pressure from these and other European conservation organizations
pushed the colonial authorities to continue to restrict resource use rights of local
communities and the strengthening of laws, rules and regulations supporting
PAs.68

They advocated for strict preservationist models of fortress-style

conservation, which removed all customary land rights from communities within
the parks. In 1959 revisions to the Game Ordinance embraced fortress-style
conservation, and colonial authorities began large-scale removals to establish
parks.69 Ultimately over 50% of protected areas in Tanzania involved some type
of evictions.70
As Independence approached in 1961 colonial conservation officials
developed two strategies to protect wildlife in the post-independence period. The
first strategy involved courting international conservation organizations and
foreign governments to support wildlife conservation, in particular the recently
formed World Wildlife Fund, African Wildlife Foundation, and the International
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Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN). 71 The decision to reach out to
international NGOs was fueled by two concerns. One, officials feared for the
safety of wildlife and habitats under African rule.

Two, they anticipated the

challenge of funding wildlife conservation faced by African governments faced
with priorities of development and national consolidation. By including
international NGOs, officials hoped to develop a funding stream, which would
support wildlife programs. 72 The second strategy involved promoting tourism to
support conservation through the generation of foreign currency receipts. These
two strategies, stressing the economic value of wildlife, were meant to ensure
that wildlife conservation remained a priority for the independent government. 73

Management of the SES Post-Independence

The post-Independence government embraced the strategies for both
revenue generation and conservation put in place by colonial officials. 74 The
administration followed the colonial model provided, resting on outside support
through donor funding and tourism to support conservation programs. 75
Tanzania continues to shape its conservation concerns squarely around
71
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economic value, whether through photo tourism, hunting, or the sale of its ivory,
and remains heavily dependent on donor funds to support conservation. 76 The
government allocates less than one percent of the national budget to wildlife,
despite its importance for revenue generation, meaning governing authorities
must rely on receipts from tourism and donor funds to operate.77 Conservation
organizations fund around 90 percent of conservation programs. 78
Tanzania’s first post-independence wildlife legislation, the 1974 Wildlife
Conservation Act (WCA), continued the colonial policies of restricting resource
use and gazzettment of large conservation areas in national parks and game
reserves.79 Wildlife remained under the purview and ownership of the central
government. The 1974 WCA did not attempt to either reinstate traditional use
rights to land or wildlife and did not establish a mechanism to guarantee
community management of wildlife or access to resources.80 It actually restricted
further the ability of small hunter-gatherer groups to hunt in parks, which had
been allowed under colonial legislation. Under the WCA, power remained with
central authorities, giving the president the authority to declare any land in the
country a game reserve, and the Director of National Parks the power to declare
partial reserves and game controlled areas, requiring no input from local
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communities.81

The WCA did, in theory, allow for local communities to use

resources in game controlled areas and undesignated lands. However, in
practice the government consistently privileged commercial use of lands
controlled by central state authorities over those controlled by local communities,
in particular the provisioning of hunting licenses, rarely allocated to local
communities, to capture most of the revenue.82

Governing Authorities

Wildlife resources in Tanzania have become increasingly valuable through
the adoption of neo-liberal conservation. As such, governance relates directly to
the commodification of resources and the capture of revenues generated through
their commodification. Revenue is generated in two ways: through photo and
hunting tourism in PAs and through foreign donor support. As such, authorities
are driven to both expand PAs to increase opportunities for accumulation, and
actively seek donor support. The struggle to capture revenues has influenced
how resources are governed and exploited, in particular the centralization and
recentralization of control over wildlife, and has shaped the relations between
communities and conservation authorities.83
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Tanzania’s large

resource

system is

managed

through

multiple

government agencies and increasingly through partnerships with NGOs and
other public-private initiatives. Many areas experience multiple and overlapping
governance authorities.84 The primary government body overseeing the
management of wildlife in Tanzania is the Ministry of Natural Resources and
Tourism (MNRT). The MNRT manages wildlife through multiple agencies
including the Tanzania National Parks Authority (TANAPA), the Wildlife Division
(WD), Ngorongoro Conservation Area Authority, and the Tanzania Wildlife
Research Institute (TAWIRI).85 Each agency is responsible for a different aspect
of Tanzania’s system of PAs.
TANAPA and the WD are the primary government bodies responsible for
wildlife conservation and management. TANAPA is a parastatal responsible for
managing and protecting the country’s national parks, located primarily in the
north.86 The agency is mandated to expand existing parks, and to create new
national parks, setting the organization up for conflicts with communities
surrounding existing parks.87 TANAPA has further responsibility for poverty
reduction and the management of community-based conservation (CBCs)
ventures in areas surrounding parks.88 The WD manages the rest of the country’s
wildlife on private lands, communal lands, wetlands, in game reserves, and in
game controlled areas. The WD allocates all hunting concessions in Tanzania,
84
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and has a significant role in how Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) are
governed.89 WMAs are areas set aside on village land for wildlife conservation
and only sustainable use of resources, and are controlled by CBCs. 90 The
purpose of WMAs, according to Ministry documents, is “to enable the local
communities living in villages to participate in the protection and utilization of
wildlife resources on village land.”91 The WD also holds responsibility for storing
the nation’s stockpile of ivory, the largest in the world.92 The Director of the
Wildlife Division is appointed directly by the president.93
TAWIRI produces and provides scientific information to the various
services on the health of wildlife and habitats; conducts community education
programs; and is the CITES designated Scientific Authority in Tanzania.94
TAWIRI is responsible for monitoring the country’s wildlife through its
Conservation Information and Monitoring Unit (CIMU), which collects information
on the number and distribution of wildlife, trends in illegal killing and animal
movements, and human activities within PAs. CIMU operates across about a
third of Tanzania’s landmass.95 TAWIRI is also responsible for producing the
country’s elephant management plans, first introduced in 1995 and later updated
in 2010. The plans address “management of elephants in PAs, population
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numbers and trends, community involvement in elephant conservation,
utilization, law enforcement and control of ivory, international obligations, and
monitoring and research.”96
NGOs, along with some prominent intergovernmental organizations like
the UNDP, UNESCO and others, have seen their role in conservation in
Tanzania continue to grow. Since the 1980s conservation NGOs have increased
from a few dozen to nearly 2,000. Currently the head offices of 31 international
conservation organizations operate in Tanzania.97 As in Kenya, NGOs are deeply
involved in every aspect of conservation, from monitoring populations to
investigating poaching and to running community based conservation programs.
NGOs are roundly criticized by scholars of the history of conservation in
Tanzania for supporting the central government agenda, and their own agenda,
over the interests of communities.98 Many scholars writing on Tanzania note the
links between the explosion of NGOs in Tanzania, and more broadly across the
continent, and neo-liberal conservation agendas, which emphasize privatization,
economic benefits, and the goal of making wildlife pay for itself. 99 The result of
the adoption of this agenda has been “the commodification of environmental and
conservation

processes,

the

reduction

in

size

and

capacity

of

state

bureaucracies, the replacement of state functions by civil society (often
international NGOs), and the liberalization of investment opportunities in the
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conservation/tourism sector.”100 Others note the influence of international
conservation NGOs in the romanticizaiton of wild landscapes devoid of people,
and the naturalization of that landscape in the overall narrative, which can be
used to push people out of wild areas.101 Goldman argues NGOs have been
particularly important in shaping local Africans as wildlife villains. 102

NGOs

continue to supported the eviction of locals from parks and shape local peoples
as a threat to wildlife.103
NGOs

have

emerged

as

key

interlocutors

shaping

Tanzania’s

conservation and development agenda, in particular in the community-based
conservation arena, which the international conservation community pushes
aggressively.104 Donors provide millions of dollars to Tanzania, largely in support
of CBC efforts, though they are increasingly involved in large scale anti-poaching
efforts.105 The cross-scalar influence of these organizations shape polices in the
SES, which may improve SES resilience, or ignore local factors and inadvertently
degrade SES resilience, depending on the area of influence.106
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Decentralization and Devolution

Reform within the wildlife management sector occurred within the context
of broader decentralization and liberalization initiatives taken on by Tanzania
since the late 1980s and the international movement towards CBCs initiated in
the 1980s and 1990s.107 After the devastating poaching epidemic of the 1980s,
and the intense and expensive law enforcement strategy launched to end it,
Tanzania began to recognize it needed a comprehensive strategy to deal with
poaching that included community participation in wildlife management. 108 The
poaching epidemic in the late 1970s and 1980s illustrated to the conservation
community in Tanzania and elsewhere that “fortress conservation” could not
protect wildlife living outside of protected areas.109 Moreover, policymakers,
heavily influenced by foreign donors and international NGOs, acknowledged that
state ownership of wildlife was not conducive to community conservation and in
fact degraded community incentives to conserve wildlife and habitats.110 As a
result, the government began to shift focus away from providing protections
primarily in national parks and game reserves and instead to focus on community
lands.111 Reforms embraced the notion of devolution and decentralization of
authority over wildlife, and pushed the development of CBCs as key components
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of conservation.112 As in Kenya, the rhetoric of decentralization and local control
of wildlife resources has not lived up to its promise. 113

Devolution

Two very important differences exist in terms of the management of
wildlife resources on community lands between Tanzania and Kenya. First,
Tanzania developed a national level land policy in 1995, followed by supporting
legislation over the next decade.

While under the laws the state retained

ownership of communal land, the reforms attempted to establish more
accountable mechanisms to manage land at the community level.114 Tanzania
recognizes customary land tenure as well as collective management through
incorporated villages, individual ownership, and private commercial ownership of
land. By contrast Kenya has only recently embarked on the process of land
tenure reform and the development of a national land policy. The impacts of
these policies are as of yet unknown.115
Second, Tanzania quickly developed the supporting policies necessary to
allow for the local management of wildlife. The Wildlife Policy of 1998 specifically
identified the key role community based conservation (CBCs) should play in
managing wildlife on community lands, and began laying out a framework for
112
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implementation. The legislation provided villages the tools to manage wildlife at
the local level through a uniform framework. The policy reforms recommended
detailed local management mechanisms, in the form of Wildlife Management
Areas (WMAs) managed through the WD, to include local communities in
decisions on how to utilize wildlife resources either through hunting, wildlife
viewing, game cropping, or wild meat harvesting. The legislation devolved
authority over wildlife to rural communities and private landholders through the
WMAs, allowing communities to manage the wildlife inhabiting their own lands,
and take a greater role in tourism, to include a greater role in hunting
concessions, and in revenue generation and revenue sharing.116
The Wildlife
communities

Policy specifically acknowledged

benefitting

directly

from

hunting

the importance

concessions

and

of

tourist

enterprises, and highlighted the intention to create more opportunities for
communities to manage wildlife on their own lands for their own benefit. 117 The
reforms designated 25 percent of revenues from hunting concessions flow back
to communities.118 As a result of the policy reforms and the general movement
towards community based conservation, CBCs sprung up under TANAPA and
the WD, and “there was a widespread perception in Tanzania that wildlife
management was on the brink of significant and far-reaching change.”119
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Recentralization

Despite the rhetoric around devolution and the value of CBCs, Tanzania
has consistently undermined its own legislation and recentralized wildlife policy
through rules and regulations from almost the moment the Wildlife Policy of 1998
took effect.120 Conservation authorities pursue strategies that reap the greatest
monetary benefit for the central government, and the greatest opportunities for
rent-seeking. The way revenues are allocated for certain types of conservationin this instance hunting allocations and later all tourism on community landsmake those strategies less desirable for those seeking short term gains from
wildlife.121 Some failures of governance authorities to conserve natural resources
can be explained by the behavior of government officials and politicians who act
in their own interests vice those of the resource system as a whole.122 Within the
central government, interests exist which push for the centralization of wildlife
control, including elites who want to protect patronage networks, and those who
want to protect Treasury flows from hunting concessions.123
While WMAs were originally meant to be a tool for rural poverty alleviation
and empowerment, they became a vehicle for elite predation. 124 According to
Baldus, the framework to form WMAs passed by the WD in 2000 was made
intentionally complex in order to force local communities to seek outside financial
120
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and technical assistance to move forward.125 The rules required communities to
go through a rigorous and bureaucratic process of initiating and financing land
studies, evaluations, and assessments.126 The regulations also required a threeyear renewal of all ventures, meaning even when communities could attract an
investor to create a lodge or other tourism venture, they could not guarantee
renewal.127

Moreover, the WD gave itself authority to revoke agreements,

essentially removing any ability of communities to manage lands. The WD did not
devolve any authority over hunting concessions to local communities under the
rules and regulations, and communities received no legal right to claim revenues
from hunting, even when it occurred on community lands.128

The WD even

refused to translate the Wildlife Policy into Swahili for local consumption for
several years, after which copies were still withheld from circulation. Locals were
unable to access the policy and exercise their rights under the law. 129
Ultimately the administrative processes were crafted in such a way to
“increased central control over wildlife and reduce the rights of rural
communities.”130 As Nelson et al. note, “The result is the perpetuation of the
basic challenges facing wildlife management in rural areas- namely declining
wildlife populations as a result of lack of local incentives to conserve the
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resource- and new conflicts occurring in some rural areas over village land and
resource rights.”131
Throughout the 2000s as tourism and tourism revenues steadily increased
in Tanzania, the WD continued to centralize control of resources to capture the
most revenue.

In 2007 the WD passed the “Non-Consumptive Utilization of

Wildlife Regulations,” which revised the Wildlife Policy, dropping the focus on
community participation altogether.132 The regulations stipulate that all nonconsumptive wildlife use on village lands, in game reserves, and in GCAs must
be approved by the Wildlife Director. Under the regulations game drives, walking
safaris, and other photo tourism activities were forbidden without the permission
of the WD.133 Communities lost the ability to directly negotiate contracts with
tourism operators, limiting significantly their ability to manage wildlife resources
or to benefit from them. 134 The regulation also shifted revenue-sharing
mechanisms, requiring tourism operators to turn over fees, set by regulation, for
all operations directly to the central government for later allocation to
communities.135 These changes significantly reduced revenue for communities,
which had directly negotiated with tour companies. Because the legislation did
not included requirements of transparency, local communities had no way of
knowing how much revenue they should have been allocated for their full
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revenue share.136 These regulations contradict the spirit of the 1998 Wildlife
Policy, which clearly aimed at devolving authority to communities.137 Devolution
is meant to foster links between communities and wildlife and strengthen SES
resilience by incentivizing conservation. Undermining those linkages by placing
all responsibility for management, and benefits of management, at higher tiers of
organization within the SES remove incentives for conservation with potentially
disastrous impacts on wildlife.138
The process of recentralization continued in 2009 when Tanzania adopted
a new Wildlife Conservation Act (WCA), which strengthened central control of
wildlife and increased the Wildlife Division’s authority to intervene in community
management of wildlife.139 The act made grazing in Game Controlled Area illegal,
which served to dispossess Maasai of traditional grazing areas.140 The new act
included “little mention of participation, development and benefits for local
communities.”141 The Act gives the Wildlife Minister the ability to designate
wildlife corridors, dispersal areas, buffer zones and migratory routes.142
The regulations undermine every goal of devolution; limit the potential for
economic benefit to communities; limit the ability of communities to participate in
the management of wildlife; decrease transparency; and remove key incentives
136
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for community based conservation. Importantly, the regulations threaten the
ability of communities to benefit economically from tourism. 143 While the massive
loss of elephants Tanzania experienced over the past six years cannot be
entirely attributed to failures of devolution, by dispossessing local resource users
the government systematically undermined social actors within the system who,
under a different governance structure, might have more quickly identified and
addressed perturbations in the SES.

Disconnected from most benefits, and

bearing a disproportionate level of the burden, resource users had little incentive
to address transformation in the system.
Several scholars argue the government never intended to devolve
authority over wildlife to local communities.144 The high values of wildlife on
communal lands ultimately undermined the devolution reforms process because
actors in the central government worked to recapture revenues. 145 The rise in
values of land and wildlife discincentivize movements towards devolution and
encourages elites and the central government to tighten control.

Ironically,

“tourism is a leading source of such incentives to re-centralize and expropriate
local resources, even as tourism is seen as a means to alleviate rural poverty
and create positive local incentives for environmental conservation.” 146
Devolution threatened rent-seeking opportunities and the opportunity for
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accumulation through dispossession. Ultimately, if implemented, devolution
threatened to result in losses of revenue and control within central authorities. As
wildlife and land became more valuable, the costs of giving up control
increased.147 Nelson argues the main driver behind reforms to the Wildlife Policy
in 1998, which clearly articulated goals of community participation, was to attract
foreign donor support, not to actually implement a more inclusive and devolved
policy.148

Weak Laws and Enforcement

The failure of devolution and the recentralization of control over wildlife
resources occurred within the context of an unmitigated poaching crisis, weak
laws, low enforcement rates, low seizure rates, failed anti-poaching operations
and serious mismanagement and corruption within both wildlife governance and
within the overall political establishment.
Until 2009, the country relied on the 1974 WCA for protections, under
which few prosecutions ever occurred.

Only ten people were convicted of

elephant poaching from 2001-2009, when more than 40,000 elephants were
poached. Those convicted received sentences ranging from 18-60 months, and
fines around $110.149 In one of the largest ivory seizures on record, a 2009
seizure of 11 tons of ivory, no prosecutions occurred despite significant evidence
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of collusion between customs agents and ivory traffickers. The case file was
eventually lost and no prosecutions occurred.150 According to the EIA “the
convoluted judicial process rarely leads to a successful prosecution and
deterrent” for poachers caught in Tanzania. Fines are small, jail time is minimal,
and few poachers arrested face any penalty at all. Less than 10 percent of those
arrested are successfully prosecuted. An EIA report notes that from 2009-2014
only one case involving a major ivory seizure has led to a significant detention.
Other cases, through more often successful than in the past, continue to lead to
small fines and short jail terms.151
The 2009 WCA is significantly stronger, though loopholes exist, and few
poachers and even fewer traffickers have been prosecuted. A 2012 study
suggests chronic poachers face a .07 percent chance of arrest over the course of
their poaching career. When they are arrested, prison sentences are very short,
and fines low.152 Judges retain a fine option, which can be levied instead of jail
time, allowing well connected poachers the opportunity to buy their way out of
jail. Placing snares or other traps for wildlife is punishable by as little as two
years in jail, or payment of a fine.153 While elephant poaching can be prosecuted
under the Economic and Organized Crime Control Act and can carry sentences
of up to 15 years, such sentences are almost unheard of.154 Another significant
loophole exists within Zanzibari wildlife legislation. The primary wildlife law active
150
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in Zanzibar, the Forest Resources Management and Conservation Act (FRMCA)
No.10 of 1996, only protects wildlife naturally occurring on the islands. As such,
African elephants receive no protections in Zanzibar, contributing to its
emergence as a major trafficking hub.155
According to the EIA, between 2002 and 2010 all ivory seizures of
Tanzanian ivory over one ton occurred after the ivory left the country. Between
2009-2014, 22.6 tons of ivory was seized in the country, while over 40 tons was
intercepted elsewhere.156 This is evidence of weak enforcement.
Where large-scale enforcement has occurred, it has been problematic.
Operation Kipepo (Kiswahili for butterfly), an anti-poaching mission launched
against poachers in the Selous in 2009, resulted in some arrests, though very
high levels of killing continued in the reserve. According to CITES, officials within
the operation were found to be involved with illegal killings, including some highly
placed WD officials.157

The 2013 Operation Tokomeza Ujangili’ (Eliminate

Poaching) led to the arrests of 1,030 suspected poachers and the seizure of
weapons and ivory.158

Originally touted as successful, the operation was

suspended after concerns over human rights abuses were raised when villagers
were robbed, beaten, forced from their homes, and in some cases killed by
security forces.159 While the government claimed the Operation was suspended
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due to human rights abuse, suspicion emerged among the conservation
community and within the media that highly placed politicians involved in the
ivory trade sabotaged the operation.160 After the operation was suspended,
officials claimed 60 elephants were killed in one month. 161
Institutional challenges within TANAPA and the WD further challenge
enforcement.

The government does not adequately fund any of its wildlife

departments, with rippling effects across the enterprise in terms of both
equipment and staff.162 The impacts in TANAPA and the WD are illustrated by
the underutilization of modern technology and equipment; poor training;
inadequate staff; lack of staff services, including lack of HIV/AIDS training
programs; and poor information sharing about wildlife, including death rates,
information on human wildlife conflict incidents, and animal behavior. 163

Small

budgets create challenges for attracting tourists. According to TANAPA
documents, parks are not realizing the full potential of tourism revenues due to
lack of infrastructure, diversification, weak marketing, weak visitor centers and
“ineffective management of external pressures.”164 TANAPA’s community
outreach programs and CBCs face multiple challenges due to weak relationships
with surrounding communities; the failure to link community development to
conservation; inadequate benefits sharing mechanisms; lack of a mechanism to
ensure communities enjoy user-rights to resources; and poor relationships
160
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between park staffs and others in the conservation community.165

These

weaknesses have created challenged for developing resilient management
systems within the SES.
Wildlife cannot be protected without an adequate ranger force. According
to media reports the government employs less than half of the 4,000 rangers
required to protect the country’s wildlife.166 TANAPA employs an average of one
ranger per 50 km², while the WD fields one scout per 139 km². 167 In the Selous
Game Reserve, hit the hardest by poaching, the budget allocates $3/km2, a mere
fraction of the $200-400/ km2 required for anti-poaching.168 The relative security
of elephant populations under TANAPA authority is increasingly under question,
as media reports suggest that one park under the agency’s control, the Ruaha
NP, lost 4,200 elephants in 2014, half its total population.169

Elephant

populations have plummeted in areas controlled by the WD.
The corruption within the WD is entrenched to the point the department
can be considered as criminalized or captured.

Criminalization refers to the

routinization of criminal acts within a government, 170 while capture refers to the
way in which elites “have been able to manipulate policy formation and even
shape the emerging rules of the game to their own advantage.” 171 In addition to
crafting rules and regulations recentralizing control over wildlife resources in
165
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order to facilitate rent-seeking within the department, WD officials have also been
accused of selling ivory from the national stockpile, as well as direct involvement
in poaching and trafficking.172 They divert funds from hunting concessions, and
engage in rent seeking through their role in overseeing CBNRM programs in
WMAs. The park services are known to move rangers who too closely investigate
corruption within the wildlife service in order to silence them.173
The WD’s management of hunting concessions illustrates their preference
for shortiterm maximization of rents over any conservation goals, and how the
capture and criminalization of key agencies can impact resource management.
In order to increase profits from the sale of hunting concessions, the WD has
continuously both added hunting concessions and subdivided existing ones.174
While similar hunting blocks in other African countries were valued in the
hundreds of thousands of dollars Tanzania’s blocks were allocated for $7,500
each, raising questions over how much money exchanged hands behind the
scenes.175 In thirty years, from 1967-1997, the WD increased the number of
hunting blocks by nearly three times, from 47 to over 140. At the same time, the
WD did not reduce hunting quotas, but instead allocated each subdivided block
with the same quotas as the original blocks, in affect multiplying by many times
the amount of wildlife offtake allowed. In addition, game cropping, game capture,
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and local hunting licences continued to be apportioned in these same areas,
exacerbating the problem further.176
Tanzania’s early decision to deeply embed international conservation
organizations and their respective agendas into national conservation polices,
first driving fortress-conservation and later neoliberal conservation, and to adopt
the principle that wildlife must pay for itself, has impacted the attitudes and
actions of all resource users, from government rent seekers to poachers and
people living within WMAs.177

Resource Users

Resource users’ interactions with conservation authorities and the
resource system have been shaped by patterns and processes, which emerged
during the colonial era, and mirrored in the post-independence era. These
privilege both government agendas and the international conservation agenda
over the rights of local resource users. As resource values have been driven up
through the adoption of neoliberal conservation and the commodification of
natural resources, Tanzanian communities have progressively lost authority and
rights over resources, degrading norms for conservation and undermining
conservation goals.178 As the SESF literature suggests, by ignoring important

176

African Hunting Info, "Tanzania Plans a New Wildlife Authority,"
http://www.africanhuntinginfo.com/en/home/news/287-tanzania-plans-a-new-wildlife-authority.
177
Young.
178
Nelson and Agarwal, "Patronage or Participation? Community Based Natural Resource
Management Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa." Baldus, Hahn, and Picard, "Community Based
Conservation in Tanzania." Benjaminsen and Bryceson, "Conservation, Green/Blue Grabbing,

241
interactions between users and the system, in this case the loss of resource
rights and social marginalization, governing authorities may inadvertently impose
policies, which exacerbate, instead of address, perturbations with the SES. 179
Community-based conservation was adopted as the primary mechanisms
to both maintain wildlife and habitats in wildlife dispersal areas and on community
lands. A central tenet of CBCs is their contribution to the economic and social
wellbeing of communities living within CBC areas.180 As a model of neo-liberal
conservation, revenues from wildlife are expected to pay for all the costs
associated with the programs. Additionally, communities have to be interested
and willing to participate.181 The government’s deliberate recentralization of
authority over wildlife, and purposefully onerous demands on local communities
attempting to benefit from wildlife, made creating the conditions required for
success impossible, with potentially irreversible impacts on conservation norms,
relations between communities and governing authorities, and relations between
communities and wildlife.
Within the current SES, communities feel they bear all of the costs of
wildlife conservation, and share in none of the benefits. 182 The failure of the
government to live up to its promise to devolve authority over wildlife to local
communities, coupled with the inconsistent and generally weak performance of
CBS and the simultaneous expansion of protected areas onto communal lands,
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fostered an atmosphere of intense conflicts between communities and
conservation authorities and wildlife.

Licit Resource Users

As in Kenya, rural communities of agriculturalists and pastoralists in
Tanzania exist within wildlife dispersal areas and abut national parks and game
reserves.183 Largely poor and dependent on rain-fed agriculture, these
communities are in many ways stressing the landscape and degrading wildlife
habitats through intensive farming, deforestation, fencing, and poaching for bush
meat. In-migration in response to over-crowding in more productive landscapes
is increasing the population in the rangelands, and increasing human-wildlife
conflict.184 In some areas community lands surrounding parks have as much
wildlife as the parks themselves, creating significant potential for local resource
users to capture revenues.185
However, despite the similarities with Kenya, in many ways Tanzania was
better prepared to protect wildlife and contribute to rural development through
utilization of its wildlife resources due to the early recognition of the role of
communities in conservation, the development of legislation to protect communal
land rights and the supporting policy to enable community wildlife management.
183
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The failures of the conservation authorities over the last decade and a half to
implement these policies, on top of the lingering distrust of conservation
authorities stemming from colonial era expulsions and centralization of wildlife
authority, may have transformed attitudes amongst resource users beyond
repair.
Whereas in Kenya communities were left out of wildlife conservation almost
entirely, lacking rights to either land or resources, in Tanzania the very
association of communities with wildlife management has soured attitudes of
communities both towards conservation officials and wildlife and conservation
generally, leading to some of the same outcomes evident in Kenya in terms of
degradation of the landscape, intensive resistance to conservation, and
significant loss of biodiversity and habitats.

Pilot Projects and Early Success

Communities experienced

significant

early successes with liberal

conservation. Community-based conservation was pioneered in Tanzania as part
of the Selous Conservation Program (SCP) in 1987, funded and administered in
part by German NGOs. Initially the project was limited to the Selous with the
goals of strengthening management of the park, and promoting sustainable use
of wildlife to drive rural development.

Almost immediately similar programs

started in the Serengeti, followed later by programs across the country.
Communities looked to the passage of the 1998 Wildlife Policy and land reforms
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as a positive step forward in what had been a process of “silent devolution.” 186
The shift in policy in Tanzania was meant to create a more inclusive style of
community conservation with active participation in the management of the
landscape in crafting and enforcing wildlife protections by communities. 187 By
2000, 19 wildlife management areas controlled by local CBCs has been
established.188
These early CBCs were inclusive, transparent, and directly benefited
communities through jobs, the provision of game, and a sense of ownership of
the process and outcomes of conservation. 189

Villages began to negotiate

directly with safari companies as market forces took hold in the wildlife industry
throughout the 1990s. Direct negotiations allowed communities to bypass the
WD and capture all of the negotiated revenues. Villages near the Serengeti
negotiated agreements for as much as $55,000 per year. Communities were able
to control the revenues and prioritize community service projects per local
preferences, gaining a sense of ownership.190 The progress of these CBCs to
both improve livelihoods and maintain habitats was undermined by the passage
of rules and regulations recentralizing control over wildlife resources on
community lands. The rules and regulations took away the right of communities
to directly negotiate with tour operators, and restricted all tourist activities outside
of national parks and the NCA not approved through the WD, making all such
186
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ventures lacking WD approval illegal, and significantly decreasing the revenue
share for local communities.
Despite the policies of recentralization the government and the
conservation community continued to push CBCs on village lands throughout the
2000s.

However, literature on community-based conservation in Tanzania

suggests that both CBCs run through the WD and those associated with NGOs
and other donors suffer significant challenges in achieving the primary objectives
of CBCs, that is, maintain wildlife and habitats and contributing to economic and
social wellbeing of communities. They may in fact be undermining conservation
norms and sewing distrust in communities.

Their performance is uneven;

management structures are not inclusive; they routinely ignore local knowledge
and norms of conservation management; and they include steep opportunity
costs.
Considerable disparities exist across CBCs in terms of revenue generation
and benefits sharing.191 For example, between 1992 and 2003, Serengeti
National Park (SNP) generated US $31 million from tourism but only 1.6% was
allocated to adjacent villages for socio-economic development projects.192 In
some areas individuals may receive as little as $2.50 per year as a revenue
sharing portion.193 Communities in areas where hunting occurs benefit very little
from hunting revenues. Most hunting revenues accrue to government officials,
191
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government agencies, firms, and elites. The money, which flows to agencies
does not trickle down.

Only around three percent of revenues reach local

communities.194
The level of community involvement also varies considerably. WMAs in
particular have not become vehicles for community participation in decisionmaking as outlined in the 1998 Wildlife Policy. Their very creation depended on
the authority of the central government and a decision by the Minister in charge.
In practice, most authority resides with the central government as communities
depended on program staff at higher headquarters for allocation of resources
and to make basic decisions.195 As a result, control is re-emebedded at the level
of the central government.196 Councils are often not consulted about land-use
planning whether it is for conservation or development. 197 In some cases the
community is left out entirely as decisions are made by NGOs or the WD. Where
“communities” are included that may actually mean the chief or village leaders
make choices.198 In other instances tour operators have come into areas without
consulting communities at all. They do not negotiate agreements, and have no
revenue-sharing mechanism. 199 Community members may not even understand
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that the goal of conservation programs is to conserve resources- they may be far
more interested in how to access resources. They may think programs mean
more access to hunting and legal rights to harvest, not less.200 Resource users
within WMAs and may not even realize they live in a WMA, may receive no
benefits from wildlife management and no revenue sharing. 201 Benefits schemes
often lack local input, meaning money flows to projects not considered priorities
in a community.202 Local communities are ultimately marginalized from the
conservation process and have had little influence on reforms to the system. 203
Not only are communities generally left out of decision-making, but
conservation authorities both during the colonial era and in the present, routinely
ignore traditional and indigenous knowledge of wildlife and landscape
management systems. 204 For example, the strict emphasis on zone-based
planning pushed by conservation authorities, both the government and NGOs,
“contradicts the fluid nature of wildlife movements as well as those of pastoral
herds, and therefore risks further disrupting both pastoral practices and wildlife
movements.”205 By ignoring local knowledge, preferences, and management
strategies that can benefit both human and wildlife communities, conservation
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officials ultimately assert their own agendas at the expense of communities. 206
This exclusion has eroded interest in conservation and in participating in
sustainable land use practices.207
While the social and economic benefits of CBCs are uneven, costs of
community participation are often very high. They include “loss of access to
legitimate and traditional rights, damage to crops and other properties, livestock
depredation, and risk posed to people’s lives through disease transmission and
attacks by wild animals.”208 Coercive and often violent operations to protect
wildlife and habitats meted out onto communities is another significant cost
associated with conservation.209 In some communities people feel they bear all
the burden for conservations, including loss of property, rights, harassment by
game officials, and marginalization, and none of the benefits.210
Failures to devolve actual authority over wildlife management to local
communities, along with the poor performance of CBCs generally, has
implications for the survival of wildlife and the feasibility of community based
conservation. One failed conservation initiative can create negative perceptions
of all conservation organizations and initiatives in an area, with rippling effects
spatially and across time.211
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Park Expansion

Over the same period that Tanzania introduced and pushed the adoption
of CBCs, (and simultaneously rolled back most benefits associated with them),
the country consistently increased the total land area under some form of
protection in order to capture increases in value accruing to the commodification
of wildlife.212 As the values of wildlife and landscapes increased on the global
market, both the Tanzanian government and private investors have an incentive
to create new PAs and to expand existing ones, that is, to preserve resources for
the use of tourists at the expense of local communities.213 Because the president
retains the right to allocate land without consultation with local communities, the
conversion of communal lands to conservation amounts to “land grabbing” by the
government.214 Expansion threatens local communities with eviction or
dispossession. Land available for human use in Tanzania is significantly limited
by the provision of large amounts of territory for the use of wildlife. As more land
gains some levels of protection, local peoples are cut off from their ability to
gather wood, utilize water resources, harvest building materials, farm, or graze
animals.215
Evictions have occurred since the colonial era and relate to colonial style
“fortress conservation.”
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advantaged peoples, often pastoralists like the Maasai.216 Among others, the
Maasai were removed to create the Serengeti and their land use rights were
restricted in the NCA. They are currently under threat from the allocation of
massive hunting concessions on their communal lands. The 2009 WCA made
grazing in hunting concessions illegal, meaning the Maasai lose their rights to
pursue preferred livelihood strategies without consultation or compensation. In
2015 the government attempted to remove as many as 40,000 people to make
way for a lion hunting concession. Some groups have been evicted from areas
multiple times as more and more land gains protected status.217
Dispossession occurs when community land use rights are restricted on
community

lands

through

recentralization.218

As

Benjaminsen

notes,

dispossession involves the exclusion of some users, primarily local peoples, and
the capital accumulation of other users, primarily rent seekers within government,
tourism operators, conservation organizations, and the State Treasury.219

Resistance to Conservation

These interactions have resulted in a loss of trust and erosion of
conservation norms, pushing communities into intense conflict with conservation
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authorities and wildlife. Increasingly communities are turning to defensive tactics
to stop what they consider “land grabbing” by conservation authorities. In this
way parks and protected areas can become “perilous” to wildlife protections
when communities feel they threaten their livelihoods, in particular in the context
of the failure to devolve authority and the recentralization of control currently
underway in Tanzania.220 As such the social structures designed to conserve
wildlife ultimately lose resilience to absorb or address perturbations in the
system, with impacts on the stability of the system as a whole.221
These policies have created a sense of distrust among Tanzanians
towards the wildlife establishment and a deep-seated fear of conservationists,
researchers, and wildlife officials.222 Local people feel often betrayed by the
conservation process.223 They believe conservation authorities will kick them off
their land and replace them with animals. For Maasai and others, the term
“conservation area” equates to “government owned,” and has become
synonymous with the loss of grazing, farming, and other land use rights. 224
Scholars note the growing perception among resource users that
conservation infringes on human rights “through the exclusion of local people as
knowledgeable active participants in management, policy formation, and
decision-making processes in land that ‘belongs’ to them and on which their
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livelihoods depend.”225 These policies alienate people from wildlife, as in Kenya,
removing norms of preservation and the responsibility to protect wildlife. Wildlife
has shifted from something to be valued to something to be feared. 226
Communities begin to look on wildlife as intruders, or as a burden, or as a threat
to their livelihood.227 Disputes with conservation authorities can lead to intense
human wildlife conflict as communities begin to hate wildlife and feel that
conservation threatens their existence.228
Resistance to park expansion can include the purposeful killing of
protected species. Since 2009, elephant poaching inside Taragnier Park, in
which over 30 elephants were killed, has been attributed to protests by local
peoples.229

In some areas in dispute between conservation officials and

communities, wildlife has dropped by as much as 50 percent. Locals do not
intercede to stop poaching, and may engage in poaching in an attempt to clear
their land of wildlife.230 Local resentment of conservator policy can lead to violent
confrontations between locals and state officials, and locals and wildlife. 231 In
some instances communities have become so resentful of wildlife that they
intentionally kill animals. In one particularly egregious incident in 2009, villagers
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forced six elephants off a cliff.232 Feelings of marginalization or disempowerment
within the conservation process fuel these reactions.233 Communities that do not
benefit from wildlife are glad when animals are killed.234 People begin to feel that
wildlife is more important than people and sometimes retaliate against the
animals, in particular elephants.235
Locals are increasingly adopting defensive tactics to halt the growth of
PAs. Villagers consider loss of land and use rights as a direct threat to their
livelihoods, which creates an incentive to expand lands under cultivation as a
strategy to stop PA expansion.236 Maasai, to avoid the reallocation of their land,
have begun claiming ownership of land and farming it. Farming and “using” land
has become a strategy to prevent authorities from claiming lands for wildlife.
“‘Defensive farming’, farming specifically in wildlife inhabited areas, acts as a
mechanism to keep parks form encroaching on territory.237 Intensive and
widespread farming can threaten wildlife when it occurs on an intensive scale in
key wildlife areas through landscape degradation and an increase in human
wildlife conflict.238
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Illicit Users

Patterns and processes evident within the global SES, including both
institutionalized and informal corruption, weak laws and an absence of effective
enforcement measures, intense distrust of conservation officials and enmity
towards wildlife, and increasing values to wildlife, facilitate the illicit trade in
Tanzania.239 These processes help explain why poachers and traffickers have
operated in the country with impunity for over a decade.
Because of the volume of ivory exiting Tanzania, a significant amount of
information has been produced on how the illicit trade operates in Tanzania, from
the names of corrupt politicians, shippers involved in moving ivory, village
markets and local poachers involved in killing wildlife, and smuggling routes
commonly utilized.
The criminal networks involved in poaching and trafficking are both
extensive and well connected to the political elite.240 According to the EIA,

“Corruption is a key enabling factor at every stage of the ivory
trafficking chain: from game rangers who provide information on
patrol patterns and the location of elephant herds, to police officers
who rent out weapons and transport ivory, to the Tanzanian
Revenue Authority (TRA) officers which allow shipping containers
of ivory to flow out of the country’s ports.”241
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The ruling political party, the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), operates
across the poaching chain. Four CCM members accused of poaching, all from
the Selous area, were publicly named by the Minister of Natural Resources and
Tourism, but were never investigated. Other high ranking officials have been
found with tusks. The secretary general of the CCM owned one of the shipping
companies involved in transporting ivory from Tanzania to Vietnam in 2009.242
Police officers have also been involved in poaching and trafficking. 243 High-level
wildlife officials are known to take the ivory from elephants that died of natural
causes or that have been poached but their ivory not removed without permits or
documentation.244 Networks also include middlemen who consolidate shipments
and arrange for transport out of the country. These networks can involve any
number of corrupt officials from the wildlife sector, local and national police,
customs agents, and politicians.245

Even members of the clergy have been

implicated as significant players.246 Syndicates may be funded by a small group
of individuals who facilitate the process from behind the scenes.247
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Unlike in Kenya, mass killing incidents are common in Tanzania, though
rarely publicized. Entire herds are decimated by large poaching gangs,
sometimes comprised of as many as 100 people including the poachers, cooks,
drivers, porters, navigators, and security details. These are typically heavily
armed gangs who may spend as long as three weeks poaching in a single
area.248 As has become common across Africa, poachers in Tanzania are known
to use sub machine guns, AK-47s, shotguns, pistols, poison, spikes, arrows, and
snares to kill elephants.249 Tanzanian poachers are also known to kill elephants
in Tsavo and Amboseli in Kenya, and are thought to be deeply implicated in the
large-scale poaching which has taken place in the Niassa Game Reserve in
Mozambique since 2009. Poachers are also known to attack and rob tourists.250
According to local media reports, poachers can make as much as $300 for
selling a tusk to a middle man who can then make up to $1400 selling to
traffickers in Dar es Salaam. 251
Ivory is typically moved from harvest points via motorcycle with through
local villages on the outskirts of reserves, where traffickers and poachers meet
up to exchange goods and cash. The ivory then moves by personal vehicle or
bus to Dar es Salaam for consolidation and packing to fill large orders.
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Traffickers hide ivory in cargo ships mixed with licit goods such as sisal fibers,
garlic, or wood, for shipment through multiple ports in Asia before reaching its
final destination. Buyers and sellers from the border region between Mozambique
and Tanzania, a major poaching hotspot, are known to traffic ivory through a
famous tourist market in Dar Es Salaam, the Mwengi Carvers Market. Three
primary ports are used to move ivory out of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, Zanzibar,
and Mombasa. Zanzibar may be the largest single ivory trafficking hub in Africa.
Another trade route through Malawi to Mozambique was uncovered in 2013.
Ivory originating in or passing through Tanzania ends up primarily in China, after
transiting through multiple south Asian ports.252
The links to China are particularly stark in Tanzania. The EIA uncovered links
between wildlife crime syndicates in southern China and ivory trafficking and
wildlife crime through Zanzibar. These groups are responsible for as many as 20
shipments of ivory a year averaging between two and three tons each. The
Chinese gangs work closely with trusted Tanzanian accomplices, including
businessmen, members of the government and corrupt customs agents. 253
Chinese diplomatic visits and missions to Tanzania have been linked on
multiple occasions to increases in the volume of ivory sold. According to the EIA,
Chinese embassy staff are the primary customers at illegal domestic markets. In
2013, a Chinese naval vessel visiting Dar es Salaam, set off a buying frenzy of
ivory in local markets. On multiple occasions it is believed Chinese diplomats and

252
253

EIA, "Vanishing Point: Criminality, Corruption and the Devastation of Tanzania’s Elephants".
Ibid.

258
embassy staff have smuggle larger amounts of ivory out of the country in
diplomatic bags.254

Adaptation and Mitigation

Pressure from the international community, culminating in the declaration
of Tanzania as a member of the CITES “gang of eight” most culpable for the illicit
ivory trade, pushed the country to address the threats to wildlife.255
Crisis can create an opportunity for positive change and controlled
transformation of governance authorities and management practices to enable all
components of an SES to better absorb perturbations.256 Tanzania’s response to
the current poaching crisis, as well as the longer term threats related to HWC
and severely degraded conservation norms, represents less a controlled
transformation than it does a continuation of past strategies, with slight
alterations. The strategies Tanzanian authorities have adopted to address the
current crisis relies on the generation of revenue through donor support and
tourism. These strategies include increased enforcement and reforms to wildlife
legislation with a renewed emphasis on decentralization of wildlife authority. The
strategy more closely binds governing authorities to donors with increased
responsibility and opportunity for the latter to fund all aspects of conservation.
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Tanzania’s public request of $50 million to improve conservation has been
met with overwhelming support. Commitments poured in to support every aspect
of conservation from state sponsors, IGOs, NGOs, private industry, and
individuals.257 In 2014 donors pledged to support a UNDP administered “Wildlife
Conservation Basket Fund” and corresponding anti-poaching and anti-trafficking
task force to address issues of conservation in Tanzania.258 The task force
partners, including United States, China, Germany, European Union, World Bank
and the UNDP, promised to provide the necessary resources to impact
conservation, both through material donations and training and capacity
building.259 Through donor support Tanzania gained access to weapons;
vehicles, including trucks, helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles; training;
and infrastructure improvements, in addition to being able to take part in and cohost multiple international events focused on anti-poaching and wildlife crime.260

Improvements across Enforcement

Both through state governing authorities and in partnerships with
conservation organizations, the government is increasing protections in PAs
across the country; increasing cross-border collaboration; improving wildlife
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monitoring; has increased the number of arrest and prosecutions for traffickers
and poachers; and has improved seizure rates.
The government is credited with leading a successful operation dubbed
Operation Spider Net, which led to the arrests of traffickers, pressuring the
syndicates operating in southern Tanzania. 261

The operation focused on

traffickers, and according to media reports resulted in 40 cases pending in the
court system involving financiers.262 TANAPA is experimenting with drones in a
public private partnership with the AWF as part of a nascent Private Sector AntiPoaching Initiative (PSAPI).263 Through assistance provided by USAID and the
WCS, Tanzania is implementing a law enforcement monitoring system using
SMART (Spatial Monitoring and Reporting Tool) software in Ruaha, Katavi and
Tarangire National Parks.264 In addition, TANAPA established a Rapid Response
Team (RRT) to quickly address poaching hotspots.265 TANAPA plans to
implement intensive anti-poaching training to include crime scene investigation,
so that teams can deploy quickly to hot-spots, with support from NGOs.266
Anti-poaching

programs

run

through

NGOs

and

public-private

partnerships have sprung up across the country, increasing the number of patrols
in WMAs significantly.

261

A well know example is a UNDP program, called
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Ibid.
263
The Arusha Times, "Tanzania: Tarangire to Pilot Aerial Watch against Poaching," in
AllAfrica.com (13 September 2014), http://allafrica.com/stories/201409150523.html.
264
Division of International Conservation US Fish and Wildlife Service, African Elephant
Conservation Fund Fy2014, http://www.fws.gov/international/pdf/project-summaries-africanelephant-2014.pdf.
265
Lindy Taverner, "Nyalandu the Right Man for the Job," in African Wildlife Trust (20 January
2014), http://africanwildlifetrust.org/index.php/nyalandu-the-right-man-for-the-job/.
266
Pius Rugonzibwa, "Tanzania: Govt Mulls New Body, Force to Combat Poaching," in
AllAfrica.com (6 January 2014), http://allafrica.com/stories/201401060022.html.
262

261
SPANSET (Strengthening Protected Area Network in Southern Tanzania), which
provides equipment to ranger forces and trains them in anti-poaching methods,
as well as providing infrastructure support. SPANSET focuses on the Great
Ruaha Landscape (GRL) and Great Kitulo-Kipengere Landscape (GKKL). Other
partnerships through PAMS and the Ruvumbu Elephant Project implement
intelligence-driven anti-poaching operations to include expansion of intelligence
networks and information collection, increased patrols, and interagency
collaboration.267 With assistance from USAID, Tanzania launched the Southern
Highlands and Ruaha-Katavi Protection Program (SHARPP).

The Ruaha is

currently one of the most threatened areas in Tanzania. The program focuses on
improving livelihoods in WMAs, habitat management, and elephant monitoring
and protection. Where NGOs and PPPs have developed and deployed antipoaching operations, poaching appears to be decreasing.268 The government
claims in some areas to have decreased poaching by as much as 56 percent.269
The government has also announced it will collaborate through the EAC
and with Mozambique to combat cross-border poaching.270 The EU announced in
2015 it would provide funds to strengthen cross-border wildlife management. The
funds would support both conservation initiatives and CBCs. 271 Monitoring
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improvements have been made possible through aerial surveys as part of a
continent wide elephant census funded by American billionaire Paul Allen. 272
Arrests and prosecutions have improved. In 2013, a smuggling ring was
uncovered through extensive police investigation.

In this case, Chinese

diplomats employed at the consulate in Dar es Salaam led a syndicate
responsible for moving tons of ivory from Tanzania to China. While arrests of
important players occurred, the diplomats fled to China and did not face
prosecution.273 Some shifts in prosecutions, jail sentences, and fines began
emerging in 2014 in which repeat offenders received longer sentences, between
three and ten years.274 In one well-known example, a Chinese national found
with over 700 tusks in his home received a twenty-year sentence.275
Seizure rates have also improved significantly in Tanzania. With donor
support, the government installed special scanners to identify ivory and other
trafficked wildlife at the ports facility in Dar es Salaam. 276 In 2013, for the first
time Tanzania seized more ivory within its borders than was seized outside of the
country, indicating some effort to address the massive trade. That year 80% of
large scale ivory seizures occurred in East Africa.277 Large seizures of ivory
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continued both within Tanzania and in Asian ports throughout 2014, indicating a
continuing high level of trade.278
In 2014 the MNRT announced the development of a new National Wildlife
Strategy, created in coordination with the UNDP. 279 The strategy mandates
further improvements to intelligence led anti -poaching operations, crossborder and interagency coordination, CBC management, awareness raising
in destination countries, and law enforcement capacity. 280
If sustained, these shifts in management practice and strategy have
the potential to mitigate perturbations across the SES and possibly slow or
halt the over-exploitation of the SES, allowing populations to recover and
regain lost resilience.

Reforms to Wildlife Legislation

The potential for longer term shifts in SES management rest on recent
changes to wildlife legislation, which again attempt to decentralize wildlife
management. In 2012, the MNRT released new rules and regulations for WMAs,
which began unwinding the past decade-long effort at recentralization. The 2012
regulations address some of the primary issues with previous rules and
regulations, including the issues of benefit sharing and control over the allocation
278
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of hunting concessions. Under the new regulations, CBCs in WMAs can enter
into agreements with tour operators and other investors, including hunting
concerns, to utilize wildlife resources in WMAs. Though still subject to approval
by the WD, the changes represent a significant shift because CBCs are allowed
under the law to advertise for investors, and to be part of the selection process.
The regulations also extend out the period for contracts from three to five years,
making investments in operations more attractive. The regulations significantly
shift the revenue sharing between the central state and local communities,
allocating 75 percent of block fees to the WMAs, with the WD receiving 25
percent. For other fees associated with the hunting blocks, the WMAs receive 45
percent, with the remainder shared between the Wildlife Division, Treasury, and
District government. The regulations also allow for CBCs to charge rates higher
than those set by the government, if they can find investors willing to pay.281
In 2013, the government moved to strengthen laws and address
corruption and mismanagement within the WD when it passed the Tanzania
Wildlife Management Authority Act. The Act replaced the WD with a new body,
the Tanzania Wildlife Management Authority (TAWA). TAWA will manage game
reserves, wildlife management areas, and hunting blocks in addition to
performing anti-poaching functions.282
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agency will be fully funded and autonomous, mirroring TANAPA and the NCA,
and will benefit from the hiring of hundreds of additional rangers.283

Transformation of the SES

Despite some significant advances it remains difficult to determine to what
extent these efforts will impact long-term conservation efforts. Current policies
largely mirror past policies, with slight upgrades and additional donor support.
The government remains invested in revenue generation as a solution to
conservation concerns, and has increased the role of NGOs in conservation.
These facts suggest continued stress on the SES as economics trumps
conservation.
It is unclear if Tanzania can break with past patterns and processes to
reform and transform governing authorities.

In practice it appears that the

strategy to combat wildlife crime does not differ significantly from previous
practices and rules.
The state remains wedded to neo-liberal conservation and the
commodification of its wildlife resources as a method for conservation through
CBCs, despite little evidence market approaches achieve either goals of
improving social and economic well-being or conserving wildlife and habitats.
The MNRT publicly stated the goal of increasing revenue generation by
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around 30 percent by 2015.284 This would occur through increased tourism,
including hunting tourism, and presumably take place in continually expanding
PAs.285 The violent expansion of PAs continued in 2015 with mass evictions of
communities to increase the number of hunting blocks available for sale on the
international market. This further undermines trusts and conservation norms.
Incentives clearly remain for authorities to pursue rent seeking activities.
Transferring power to local communities is akin to transferring wealth and control
of resources, a difficult prospect when state institutions are not transparent and
when resources are highly valued. As Benjaminsen et al. note, “The
decentralization of natural resource management demands solid policies,
functioning laws, accountable governments, and an engaged and informed
citizenry.”286

These are all lacking in Tanzania.287 Structural mechanisms to

continue rent-seeking activities, though altered through the 2012 legislation,
remain in place. The new TAWA, similar to the WD, has the authority to change
policies in WMAs and to alter use practices in game reserves and other PAs
without consultation.288 NGOs and IGOs have also doubled down on CBCs and
the role income generating initiatives can play in conserving wildlife, without
addressing the role park and PA expansion have in fomenting intense conflicts
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between communities and conservation authorities and wildlife.289 Past patterns
and processes suggest that the government and corrupt officials throughout
conservation agencies will continue to craft rules and regulations to serve rent
seekers.
At the national level Tanzania has not discounted the possibility of future
ivory sales.290 The government continues to research ways to preserve its
stockpile in order to reevaluate the feasibility of sales at a later date, a move that
could, if implemented, trigger another poaching crisis by stoking demand.291
The state’s commitment to increased enforcement has not been
demonstrated. Poaching rates remain high in the south, in particular in the Ruaha
National Park, and are increasing in the north of the country and in cross-border
locations in Mozambique.292 While arrests of low-level traffickers increased, ring
leaders continue to operate with impunity in Tanzania.293 As EIA investigations
uncovered, most of the primary players in the poaching crisis in Tanzania remain
at large, and many active poaching syndicates remain unaffected by these
increased enforcement efforts.294 Lack of arrests of king-pins or higher level
operators within poaching rings reinforces the belief in many that corrupt officials
are covering up the involvement of politicians.295 The government continues to
suppress information about poaching levels or complicity of government officials
289
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and Chinese diplomats in poaching and trafficking rings.296 It also continues to
cover up poaching incidents, threatening to retaliate against NGOs reporting
increases.297 In 2015 Tanzania passed a cybercrimes act aimed at NGOs and
media outlets that makes it illegal to share information online the government
considers false. Another controversial law makes it illegal to publish statistics the
government does not agree with, challenging the ability of NGOs or others to
publish accurate numbers on wildlife populations or criminal acts occurring in
wildlife habitats.298
It is unclear how the increased role of non-government actors across the
conservation spectrum will impact resource governance structurally. In the past,
government authorities have used the involvement of donors as an avenue for
revenue accumulation. Despite the embedded nature of NGOs and the influence
they have over policy in Tanzania, they have been unable to force long-lasting
institutional change, as evidence by Tanzania’s quick reversal on long-negotiated
devolution. Considerable incentives remain for authorities to seek rents, in
particular as the value of wildlife continues to increase on the global market.
Nelson and Agarwal note the ability of governing officials to implement reform
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strategies just to the point required to gain access to financial resources, and no
more.299
Relationships between communities and wildlife, as well as between
communities and wildlife authorities, remain strained and are defined by conflict
and distrust. Harsh enforcement tactics threaten local communities and degrade
relations between conservation authorities and communities, and between
wildlife in communities. Continued evictions send powerful messages to
communities that the government values the commodification of wildlife over
community needs. People are afraid of conservation, afraid of conservation
authorities, and view wildlife and the expansion of PAS as a direct threat to lives
and livelihoods.300

Conclusion

Application of the SESF to the Tanzanian case reveal cross-level and
cross-scale interactions which are leading to the uncontrolled transformation of
the SES. Single factor explanations such as ‘corruption’ or ‘mismanagement’ are
inadequate to explain the complex interactions across the SES. 301

Both

endogenous and exogenous forces simultaneously pressure both the social and
ecological components of the system, with negative impacts for resilience of
both.
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While Tanzania should have been well suited for the application of neo-liberal
conservation- a large and seemingly resilient SES, adequate legislative
framework, ample funding and support- conditions within the governing
authorities, and within the application of reforms, instead imperiled the resource
system.
The colonial history of centralization of resource control, eviction and
exclusion of resource users, deference to international conservation agendas at
the expense of local resource users, endemic corruption, and the purposive
pursuit of economic gains to wildlife interact within an overheated global market
for ivory to facilitate the near destruction of Tanzania’s elephant resources.
Neoliberal conservation has lead to the displacement of communities and their
dispossession of resource rights because the land and resources gain value as a
global commodity, incentivizing conservation authorities to increase the area of
land under protection and officials to structure rules and regulations to benefit
rent seeking.302 Under the current governing system NGOs have been able to
develop and control large-scale conservation programs on community lands, with
nominal input and participation from local communities.303
Folke et al. explain adaptability as the ability of an SES to learn and adjust
to both internal and external factors and processes, and to continue developing
within the stability domain.304

The system in Tanzania is not adapting, and

proposed solutions to the challenges facing wildlife have not evolved in any way302
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they continue to grow PAs, rely heavily on foreign donors for technical and
financial aid, exclude local peoples from decision-making, and commodity wildlife
and habitats.
Tanzania stands in contrast to Botswana, the last case examined for this
project, where the elephant population has exploded to over 200,000, with
poaching rates at less than .05% of the population, and little evidence of any
large scale organized wildlife crime. 305 Botswana has emerged as a champion for
elephant conservation and a driving force behind efforts to halt the illegal traffic of
ivory from Africa to Asia. The threats facing Botswana’s SES, deforestation,
desertification, and water shortages do, however, similar to those facing
Tanzania, relate to global markets and changing valuations to land. In
Botswana’s case, the values accruing to cattle, and elite motivations to protect
those values, create competition for resources within the SES.

Though this

competition has not yet impacted elephant populations, both human communities
and other wildlife populations have been transformed by these interactions.
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CHAPTER 7
BOTSWANA

Problem Statement

Botswana’s social-ecological system stands in stark contrast to those of
Kenya and Tanzania. Elephant populations have exploded in Botswana, spilling
over into neighboring countries, with an impact on the region’s SES. Poaching
rarely occurs. Communities generally support conservation and express positive
views on wildlife.
Several factors in play at the national level have impacted the positive
ecological outcomes evident in Botswana’s SES including high-level support for
conservation; effective policing and enforcement; a unified strategy for
commercial tourism development; positive conservation norms; and rules and
regulations which facilitate local decision-making about resource usage.
Botswana’s challenge moving ahead is to maintain its level of resilience in the
face of growing threats to regional populations, evidenced by increasing
poaching rates in most of its neighbors, as well as the broader threats facing the
entire resource system.
At one time Botswana believed the country’s elephants, and its ivory
trade, could be sustained even in the context of a global ivory trade. Increasingly
governance authorities in Botswana recognize their elephants as part and parcel
of the global SES, and that in order to safeguard local wildlife, the entire system
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must be shored up. Adapting to changing realities across the continent, President
Ian Khama has linked the safety of Botswana’s elephants with that of the entire
African elephant SES. Botswana has framed the safety of their national herd as
inextricably linked to the patterns and processes at work, including mass killings
and hyper consumption, severely impacting other sections of the SES. As such,
the country is working to both buttress protections within the local SES and to
strengthen simultaneously enforcement and conservation of the international
SES.
However, some adaptations of governance strategies, meant to decrease
vulnerabilities within the system, may prove to degrade SES resilience.
Management of the SES continues to be impacted by a pre-colonial history of
racism and exploitation of the minority San peoples by the majority Tswana, in
addition to the acute competition between cattle-grazing users and local users of
the SES.1 Botswana’s early and continuous emphasis on commercial cattle
ranching, and the pursuit of diamond deposits as the primary pathways to
development, have shaped interactions between resource users in the system,
with damaging consequences for social and, in some instances, ecological
components of the system.
Following the SESF, this chapter first provides a description of Botswana’s
resource system and units, highlighting the large areas devoted to conservation,
the large size of Botswana’s elephant herds, and its importance regionally and
globally. The next section examines the governance system in Botswana and key
1
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interactions between the state and resource users which link the local SES to
global markets, ultimately contributing to a resilient conservation system, which
economically benefits the entire country. The chapter then examines the steps
the governance system has undertaken to address threats to the SES, which link
the health of local populations to that of the entire continental SES, while also
bolstering local protections through proactive and adaptive measures.

The

conclusion highlights the utility of the SESF in illustrating how interactions at the
domestic level, such as legislation and the actions of resource users, can impact
the international system in a positive fashion.

Resource System and Resource Units

While Botswana has largely escaped the current elephant poaching
epidemic, significant perturbations are creating vulnerabilities in the SES, most of
which relate to the degradation of the landscape resulting from commercial cattle
herding, which competes with conservation as the key rural development
mechanism, and cross-border poaching threats.2
Like Tanzania, Botswana devotes a significant portion of its landmass to
conservation.

Around 39 percent of the country is under some form of

conservation, in the country’s three national parks, seven game reserves, forest
reserves and Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs).3 The total land-area under
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protection stands at 170,850km2.4 In addition the government has divided the
entire country into 163 controlled hunting areas (CHAs) for the apportionment of
hunting quotas and guided development. 5
Botswana’s SES is tightly interlinked with neighboring systems through its
northern conservation regions which connect to a larger conservation system, the
Kavango Zambezi Conservation Area.

This area spans northern Botswana,

Zambia, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Angola. As a complex system incorporating
multiple states and varying governance systems and local SESs, it is unclear
whether promoting the interconnections of the system will increase resilience, or
introduce vulnerability, across as the poaching crisis moves out of east Africa to
the southern portions of the continent.6 The system includes three dozen national
parks, game reserves, forest reserves, game/wildlife management areas, and
other protected concessions.7 The conservation area encompasses both the
Chobe National Park and much of the Okavango Delta.8
Botswana’s physical landscape consists of both wetlands and woodland
area with permanent water and seasonal flooding in the north and semi-arid
desert in the south of the country. The country’s most famous wildlife area, the
Okavango Delta, is recognized as a World Heritage Site for the abundance of
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wildlife, and is listed under the 1996 Ramsar Convention on Wetlands as a
wetland of international importance. The southern 70 to 80 percent of the country
consists of the Kalahari Desert, characterized by recurring and prolonged
droughts, poor soils, and few permanent water sources.9
Unlike Tanzania and Kenya, Botswana is sparsely populated, limiting
negative human-wildlife interactions within the SES. Less than 37 percent of
Batswana10 live in rural areas, leaving much of the SES free from people. 11
Encroachment and competition within the SES relate to the country’s three
million cattle. Domesticated livestock threatens wildlife through fencing;
increased pressure on water resources; expansion into wildlife territory;
overgrazing; desertification; and through increased incidence of human-wildlife
conflict.12 Fences erected to keep wild animals separate from cattle to stop the
spread of disease impede wildlife movements and stop animals reaching
seasonal water sources, which can trigger mass die-offs. During a drought in the
1980s 50,0000 animals died when fences impeded their movement towards
water.13

Wildlife declines related to fencing continue to be a challenge. In

Ngamiland, 11 of 14 species declined by an average of 61 percent from 1999 to
the present. Some animals, such as wildebeest, have declined by 90 percent. In
9
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the same area tsessebe and warthog populations fell by over 80 percent. In
addition to expansive fencing, a twenty-year drought that began in the 1980s is a
major factor in these declines.14
Lack of water due to climate change, drought, and depletion of natural
water sources threaten wildlife in the SES. Conservationists are particularly
concerned about a large population of elephants that migrate between
Zimbabwe’s Hwange Naitonal Park and Botswana’s Chobe National Park.
Boreholes are drying up along the animals’ migration route, threatening as many
as 30,000 elephants with death from lack of water.15 Deforestation, habitat
fragmentation, desertification, wild fires, and encroachment into wildlife territories
also threaten the SES.16

Resource Units

Botswana hosts the continent’s largest population of elephants, as well as
endangered wild dogs, lions, cheetahs, and numerous species of antelope. The
most bio diverse region of the country is the north where permanent water
sources exist.17 Africa’s largest concentration of wildlife occurs in the Chobe
National Park, also home to the largest elephant population in Africa.18
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Like most of the rest of Africa, Botswana experienced mass poaching in
the 1980s, closely associated with conflict across the region. Organized poaching
syndicates with connections to the South African military, various insurgencies,
and warring factions across the region engaged in poaching to raise funds and
purchase weapons.19

Poachers targeted the Okavango Delta for its large

population of elephants and relative inaccessibility to authorities.20
Elephant range changes seasonally depending on the availability and
location of water year to year from around 120,000 km2 to about 93,000 km2. As
in Kenya and Tanzania, most elephant range exists beyond park and protected
area boundaries. Only between 23 to 32 percent of Botswana’s elephants live in
protected areas, fluctuating between wet and dry seasons.21
Botswana’s elephant population is critically important for the health of the
regional population, and has proven resilient to cross-border threats. Botswana
essentially became a refuge for elephants fleeing violence and insecurity in
neighboring states. In recent years those same elephants began repopulating
neighboring countries, at one point expanding their range across 250,000 km2,
over multiple international borders.22 As poaching rates have again risen across
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borders, the elephant dispersal to neighboring Namibia, Zambia and Angola has
largely stopped.23
Since the last poaching epidemic, illegal killing of elephants in Botswana
has been rare. According to MIKE analysis, Botswana lost less than 120
elephants per year during much of the recent poaching crisis.24 Botswana likely
houses more than a third of all elephants in Africa.25 Elephant populations in the
Okavango Delta and Chobe stand at around 130,000, based on aerial estimates
between 2010 and 2012. Another 70,000 live in other parks, protected areas, and
unprotected areas across the SES. Some herds contain as many as 500
elephants.26 Most of the country’s elephants live in the north, with smaller
populations in the eastern tip of the country.27
Utilizing wildlife has been a key component of Botswana’s governance
system until recently. Hunting of all but a few protected animals was allowed
under a licensing and quota system. Botswana generally issued licenses to kill
around four hundred elephants per year. Botswana’s elephants are listed under
CITES Appendix II. The country participated in both the 1999 and 2007 sale of
ivory.28

23

Don Pinnock, "Southern African Elephant Corridors Blocked by Poachers," in Daily Maverick (9
January 2014),
http://www.elephantswithoutborders.org/downloadspapers/Southern%20African%20elephant%20
corridors%20blocked%20by%20poachers%20_%20Daily%20Maverick.pdf.
24
CITES, "Fifteenth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties: Interpretation and Implementation
of the Convention Species Trade and Conservation Issues: Elephants: Monitoring of Illegal
Hunting in Elephant Range States," (Doha, Qatar: CITES, 13-25 March 2010).
25
Steyn.
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid.
28
CITES, "Press Release: Ivory Auctions Raise 15 Million Usd for Elephant Conservation," (7
November 2008), http://www.cites.org/eng/news/pr/2008/081107_ivory.shtml.

280
Botswana is heavily dependent on the health of the SES for both the
tourism industry and cattle production. Tourism in Botswana has increased on
average over eight percent per year since 1994.

Numbers increased by 50

percent between 2000 and 2009. The over one million visitors per year account
for over 12 percent of the country’s GDP. 29 According to the USDA, 85 percent
of Botswana’s agricultural output is derived from livestock, primarily cattle
production, though the cattle industry accounts for less than three percent of
Botswana’s GDP.30

Governance System and Resource Users

Per the SESF literature, an examination of social and ecological
processes and the linkages between them within a specific SES can answer
questions about how the system developed into its present state, how it operates
currently, and how it might change in the future.31 Exogenous forces, including
liberalization, privatization, and globalization emerged early on as important
factors influencing early land-use decisions and the development of the SES in
Botswana. As Young et al. note, globalization is a key factor in exposing an SES
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to both resilience and vulnerability.32 Globalization has had a clear impact on
Botswana’s SES in terms of both the system’s resilience- funded in large part
through the country’s diamond reserves- and its vulnerabilities, which correspond
primarily to degradation caused by the commercial cattle industry and threats
associated with the massive expansion of the global ivory market.

The

globalization of the cattle industry in Botswana has resulted in large-scale
fencing, degradation of communal lands, increased pressure on water sources,
and an overall decline in most large mammal species, as well as multiple
deleterious impacts on human communities.33
Similar, and linked, endogenous forces driving the development of the
economy and the production of a national identity, including heavily centralized
resource control and de-racialization of resource allocation, have impacted how
governance over wildlife resources developed over time. 34 Botswana early on
addressed issues of land tenure and privatization to spur the growth of the
economy and aid in the development of a national identity. These imperatives
have shaped the decisions on resource use and governance within the SES.
The highly centralized management system, which developed has also
introduced both resilience and vulnerability into the system.

Botswana’s

resilience is evidenced by its strong legislation addressing wildlife crime and
effective enforcement mechanisms, and is reinforced by its focus on utilization
32
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programs that foster positive conservation norms for most Batswana. Unlike
Tanzania and Kenya, Botswana has managed the development of its wildlife
resources as a means to pursue national development goals. The government
has invested heavily in the protection of wildlife assets, and is less reliant on
NGOs for key conservation services.35 As such, the elephant population has
exploded in the country, and wildlife industries have become a key driver of
economic development in rural communities. However, vulnerabilities emerge in
contested political and geographic spaces because the government continues to
support land uses which are incompatible with wildlife conservation, favoring elite
concerns over national priorities. Moreover, some adaptations of governance
strategies meant to decrease vulnerabilities within the system, such as the ban
on hunting and shifts to rules and regulations, which recentralized control over
community-based conservation programs, may prove to degrade SES resilience.
Despite their significant damage to the SES, both within social and
ecological components of the system, Botswana continues to support large-scale
globalized cattle production and diamond mining through subsidies and
preferential land-use policies at the expense of wildlife and local resource
users.36 Other challenges relate to the decision to treat wildlife resources in the
same manner as other national assets, meaning central management and
national allocation of benefits.
These challenges, though significant, do not diminish Botswana’s
achievements in protecting its elephant herds and increasing the relevancy of its
35
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wildlife assets for the country.

Moreover, Botswana’s dual strategy for

addressing wildlife crime, consisting of an emphasis on the local/global nature of
the SES while simultaneously strengthening local mechanisms for protection, has
proven effective to date at both raising the profile of wildlife crime at the
international level and increasing protections locally.

Park Development under the British Protectorate

Unlike in Kenya and Tanzania, it was not immediately obvious that
conservation was desirable or feasible in Botswana, then called Bechuanaland
Protectorate. Early explorers and adventurers over-exploited Botswana’s wildlife,
resulting in the mass depletion of wild animals, in particular elephants, by the turn
of the nineteenth century. European settlement and grazing began changing the
landscape from the 1890s when Afrikaners from Transvaal moved into what
would become Botswana, foreshadowing current challenges to the SES. Largescale cattle ranching degraded the landscape through overuse of scarce water
resources, overgrazing, and depletion of veld products.37

By 1890 animal

populations were at an all-time low, before being further decimated by an
outbreak of rinderpest.38
These early usage patterns and the reality of a degraded SES devoid of
wildlife led colonial administrators to ignore international trends in conservation
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emerging at the time.

Instead colonial administrators chose to promote the

protectorate’s capacity as a cattle producer, supporting policies incompatible with
wildlife conservation from the turn of the 20 th century.39 Authorities argued wildlife
management was a waste of time, considering the degradation of the SES in the
early part of the century. As a result, the British Protectorate did not establish the
first game reserve in the Okavango Delta until 1940. In the 1960s the park
system was expanded to include the Central Kalahari Gam Reserve (CKGR) and
the Moremi Game Reserve.40
As elsewhere, under the colonial authorities and after independence, the
government centralized land and wildlife management and claimed ownership of
all wildlife.41 Evictions occurred to make way for gazzettment of parks and
protected areas. In some instances the colonial authorities consulted local
peoples, while in other instances, such as in the creation of the CKGR,
particularly important to hunter-gatherer communities, consultations did not
occur.42 Chobe, long recognized as an important area for biodiversity, did not
receive protections until the late 1960s.43 In 1966 a formal conservation policy
was devised.44

Usage patterns which developed in the protectorate era-

centralizing control over wildlife resources and favoring cattle interests over
wildlife- continue to inform governance of the SES.
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Governing Post-Independence

Wildlife policy in Botswana post-independence continued to be top-down
and highly centralized.45

The state remained focused on commercial cattle

production in much of the SES, impacting the patterns of resource use, which
emerged, including fencing to facilitate the expansion of the cattle industry. After
the discovery of diamonds, mineral extraction drove GDP growth. Wildlife
conservation did not emerge as an economic driver of development until the late
1980s. At that time Botswana embraced community based conservation and
developed a national marketing strategy to raise the value of wildlife resources
on the global market. With rising values to wildlife, conservation has become
entangled in a national debate over resource allocation and national identity.

Governance Authorities

The Ministry of Environment, Wildlife, and Tourism, (MEWT) manages the
country’s wildlife assets through the department of environmental Affairs (DEA).
MEWT consists of eight departments, one parastatal (the Botswana Tourism
Organization), and one not-for-profit company (Forest Conservation Botswana).
Under MEWT, the Department of Wildlife and National Parks (DWNP) is the
primary organization responsible for overseeing wildlife conservation and
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managing utilization. The DWNP account for 92 percent of MEWT’s revenues.46
As in Kenya and Tanzania, the managing authorities have a wide range of
responsibilities. The department conducts research on wildlife; enforces wildlife
laws; develops managing plans; conducts the building of infrastructure; is
responsible for community outreach and education programs; manages the
country’s fisheries; and runs the Botswana Wildlife Training Institute. 47
Botswana’s approach to wildlife control is community-based and allows
communities to utilize wildlife on their land and in the Wildlife Management Areas
(WMAs), recognizing traditional user rights.48 The laws and policies in Botswana
allow the local communities to hunt in Wildlife Management Areas without a
permit, for food.49
Though not to the same extent as in Kenya and Tanzania, IGOs and
NGOs play a role in the management of wildlife in Botswana, particularly in
influencing the reform process and the adoption of community based
management since the 1980s. NGOs produce research on wildlife populations in
the country, assist in monitoring wildlife movements, and promote and facilitate
Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) programs. USAID
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in particular was instrumental in the development and adoption of CBNRM as a
conservation strategy in Botswana.
In the late 1980s when Botswana began focusing heavily on its wildlife
sector as an engine of rural growth, authorities developed a national use strategy
focused on attracting high-end, low-volume tourism. This decision was made in
recognition of a weak tourism infrastructure and the desire to limit environmental
impacts related to mass tourism. 50

Legislation

Effective, and enforced, legislation in Botswana increases the resilience of
the SES. The primary legislation on wildlife in Botswana is the Wildlife
Conservation and National Parks Act of 1992 (WCNPA) and supporting
legislation including the Tourism Policy of 1990, the National Conservation
Strategy of 1990, and the Tourism Act of 1992.51

The WCNPA implements

Botswana’s obligations under CITES in addition to regulating the domestic trade
in wild animal meat, trophies and other wildlife products.52 The CBNRM policy of
2007 governs local management of wildlife.53
Unlike in Kenya and Tanzania, laws against illegally killing and trafficking
wildlife in Botswana were strong before the current poaching epidemic.
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Moreover, penalties for poaching and illegal hunting practices under the WCNPA
are much higher than in most African countries. Hunting any animal without a
license can result in two years in jail and a fine. Illegally killing a protected game
animal carries harsher punishments, starting with seven-year terms for animals
like cheetahs, ten years for an elephant, and increasing to a fifteen years for a
rhinoceros. Repeat offenders face fines and sentences fifty percent greater.54
Laws are written to facilitate prosecution and law enforcement, so an individual
does not have to be caught in the act or with a trophy to be prosecuted. For
example, trespassing onto private land or unauthorized entry into a park with a
weapon is a punishable offence, as is travelling along a road with a loaded
weapon other than a pistol.55 Wildlife enforcement officers have broad powers to
enforce wildlife laws, including warrantless searches and seizures if they can
establish reasonable suspicion of the commission of a crime under the WCNPA.
For instance, a wildlife or police officer may “stop, seize and search any vehicle,
boat or aircraft which he believes to have been used in the commission of the
offence, or to contain anything which might provide evidence of the offence.” 56
Authorities retain the right to seize trophies, meat, animals, and weapons as
evidence, in addition to holding some prosecutorial powers to charge suspect
and convey summons.57 The law also addresses the need for compensation for
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victims of wildlife crime, and provides a provision for property owners to kill
wildlife in order to protect property or lives from damage or death.58
To further support law enforcement and limit opportunities to kill wildlife
illegally, the government issued a temporary hunting ban in 2014. The ban
impacts all commercial hunting, and all hunting in public areas, turning
designated hunting zones into photographic areas.59 The move was in response
to the significant declines in wildlife populations. The ban impacts all CHAs and
WMAs in Botswana. Quotas for those areas were suspended. The ban did not
affect hunting in private game ranches. 60

Militarized Anti-Poaching

Bolstering Botswana’s strong legal mechanisms to address perturbations
in the SES is its robust anti-poaching force, which is led by the country’s military
force, the Botswana Defense Force (BDF). Botswana initially turned to the BDF
to support anti-poaching operations to address militarized cross-border poaching
in the late 1980s. The BDF was immediately successful, after which the antipoaching mission was extended to the rest of the force.61
The unit works closely with the DWNP and the police to enforce antipoaching laws and protect wild animals. The BDF’s anti-poaching operations
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focus primarily on cross-border poaching, while the DWNP focuses on local meat
poachers. At any one time, as many as ten percent of the BDF may be deployed
fighting poachers. The BDF patrols in all border areas of the country on antipoaching patrols. Anti-poaching training exposes troops to wild animals at its
headquarters, allowing soldiers to learn about animals, how to handle them, and
to gain an appreciation for their value.62 The BDF and DWNP also coordinate
through a regional Joint Military Commission to share intelligence on poaching
and coordinate operations.63
The success of anti-poaching operations in Botswana is attributed to
multiple factors including superior training and professionalism evident in the
BDF; support from the local population; and high-level political support.
Botswana’s current president, Ian Khama, was intimately involved with the
decision to deploy the BDF to fight poaching in the late 1980s.64 A self-described
conservationist, Khama specifically sought out personnel with the right skills to
track and interdict poachers. The force remains successful after over two
decades on the mission due to high standards of discipline and good leadership;
high levels of education among recruits; relationships with foreign militaries and
foreign military training; ability to maintain resources; and regular and generous
pay.65
Despite significant success, the BDF’s anti-poaching mission presents
multiple challenges including the requirement to patrol large and remote areas;
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the harsh climate; danger of wild animals;66 small number of troops dedicated to
the anti-poaching mission; exclusion of the local populace from anti-poaching
operations lenient penalties in neighboring countries; and regional political
instability.67

Community Based Management and Competition within the SES

Two factors drove the emergence of community based conservation in
Botswana. First, similarly to Kenya and Tanzania, the government realized after
the poaching epidemic of the 1980s that protecting wildlife required community
involvement and some devolution of authority to community members. Second,
community based conservation arose in response to the government sanctioned
expansion of the cattle industry further into wildlife territories through the Tribal
Grazing Lands Policy (TGLP), and the subsequent declines in wildlife
populations that followed.68

The DWNP considered the TGLP a threat to

conservation as a rural development tool, and supported the 1986 Wildlife
Conservation Policy laying the groundwork for later community based
conservation efforts.69
The TGLP, sponsored and funded by the World Bank, was meant to raise
the standards of cattle production to meet European standards in addition to
66
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addressing issues of land degradation.70

The TGLP developed in part as a

response to the Beef Protocol Agreement between Botswana and the European
Economic Community (EEC), meant to promote economic development in
several southern African nations.71

The TGLP essentially enclosed and

privatized communal lands under the guise of protecting wild areas, and to avoid
a ‘tragedy of the commons.’ 72 The policy aimed to provide a more efficient way
to deliver services, control diseases, and monitor cattle breeding. 73 The TGLP
expanded privatization, already well under way in Botswana from the late 1960s,
by rezoning rangeland to include areas for communal use, commercial ranches,
and reserved areas. The policy essentially divided the land in terms of current
and future livestock production, ignoring the needs or role of wildlife, favoring
commercial enterprise over subsistence and other non-commercial uses of the
land. 74
Instead of slowing degradation, the TGLP divided and damaged the SES,
irrevocably transforming parts of the SES. Under the subsidies, land has become
more valuable for livestock purposes than for wildlife.75

The policy was

ultimately meant to strengthen beef standards in Botswana in order to meet
European import requirements, receive subsidies and other development
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assistance. The EEC required strict animal health measures, in particular the
separation of livestock form wild animal populations. To meet these requirements
Botswana built hundreds of miles of veterinary fences, with disastrous
consequences for wildlife.76 Fencing divides the country into disease control
areas and quarantine areas.

The fences interrupt major wildlife migrations,

prevent animals from reaching water sources, and become targets for poachers
searching for trapped wildlife.77 Fencing policies have not stopped the spread of
disease and have had a deleterious effect on migrating wildlife.78 The subsidies
created incentives for ranchers to push into areas inappropriate for commercial
cattle production, prone to erosion, with salty soil, poor vegetation, inadequate
groundwater resources, and low rain, degrading an already marginal landscape
unsuited to agro-pastoral enterprises.79 Fencing and expansion onto communal
lands has the additional impact of preventing the hunter-gatherer communities
from accessing veld products and pursuing traditional livelihood practices.80
Moreover, because rights to graze in communal lands were not rescinded,
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wealthy cattle owners graze their animals first in common areas, then on their
own lands, leading to a “tragedy of the commons.”81
Despite significant wildlife declines, fencing to support cattle grazers was
bolstered by the 1997 the Diseases of Animals Act (1997), which promoted
further veterinary fencing across the country.82 This policy led directly to massive
declines in wildlife over the past decade and a half, radically shifting the SES
from a resilient system to one experiencing unplanned transformation.

Devolution and the Development of CBNRM

Community

based

natural

resource

management

programs

were

implemented differently in Botswana than in Tanzania and Kenya, emphasizing
to a greater degree transparency, inclusion, and more completely devolved
authority over revenues.

However, some of the same criticisms of CBNRM

ultimately emerged and the government very quickly recentralized programs.
CBNRM developed in Botswana through a close partnership with USAID.
The program ran for one decade, from 1989-1999, after which NGOs took up the
mantle of assisting communities in developing and managing CBNRM
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programs.83 CBNRM was shaped to align with the government’s overall strategy
to focus the tourism industry on high-value/low-volume tourists.84
CBNRM programs operate across the SES in areas outside of national
parks in WMAs and CHAs.85 Communities within CHAs can apply to manage
wildlife in their area, run photo safaris or cultural tourism ventures, or for the
commercial harvest of veld products.

CHAs are zoned for multiple use, so

grazing and agriculture are also allowed, though with restrictions.

More

restrictions apply on CHAs that fall within WMAs. These areas are reserved for
primarily wildlife centered enterprises.86 Two types of CBOs emerged, those
engaged in wildlife management through joint venture agreements (JVAs) with
hunting outfits or photo safaris, and those partnering with NGOs or private
companies to exploit veld products.87
Significant differences exist between how CBNRM programs developed in
Botswana compared to Kenya and Tanzania.

First, CBNRM programs in

Botswana adopted a “sustainable use” model in which local people can both sell
the rights to wildlife but also utilize wildlife for their own needs through a quota
system.88 Utilization also includes the commercial gathering of “veld products,”
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such as thatching grass or medicinal plants.89

Second, under CBNRM

communities gained the ability to negotiate directly with tour operators and
hunting outfitters through JVAs, or run concerns themselves.90 Leases begin
with one-year renewals, followed by a three-year contract, and then sets of fiveyear contracts.91 Third, CBNRM programs were designed taking local knowledge
on animal behavior and ecosystem attributes into account to determine hunting
quotas, camping spots, and other land use decisions.92 Locals directly take part
in the management of wildlife by monitoring wildlife populations, movements, and
death and renewal rates, and in increasing knowledge on wildlife behaviors and
characteristics.93

Fourth, communities keep 100 percent of the proceeds

generated through ventures under the initial CBNRM framework, 94 and make
decisions on how to allocate or utilize revenues gained through the utilization of
resources.95 Some successful programs were earning hundreds of thousands of
dollars annually.96 By 2003 communities collectively earned more than $4 million
annually.97 Access to funds and participation in management decisions allowed
communities to gain a sense of ownership over wildlife resources and craft
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locally relevant plans for development. 98 According to government documents,
the CBNRM Policy raised the value of wildlife concessions by over 100% from
2002-2012.99 Unlike in Kenya and Tanzania where resistance to CBNRM is
acute, in Botswana communities seek out opportunities to participate in
WMAs.100
However, despite the relative success of CBNRM, significant challenges
exist, many of them corresponding to those already discussed for Kenya and
Tanzania. Rules to establish a CBNRM program are complex and onerous,
creating barriers to local management. 101 Because finding and retaining local
skilled workers to manage a CBNRM is a challenge, communities are forced to
rely on venture partner, aid organizations, or government officials, 102 shifting
authority away from communities to boards and other governance structures. In
practice communities are often times totally left out of the management
process.103 Wage benefits are not evenly spread through communities, creating a
disconnect for a large number of those living in WMAs who do not directly
benefit, and who may only very slightly indirectly benefit. 104 Other challenges
relate to unequal benefits among the community, and the attendant conflicts,
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which ensue from that inequality.105 Overhyped promises of development;
requirements to relinquish use of land or limitations on usage; lack of inclusion
within management mechanisms once JVAs are established; lack of knowledge
on the goals of CBNRM; and a general feeling of disconnect between
communities and conservation operations characterize CBNRM in Botswana.106
These challenges were exacerbated by the lack of a legal framework to
govern CBNRM programs. As in Kenya, Botswana did not draft legislation or a
policy framework to support CBNRM until long after programs were established.
The community organizations operated on a draft of the policy for at least fifteen
years, opening up the organizations to manipulations by authorities in various
agencies.107 Thakadu argues the system was really designed for comanagement of resources as opposed to the actual devolution of authority. 108
The DWNP retained ownership of wildlife and land and exercised approval
authority over local decisions in terms of wildlife management and quotas and
revenue allocation and investment.109
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Recentralization

Despite initial success and widespread acceptance of the programs,
throughout the 2000s the government recentralized wildlife authority and
reversed key aspects of its devolution initiative through its 2007 CBNRM policy
and later ban on hunting.110 The policy backtracked on the original tenets of
CBNRM, which indicate communities should gain the most from conservation
revenues. This occurred in Botswana for a number of reasons related less to
critiques over the management of resources and more to conflicts and contest
between the allocation of revenues accruing to conservation. As Rihoy argues,
CBNRM became “socially and politically contested in Botswana, with resource
rights and benefits subjected to struggles amongst local communities and
political economic elites.”111
Shifts in the CBNRM policy were justified on two primary grounds. First,
under Botswana’s constitution, all natural resources are national assets to be
managed centrally for equitable allocation. Local management of wildlife
resources seemed to run counter to the constitutional requirement, in particular
because local communities received 100 percent of revenues accruing to
conservation ventures.112 CBNRM seemed to disproportionality benefit San. 113
The development of local control of resources and revenues also set a
110
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dangerous precedent for communities living in diamond-rich areas.

Those

communities began agitating for local control of diamond resources. 114

As

Poteete argues, “calls for mineral royalties to be paid to mining communities just
as wildlife revenues are paid to wildlife communities challenge the government’s
main source of revenues.”115
Second, and related, the shift was justified as a mechanism to promote
national identity. In Botswana, rights accrue to national citizens, not as a result
of membership in a certain racial, ethnic, or tribal group. Some communities
wished to define membership in their CBNRM by ethnicity, which the government
considered to be threatening to national unity.116

The government began

portraying CBNRM as divisive, interfering with “collective ownership” of wildlife,
and as negating the intent of shared resources. 117
The policy reneged on some of the key aspects of CBNRM, including local
ownership, resources access, and benefits sharing. Under the new policy the
government took control of the processes to select companies and award JVAs
to allocate revenues away from local communities. Tour operators now pay fees
to the National Environmental Fund, managed by the central government,
instead of directly paying local communities. Funneled through the central
government, communities now receive 35 percent of funds, to be used on
approved development projects. The MEWT allocates the rest of the money, per
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its priorities, to CBNRM programs and ecotourism projects across the country.118
The new policy increases the oversight role of the central government and district
councils, and limits community representation to a board chairperson and a
secretary. Hoon argues that the 2007 legislation has resulted in a punitive, as
opposed to enabling, system.119
Moreover, policy shifts, which equate wildlife resources to mineral
resources fail to acknowledge the special challenges communities rich in wildlife
face with which communities rich in mineral wealth do not have to contend.
These include human-wildlife conflict, crop raiding, predation, and loss of access
to resources, among other challenges. Minerals do not pose the same
challenges or costs to locals.120
Rihoy argues the devolution of resource management was more about
managing people than resources.

As she argues, the policy aims of the

government did not correspond to community goals. The government sought to
bring rural communities into a modern wage economy, which is not a goal for
many in rural areas, in particular of those of older generations.121 According to
Twyman, “implicit in the policy implementation process are mechanisms which
constrain empowerment and dictate the forms of participatory conservation which
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can emerge.”122 Local communities become “rentiers with no opportunity for
widening livelihood options and associated skills.”123

Resource Users: Emerging Challenges to Conservation Norms

As the SES literature indicates, the history of interactions between
resource user groups, the resource system, and governing authorities shape
current patterns and processes of utilization within the SES. Patterns of
degradation in parts of the Botswana SES reflect interactions within the system
focused on economic objectives not tied to conservation, primarily cattle
ranching, and elite privilege. At the same time, the lack of commercial poaching
or intentional overexploitation of the system reflects positive conservation norms
that developed partly based on cultural affinity and partly from effective and
inclusive governance policies.
Most Batswana view wildlife and conservation positively, and consider
conservation an important mechanism for economic development. These positive
attitudes relate to several factors, the first of which is Botswana’s governance
practice of allowing utilization of wildlife resources. By allowing local resource
use, authorities not only encouraged local responsibility, but also created a
connection between wildlife and communities and a sense of ownership.
Positive attitudes also relate to the fact that interactions within the SES between
human and wildlife are not as common as in Tanzania and Kenya, where
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communities push into wildlife areas. The SES in Botswana is sparsely
populated, limiting human-wildlife conflict and competition. Most Batswana live in
the east of the country, while the densest populations of wildlife are in the north,
where communities are smaller and more spread out. The communities living
closest to wildlife, San, have a long history of close association with the resource
system, and deeply held conservation norms, which take center stage in their
cultural practices.
The challenge for the governance authorities in Botswana is to preserve
these positive conservation norms as the country proactively adapts to
international threats to the SES. Steps taken to safeguard wildlife at the national
level, including alterations to CBNRM, and the ban on hunting, coupled with rural
development policies such as the TGLP which favor elite cattle ranchers over
rural communities, may feed some long simmering resentment among San
communities, long subjugated by the Tswana.
San have generally been marginalized in land use decisions, both in the
pre-colonial era and under the Protectorate, and presently. Around 45,000 to
60,000 San live in Botswana.124 They typically live in extreme poverty and
depend on access to land and natural resources for their livelihood. 125 Their
interactions within the resource system are ‘managed,’ as Potteete notes. 126
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Increasingly development, whether through CBNRM or other programs, is
perceived as threat to their tradition and culture. 127
As wildlife conservation has become more important at the national level,
the impact on San has been, paradoxically, to create a disconnect between local
users and the system as neo-liberal conservation development requires
significant shifts in livelihood practices that threaten the survival of these cultures.
Since the pre-colonial era, when San were subjugated under the Tswana, they
have

progressively

experienced

dispossession

and

marginalization

by

authorities. In some instances, as in Tanzania, indigenous people have been
subject to eviction to create protected areas. Evictions occurred in Central
Kalahari Game Reserve over three waves, between 1997 and 2005. 128 These
Bushmen were the last in Botswana to live primarily off of the land through
traditional means.129 Removals were carried out under the banner of
conservation, though after removing the San, diamond and oil prospecting
began, raising questions over the underlying reasons for the evictions.130 The
government argues the evictions are about protecting wildlife and providing the
San with access to services, and were not about accessing diamond
resources.131
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San have also been evicted in some areas of the Okavango delta. Other
communities, in addition to San, were removed to create both the Chobi National
Park and the Moremi game reserve.132 Evictions continue in Botswana, more
recently as the government is trying to create wildlife corridors, most notably in
areas surrounding the CKGR which have been deemed as key wildlife corridors
connecting the reserve with the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park. In many cases
these evictions have been carried out with violence. In 2002 the government
evicted one community and in the process destroyed water boreholes, removed
remaining stocks of water, and forbade hunting and gathering. 133 The displaced
often end up in settlement camps where they are unable to obtain employment
and experience high rates of alcoholism, depression, and HIV/AIDS.134 Those
caught trying to re-enter parks and other restricted areas face violence by park
officials, and allegations of torture and severe abuse have emerged. 135
Patterns of marginalization and dispossession also emerge in the
development of the TGLP and, to a lesser extent, CBNRM, in particular as
implemented under recentralization. The TGLP enclosed and/or degraded
communal areas, limiting their potential for subsistence utilization. 136 The TGLP
relegated San peoples to the reserve areas, which would later morph into WMAs,
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the primary geographies for CBNRM programs. San, forced out of traditional
livelihoods, are increasingly dependent on the CBNRM ventures. However, as
they have developed and become more centralized, these are perceived as elite
and reflective of international, not local norms and goals. Programs are referred
to colloquially as Dilo tsa Makgoa, or “something for the white people.”137
The recent hunting bans, imposed to safeguard wildlife in the face of
international, rather than local, threats, are experienced by the San as a
dispossession138 and as an infringement on their traditional livelihoods.139 The
hunting ban, in their view, treats them as common poachers, without
acknowledging their long relationship with and sustainable use of wildlife and
landscape resources.140

San increasingly resent the central government,

blaming them for shifts in the SES including wildlife declines, land degradation,
and water depletion, which they have witnessed over the past 150 years. 141
Removing hunting rights and forcing San out of traditional communal
lands threaten the survival of a culture dating back tens of thousands of years.
San culture is deeply rooted in the landscape and in practices only possible
through active utilization of wildlife resources. 142

By removing the San and

limiting their opportunities to fully develop and access their traditional knowledge
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and skills, the government is also removing a valuable resource from the
landscape, given the deep knowledge and understanding of all parts of the SES
innate in San communities. Advocates for the San note that in areas where they
have been removed, poaching and degradation increase.143
At the same time, because land use rules and regulations continue to
support large-scale cattle ranching, elite resource users continue to adopt and
enact practices, which damage portions of the SES. Tswana elites own most of
the cattle concerns in Botswana.144 The national cattle herd, over three million
strong, depletes water and grazing with impacts for local resource users and the
viability of the system. Instead of adapting to depletion of resources by reducing
herd sizes, elites have responded by pushing cattle further into remote areas,
previously used primarily by wildlife and rural dwellers. According to Swatuk “the
dominant philosophy among this group of cattle keepers is more borehole
development, not fewer head of cattle.”145 Elites pursue their economic goals
both in reaction to exogenous forces, primarily subsidies, and in relation to social
relationships that have developed over centuries in which the Tswana majority
feel entitled to subjugate San minority groups. These actions are not conducive
to the health of either social or ecological components in the SES, and may
prove, over time, to create vulnerabilities.
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Illicit Users

The strength and resilience of Botswana’s SES is evidenced by the almost
complete lack of organized elephant poaching, even in the face of some local
resistance to conservation and degradation of conservation norms. However both
scholars and the governing authorities in Botswana are clearly concerned that
organized poaching will move into the country as elephant populations in central
and east Africa are poached to extirpation. Poaching of other high valued wildlife
is increasing in Botswana.146
In fact, some signs of the development of organized poaching in Botswana
are beginning to emerge. Recent wildlife trafficking arrests have linked the
Chinese immigrant business community to the trade in big cats and, to a lesser
extent, ivory. Media reports suggest that Chinese construction crews are working
with organized poachers to traffic ivory out of Botswana, launching poaching
operations from construction sites. 147 However no evidence suggests Botswana
is experiencing levels of illegal killing on par with east Africa.148
Most of the poaching in Botswana, according to media reports, is crossborder poaching committed by small poaching gangs, sometimes including
former guerrillas or militiamen, which use military style tactics and high caliber
weapons.149 Poaching militias operate in units of about seven people, with every
146
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member of the group highly skilled in their area of specialization including
providing surveillance intelligence, logistical support, or overall security.
Poachers move into Botswana from Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Zambia, using
local informants, sometimes subsistence hunters, to gather intelligence on
wildlife.150 Some reports indicate complicity with civil servants, law enforcement
agencies, and security services. Poachers traffic ivory from Botswana through
Zambia by truck for export, typically hidden with licit products.151
Despite these perturbations the SES remains resilient to these low-level
threats.

Adaptation and Mitigation

Botswana’s response to the poaching crisis has been two-fold. First, they
have linked their local SES more closely to the international SES, framing the
larger threats of uncontrolled transformation as locally relevant, in recognition of
the interactions between levels and scales in the SES. Authorities in Botswana
recognize the multi-level and multi-scalar nature of the SES. 152 Second,
Botswana is adapting policies and practices to strengthen local enforcement and
management mechanisms to be pro-active and responsive to the increased
threat form organized wildlife crime.
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On the international stage this has occurred through massive international
public awareness raising campaigns in which Botswana has cast itself as a
leader in conservation.153 Botswana hosted two major conferences in 2013 and
in 2015 to elevate the issue of wildlife trafficking within the international
community. Both events brought leaders from across Africa and global leaders
interested in combatting wildlife crime in an effort to develop a comprehensive
approach to address the crisis.154 These events laid the groundwork for follow-on
international level meetings, symposiums, and conferences including large
events in London, Tanzania, and South Africa. Through these venues and in
separate initiatives, Botswana is actively developing partnerships with neighbors
to address cross-border poaching and trafficking. Botswana joined the Wildlife
Enforcement Network for Southern Africa (WENSA) to coordinate with regional
neighbors on anti-poaching strategies for elephants, big cats, and other crossborder populations under threat.155 Botswana is working with fellow African
countries through regional initiatives such as the Southern African Development
Community, and the Wildlife Protection and Law Enforcement Protocol to expand
the scope of regional cooperation in the fight against wildlife poaching and
trafficking.156 Collaboration stretches to East Africa where Botswana signed an
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memorandum of understanding with Kenya to increase training opportunities for
Kenyan rangers.157
At the 2014 Wildlife Crime Symposium in London, Botswana pledged to
put its ivory beyond economic use in recognition of the role a legal trade plays in
covering for illegal trade. Botswana reversed its long-held stance on the
feasibility and viability of an international ivory trade and dual-listing system for
elephants. The country also agreed to support a ten year ban on all ivory sales
through CITES.158
Botswana took several proactive measures to protect wildlife within the
local SES. Through a partnership with the AWF and the Kalahari Conservation
Society, Botswana is drilling extra boreholes in the Makgadigadi National Park so
elephants do not have to travel outside the park to obtain water, reducing
poaching incidents and HWC.159 Botswana also continues to track and interdict
poachers. As cross-border poaching has increased, Botswana has adopted a
“shoot to kill” policy, resulting in violent clashes with poachers.160 The BDF
continues to augment the park ranger force, working with intelligence services to
track and interdict poachers.161 To stop rhino poaching, which could prove to be
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a precursor to mass elephant poaching, the government created a special unit,
the Rhino Squad, with dedicated funding for equipment and training. 162
Botswana is attempting to address some of the challenges wildlife face
due to fencing, though large-scale removal or discontinuation of the practice has
not been seriously considered. More recently constructed fences have, however,
been developed to be friendlier towards wildlife. The Makgadikgadi/Boteti fence,
for example, was designed to zig-zag over a water course to allow cattle on one
side of the fence, and migrating zebra and wildebeest on the other side of the
fence, to both access water. In other cases the government has left gaps across
critical wildlife corridors to allow the movement of migrating animals. In most
cases, the government continues to erect fences as a first line of defense against
the spread of disease, despite impacts on wildlife and lack of evidence that the
fences actually control disease spread.163
Other shifts in policy may, however, have unintended consequences and
potentially perverse outcomes.

One of the most popular aspects of the

government’s stance on wildlife conservation in Botswana has been the
emphasis on utilization, both through local use and through the sale of resource
rights to safari companies and hunting outfitters. Able to use wildlife under a
quota system, Batswana have enjoyed a sense of responsibility for wildlife
management. The hunting ban, implemented in 2014, has had the impact of
further alienating and dispossessing local resource users. As skilled hunters and
162
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trackers, these groups could become susceptible to the lure of poachers, as
similar groups have in Gabon.164 The same fear exists for professional hunters
who could be attracted to illegal hunting, as has happened repeatedly in South
Africa. The ban on hunting also costs jobs and money to communities. 165
Removing the ability to utilize wildlife, placing it as a commodity for wealthy
Westerners to enjoy, may strain the positive conservation norms in Botswana, in
particular as elephant populations expand with increasing impacts on humanwildlife conflict.
The government also continues to support the evictions of San and other
communities from wildlife areas. In 2006 Botswana’s High Court ruled the
evictions were unlawful and unconstitutional, however the displaced peoples
regained only limited access to the land and resources.166 The government has
not granted promised special exception licenses for hunter-gatherers wishing to
access the CKGR. Specially designated enforcement authorities assigned to the
GCKR, the Special Support Group, have targeted Bushmen communities and
intimidated, threatened, and beaten the Bushmen. As noted by prominent
advocates, “there is no evidence that the Bushmen of the CKGR hunt in any
systematic way for sale, or use guns or vehicles, or hunt endangered species, or
that their hunting is unsustainable. In the name of conservation they have had to
pay a price out of all proportion to any threat that their subsistence hunting might
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pose.”167 The government’s attitude is that moving the San people out of “the
dark ages” is about development and spreading mineral wealth.168
Botswana continues to refine its CBNRM strategy in order to balance
needs of local communities living near wildlife and the desire of the country to
share the nation’s assets collectively. Reforms were under way at the time of
publication.169 However, reforms to the CBNRM process, while politically
expedient, may prove to increase vulnerabilities in the SES. The centralized
management of concessions and reallocation of assets fundamentally go against
the principle of CBNRM and weakens the connections between local
communities and the wildlife they live among. Communities lose their ability to
prioritize development goals and are subject to state development priorities.
Before the policy passed, communities retained the right to decide whether
schools, hospitals, or other projects were the most important. Under the new
policy they lose that authority and are the receivers of development projects
determined by the central government. As Poteete notes, recentralization polices
in Botswana did more to “transform wildlife into a national resource then it does
to solve problems of local management and capacity.”170 The shift in CBNRM
programs also impacted NGO funding, much of which was withdrawn as the
government increasingly recentralized control through the 2000s.
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external support, CBNRM programs in most of Botswana struggle to recover
costs and stay afloat. 171

Conclusion

Applying the SESF to the Botswana case study illustrates how governing
authorities understand linkages within the system, and the necessity to link local
protections to international level actions, whether exploitive, consumptive,
constructive, or preventative.
Botswana enjoys significant advantages over Kenya and Tanzania in
terms of the small number of resource users living in and dependent upon the
resource system, and the apparent lack of organize poaching, both of which, at
the time of publication, contribute to the resilience of the SES. While Botswana
has enjoyed these generally lucky circumstances, authorities are not relying on
them to replace strategies to contend with perturbations to the system. And in
fact Gabon, a country with similar attributes to Botswana- middle income status,
a small number of people living near wildlife, and abundant elephant populationshas not developed resilient systems precisely for this reason. Gabon’s SES is
second only to Tanzania’s in terms of over-exploitation and potential
transformation, having lost two-thirds of its elephants in the past decade as a
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result of weak laws, lack of enforcement, and estrangement and dispossession of
local peoples.172
The SESF illustrates how Botswana’s strong laws, strict enforcement,
essentially universal conservation norms, and transparent system of community
based conservation initiatives increase resilience within its SES. By focusing both
on domestic level actions and on the international level, governing authorities in
Botswana are seeking a more permanent solution to the challenges associated
with transnational organized crime to forestall the inevitable poaching onslaught
which will occur if the system cannot adapt.
Botswana is attempting to adjust and adapt wildlife conservation strategies
to meet the new realities of transnational criminal poaching before the resilience
of its system is tested.

By linking the local SES to the international SES,

Botswana has raised the alarm within the international community, emerging as a
global leader in and addressing preventing wildlife crime, and helped shape an
understanding of local SESs as inextricably linked to the continental and global
system.
At the time of publication Botswana is far better suited than Tanzania or Kenya to
meet the onslaught and quickly identify and address perturbations in the system.
But Botswana has not been challenged by transnational organized wildlife crime
to any great extent. If ivory prices remain high, poachers will move into
Botswana, and target the largest remaining herds of elephants in the world,
testing the resilience of the system to absorb perturbations.
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The concluding chapter illustrates how the SESF, applied to this project,
explains outcomes in the international SES and in the three case studies, Kenya,
Tanzania, and Botswana through the lens of Cash’s scale and level challenges to
understanding SES dynamics.173

Second, the chapter will focus on the three

broad questions Ostrom argued the SESF can answer, as well as briefly address
the hypotheses identified in the research design.174 Next the chapter identifies
areas for further research, and, finally, the chapter concludes with a synthesis of
key insights.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION

Multiple goals informed this research including, first, to explicate and
describe the potential causal factors degrading or improving SES resilience
related to poaching; second, to identify and explain cross scale and cross level
challenges to SES performance; third, to describe and compare specific case
studies utilizing the SESF; and fourth, to contribute to a critique of present
conservation strategies related to social components of the SES. 1 The research
essentially focused on three primary questions: What conditions exist which allow
some states to better protect their wildlife than other states? How can states in
the developing world withstand the pressures of rising global demand for limited
wildlife resources? And, what group of factors operate together to protect wildlife
and maintain sustainability?
The research was motivated largely by a concern over the exponential
growth of wildlife crime, and its serious and negative impacts on wildlife and
human communities. Transnational organized crime (TOC), taking advantage of
global connectivity and complex interconnections which link remote wildlife areas
with urban markets, coupled with climate change, habitat loss, and other manmade threats, is contributing to what scientists are calling the sixth mass
extinction. Recent estimates suggest that 75 percent of all species will disappear
within the next three generations. Wildlife ranging from coral reefs, Venus
flytraps, and leeches to rhinoceros, elephants, sharks, and seahorses will be
1

Berkes, Colding, and Folke, "Introduction."

319
impacted. Solutions to these environmental challenges must acknowledge the
kind of scale dynamics the social ecological framework, applied throughout this
project, can identify. Monocausal factors can provide some insights, but without
contextualizing the information analysis becomes reductive and oversimplified,
and worse, leads to inappropriate, ineffective, and damaging policies.
This final chapter will first illustrates how the SESF explained outcomes in
the international SES and the three case studies, Kenya, Tanzania, and
Botswana through the lens of Cash’s scale and level challenges to understanding
SES dynamics.

2

Second, the chapter will focus on the three broad questions

Ostrom argued the SESF can answer, as well as briefly address the hypotheses
identified in the research design.3 The subsequent section identifies areas for
further research. And, finally, the chapter concludes with a synthesis of key
insights.

Outcomes: Applying the SESF

Specific characteristics of the SESF, including its inclusion of variables as
nested and tiered; acknowledgement of scale and level dynamics; and ability to
disaggregate the features of globalization allow the framework to identify Cash’s
three scale and level challenges.4 These include not recognizing or ignoring
scale dynamics entirely; the “persistent mismatch between levels and scales;”
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and “the failure to recognize heterogeneity in the way that scales are perceived
and valued by different actors.”5 This section will provide examples from the
case studies to illustrate how applying the SESF, specifically these features,
provided greater insights into outcomes than simple mono-causal explanations
that focus on the role of poverty; conservation norms; state level factors like
weak governance and weak enforcement; land management strategies; the trade
ban; and neo-liberal conservation reforms as largely separate explanations for
current outcomes. A broad brush approach to poaching “in Africa,” does not take
into account heterogeneity in problem sets; in interactions between the governing
authorities and resource users; does not address specific challenges to
governance which arise in a specific context and operate in a specific way.
Ignoring heterogeneity ignores scale dynamics all together.
By applying the SESF to these three cases studies, linkages emerge
across levels and scales of the SES, illustrating how interactions at the domestic
level- such as legislation and the actions of resource users- can impact the
international system, while international level factors such as increased illicit ivory
use and CITES’ enforcement actions can shift outcomes in the domestic SES.
No one factors, or small combination of factors can explain how the system
developed either at the international level, or at national levels. At each level,
SESs are complex non-linear systems.
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Scale Dynamics

As Cash notes, the primary challenge occurs when policymakers fail to
recognize or ignore entirely scale and level dynamics.6

Because the SESF

acknowledges variables within nested tiers in the system, and their relationship
across levels and scales of analysis- spatial, temporal, jurisdictional, institutional,
management, networks, and knowledge- multiple perspectives of an SES can be
studied simultaneously, if those portions impact ecological or social outcomes.
Simply stated, how individual resource users operate in the system, and how the
system impels or compels them to interact- in particular considering scale
dynamics related to global trade- can reduce resilience in the system, or bolster
it.
Because anthropogenic forces affecting ecosystems occur at all levels of
social organization, any comprehensive account of the institutional dimensions of
global environmental change must deal with processes at work at each of these
levels.7 All of the case studies illustrate the importance of scale dynamics in
explaining SES outcomes. Chapter 4 describes how interactions between parts
of the international level SES- resources, users, governance systems, and the
system, have largely occurred in the context of an open-access system, leading
to local extirpation of elephant resources and the transformation of the SES over
time.

The

outcomes

of

the

international

level

SES,

fragmentation,

transformation, and shrinkage, relate to jurisdictional/geographic, institutional,
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temporal, and knowledge challenges. Mechanisms at the international level lack
enforcement capabilities; these deficiencies are mirrored at the tiers nested
below in state enforcement systems. Laws restricting trade are essentially
unenforced at all levels. Neither the governance systems involved nor nonconsumptive resource users adequately fund measures to protect wildlife from
the current scale of exploitation. CITES as an international governance authority
is limited in its ability to protect species by lack of consensus amongst parties on
the political, economic, and cultural valuations of endangered species. Ignoring
these scale dynamics leads to inaccurate assessments of the challenges facing
the SES at any level.
In Kenya linkages emerge across levels and scales of the SES, illustrating
how interactions at the domestic level, such as legislation and the actions of
resource users, can impact the international system, while international level
factors such as increased illicit ivory use and CITES’ pronouncements can shift
outcomes in the domestic SES. Kenya’s weak laws and lack of enforcement
enable international ivory traffickers to penetrate its porous borders and move
massive quantities of ivory to international markets, with impacts rippling across
the international SES as elephant populations throughout Central Africa are
poached to extirpation. By centralizing wildlife policies, the government has
marginalized stakeholder participation in efforts to manage the SES and combat
poaching, damaging indigenous conservation norms and removing the
responsibility to conserve and protect from local communities. Similarly, the lack
of a speedy response at the domestic level to changes in the global resource
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system driven by shifting resource utilization strategies has impacted the health
of the system, and its ability to absorb perturbations and disturbances.
In Tanzania resource users resist conservation and participate in
commercial poaching, feeding global ivory markets and introducing vulnerability
in the local system with impacts across scales. Application of the SESF to the
Tanzanian case reveal cross-level and cross-scale interactions which are leading
to the uncontrolled transformation of the SES. Single factor explanations such as
“corruption” or “mismanagement” are inadequate to explain the complex
interactions across the SES.8 This is because both endogenous and exogenous
forces simultaneously pressure both the social and ecological components of the
system, with negative impacts for resilience of both. The interplay of globalizing
forces, including the hyper consumption of Asian consumers; connectivity of
global markets; and application of perverse forms of neoliberal conservation,
combined with processes occurring at the domestic level including corruption,
and rent seeking, have severely degraded conservation norms. These patterns
of conflict between users and authorities together explain SES outcomes. 9
Similarly, in Botswana an examination of nested tiers of the SES reveals
how forces can positively impact the local and international SES. Scale dynamics
are specifically acknowledged through Botswana’s domestic policies meant to
increase safety of local populations within the context of a global threat.
Governance authorities in Botswana recognize their elephants as part and parcel
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of the global SES, and that in order to safeguard local wildlife, the entire system
must be shored up.
Understanding cross-scale and cross-systems interactions helps explain
why resource usage changes in an area.

With the advent of globalization,

decisions at one level of organization in one geographical location impact people
and resources elsewhere.10 Global change is linked to a complex set of local
processes, and vice versa.11

Hyper-consumption in Asia, global trade, neo-

liberal conservations trends, and privatization have played important roles in
shaping the SESs examined, with specific impacts on outcomes, both positive
and negative. In all three case studies, indigenous people with deep knowledge
and understanding of resource dynamics were largely excluded from governance
of the resource system, constructed as environmental villains or as backward
and anti-modern. The antidote, community-based conservation, was meant to
address the outcomes of fortress based conservation, namely over-exploitation;
human wildlife conflict; weak conservations norms; and resentment towards
wildlife.

As the case studies illustrate, through globalization and market

processes, some of the most marginalized people in the world are now “at the
center of global environment and development discourse and practice.” 12 Their
interactions within the resource system have become the object of interest of
national governments and international conservations organizations and IGOs
expressly because their interactions with the resource system not only impact
10
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local SESs, but also trickle up and across the system to affect broader
outcomes.13
The SESF allows for the examination of temporal shifts in patterns and
processes, and takes into account how past patterns and processes shape a
system in order to, when appropriate, examine scale dynamics operating across
time to help explain outcomes. By closely examining historical interactions,
policymakers can better shape locally appropriate solutions, which acknowledge
past challenges. Temporal scale dynamics proved important in this study for
each of the cases. As Young argues, because “institutions that yield acceptable
results during some stages of their existence may contribute to the occurrence of
significant environmental problems during other stages,” it is crucial to constantly
examine the fit between resource users and governance systems, including how
those organizations and the rules and regulations that shape them came to be.14
In each of the cases studied, the SESF illustrated how conditions of the modern
SES relate to policies and practices stretching into the earliest colonial era, and
in some cases the pre-colonial era, creating a more nuanced understanding of
the differences in outcomes across systems. Fortress-style conservation worked
prior to in-migration to conservation areas and cycles of over-consumption
proved it untenable. Colonial policies generally centralized decisions on wildlife
and land usage, marginalizing and in some cases alienating resource users
within the system, inculcating a lack of conservation norms and removing any
sense of responsibility for the health of the resource system. Where that occurred
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less, in Botswana, the SES has developed to be more resilient. Devolving
centralized control proved to be a challenge in each case. CBNRM programs, as
the case studies illustrate, similarly emerged as elite vehicles which did not
ultimately strengthen wildlife norms or increase feelings of responsibility towards
wildlife, and in some cases, actually increased the sense of competition between
communities and conservation.

Mismatch between Levels and Scales

As Cash notes, the SESF also reveals the “the persistence of mismatches
between levels and scales.”15 A mismatch can refer to a poor fit between the
size and range of a resource system and the governing authority overseeing it, or
refer to “the challenge of matching the scale of knowledge about a problem
(global climate change models, biodiversity loss), and the scale of jurisdiction for
solving that problem.”16
Mismatches in the size of the resource system and the level of
governance and authority are evident when examining each case study as a
subset or lower tier of the international SES, and apply broadly to the challenge
of CITES to provide oversight to the management of the international SES. The
countries studied all increasingly link, at least rhetorically, SES outcomes to
interactions and governance at the supra-state level. This emphasis overstates
the role of CITES in protecting species from exploitive trade, while underplaying
15

Cash et al., "Scale and Cross-Scale Dynamics: Governance and Information in a Multilevel
World."
16
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interactions between other variables in the system, many beyond the ability of
CITES or other suprastate authorities to influence. Their willingness to address
sub-state levels, however, will ultimately have the greatest impact on each
individual system’s ability to absorb perturbations.
As the case studies illustrate, examining the challenges facing the
international SES as a mismatch between scales of knowledge about a problem
and the scale of jurisdiction for solving the problem, also proved informative.
Issues facing the SES are framed and shaped according to political, cultural, and
economic expedience by the most voracious resource users, creating a
disconnect between how the system is valued by local users as opposed to
distant users.
As Chapter 4 notes, the groups with the most potential capability to
immediately disrupt the disturbances in the system- Asian, in particular Chinese,
governing authorities and Asian consumers- do not recognize poaching in Africa
as a problem that can be met under their jurisdiction. The lack of conservation
norms or a deep understanding of SES dynamics, either in terms of elephant
biology or the weakness within nested tiers of the governance system, partly
explains Chinese policies to promote utilization over conservation. The governing
institutions have not been able to halt the over-exploitation of the system or to
mitigate or control illicit resource users.

By shaping poaching problems as

related more to African governance and enforcement failures than as a market
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response to hyper-demand, Chinese leaders and consumers can justify
continued mass consumption.17
On the flip side, Botswana governing authorizes note challenges to their
local SES as specifically related to the global SES, and as under the jurisdiction
of international authorities which they have repeatedly called upon to act.

Heterogeneity

The last scale challenge Cash identified is the failure to recognize
heterogeneity in the way that scales are perceived and valued by different actors,
even at the same level.

Treating actors as homogenous and motivated by the

same values and goals assumes a universality of norms that does not exist,
limiting the potential for tailored, culturally relevant and effective solutions.
Depending on how they perceive perturbations in the system, actors can chose
to shape a problem as local or global, to either draw attention to the problem or
to off-set responsibility.18
While similarities exist, each country studied has had a different
experience with wildlife management, experienced different outcomes, and
operates in a different geographic and socio-cultural historic context.

Not all

actors in the system view the problem the same way. Ignoring heterogeneity
also ignores the scale dynamics in the system.

The scale challenges noted

above can be recast as failures to recognize heterogeneity in the system.

17
18

Ibid.
Ibid.

329
In Kenya, factors at tiers nested below the international SES impacting
outcomes include the small size of the resource system; increasing human
populations in wildlife buffer zones; inadequate land use and tenure policies;
corruption within the port administration and police; incompatible land use
strategies; and weak conservations norms.

In Tanzania, deep distrust of

conservation authorities; intense human wildlife conflict; degraded conservations
norms; and rules and regulations favoring short-term exploitation for rent-seeking
elites provide a backdrop to market-driven overexploitation of the system enabled
by sophisticated and well connected transnational organized crime syndicates.
In contrast, in Botswana dedicated leadership; strong enforcement mechanisms;
a proactive and multi-scalar approach to addressing wildlife crime; a sparsely
human populated resource system; and deep seeded conservation norms
contribute to a resilient system.

Resilience, Adaptability, and Transformability:
Ostrom’s Primary Research Questions

This study provides insights into the three primary questions Ostrom’s SESF
proposes to uncover which feed into determinations of an SES’s resilience,
adaptability, or transformability. To reiterate from Chapter 3, the questions are: 19
What patterns of interactions and outcomes such as overuse, conflict,
collapse, stability, and increasing returns, are likely to result from using a
particular set of rules for the governance, ownership, and use of a
19

Ostrom, "A Diagnostic Approach for Going Beyond Panaceas," 15182.
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resource system and specific resource units in a specific technological,
socioeconomic, and political environment?
What is the likely endogenous development of different governance
arrangements, use patterns, and outcomes with or without external
financial inducements or imposed rules?
How robust and sustainable is a particular configuration of users, resource
system, resource units, and governance system to external and internal
disturbances?
Applying these questions to the specific case studies explored in this project,
one can alter the questions to read:
1. What patterns of interactions and outcomes (such as overuse, conflict,
collapse, stability, and increasing returns), are likely to result from the
implementation of centralized wildlife management coupled with neoliberal conservation and community based resource management in
Kenya, Tanzania, and Botswana?
2. What is the likely endogenous development of community based
management, use patterns, and outcomes without external financial
inducements or imposed rules?
3. How robust and sustainable is the SES in Kenya, Tanzania, and
Botswana to external and internal disturbances?
The patterns of interactions and outcomes which emerged through an
examination of the primary mode of conservation in the three cases studies- are
conflict, decreasing returns, overuse, and in at least one instance, Tanzania,
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collapse. Even in Botswana, which has experienced almost no organized wildlife
crime, almost all wildlife populations, with the notable exception of elephants, are
in decline; resource users are increasingly isolated from the process of
governance of wildlife resources; and competition between wildlife and human
communities are increasing, to the detriment of the ecological system which is
suffering from water depletion, desertification, wildfires, and other degradation
caused primarily by anthropogenic forces.
These forms of control over wildlife and conservation developed squarely
in the context of the international conservation discourse, first shaped by notions
of centralized exclusive control of wildlife and resources; then through fortressstyle conservation and the separation of communities and wildlife; and later
through the widespread adoption of neoliberal conservation and the broader
Washington Consensus agenda pushed through the international development
community.20 As the case studies reveal, despite rhetoric focused on community
empowerment governments have progressively recentralized control over wildlife
resources, bolstering existing literature on CBNRM. CBNRM, absorbed back into
central governing authorities or as controlled by elites and private companies,
has become more about managing people and capturing control of resources
than about conservation. 21
As evidence form the cases presented illustrate, Kenya, Tanzania, and
Botswana represent varying levels of resilience, adaptability, or transformability.
20

McAfee, "Selling Nature to Save It? Biodiversity and the Rise of Green Developmentalism."
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Per Folke, Kenya’s SES can be said to be in an adaptive stage. Adaptability is
about the human management of resilience in the system. Adaptability refers to
the ability of an SES to learn; adjust to both internal and external factors and
processes; and to continue developing within the stability domain. 22 Kenya is
attempting to manage resilience through adaptation of its governing systems and
relations to and interactions with resource users. Tensions continue to exist
within Kenya between the centralizing tendencies of the wildlife establishment
and the ethics and rhetoric of decentralization espoused in public policy. If Kenya
cannot resolve these tensions resource users will continue to make decisions
that best benefit their immediate needs, not the longer terms requirements for
resource conservation.
When stability domains shift beyond thresholds and ‘new’ systems emerge
one may consider the SES to have ‘transformed,’ impacting both societies and
environments.23

While transformation does not have to be uncontrolled or

unplanned, or result from sudden shifts in the SES, that is what occurred in
Tanzania. Tanzania has experienced an uncontrolled transformation, with
portions of its SES in collapse. While Tanzania should have been well suited for
the application of neo-liberal conservation- a large and seemingly resilient SES,
adequate legislative framework, and ample funding and support- conditions
within the governing authorities, and within the application of reforms, instead
imperiled the resource system.

22
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At the other end of the spectrum, Botswana is strengthening its system’s
resilience in anticipation of emergent threats. The leadership in Botswana
recognizes that more resilient systems can absorb larger shocks and withstand
more disturbance. As a resilient system, Botswana has effectively adjusted
policies, practices, and procedures to adapt to threats emerging at the
international, and increasingly regional, level of the SES. 24

Hypotheses

The dissertation also posed six hypotheses. These are:
Hypothesis 1: In SESs where more modes of authority exist, systems will be less
resilient to perturbations.
Hypothesis 2: The imposition of rules from external organs increase the
resilience of an SES.
Hypothesis 3: When local communities engage in the management of wildlife
industries the SES will be more resilient to disturbances than in cases where
communities do not engage in the management of wildlife industries.
Hypothesis 4: Resource stress or collapse is more likely to occur in states with
weak wildlife crime legislation and/or poor enforcement of wildlife crime
legislation than in states with strong wildlife crime legislation and effective
enforcement.

24
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Hypothesis 5: In areas where human-wildlife conflict is not effectively addressed,
the SES will be less resilient than in areas where human wildlife crime is
effectively addressed.
Hypothesis 6: An SES characterized by geographic fragmentation is less resilient
to disturbances than a contiguous SES.
The case studies provided information and analysis on each of these
hypotheses, affirming hypotheses 1, 4, 5, and 6.

More modes of authority did

not increase SES resilience in any of the cases. In Tanzania where multiple
government agencies and hundreds of NGOS operate to oversee wildlife
conservation and CBNRM, SES outcomes are the direst.

Multiple and

overlapping authorities have not provided extra protections. States with weak
wildlife legislation do suffer a higher percentage of illegal killings, as evidenced
by Tanzania and Kenya which both have far higher rates of illegal killings than
Botswana. SES resilience is challenged by human-wildlife conflict. In Tanzania,
where communities express an intense sense of conflict and competition with
governing authorities and wildlife, the most illegal killings occur. And lastly, in all
cases fragmentation of the SES presented challenges both in the short and long
term, creating threats for wildlife from both illegal killing and lack of access to
water, forage, breeding grounds, and other essential landscape features required
for survival.
The case studies did not affirm hypotheses 2 and 3. As the case studies
and Chapter 4 illustrate, the imposition of external rules has not increased the
resilience of local SESs.

In many cases states have been remiss in
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implementing rules and regulations suggested by CITES or pushed by NGOs
and IGOs.

And lastly, little evidence suggests that community management of

wildlife achieves any of the goals of community-based conservation, either in
terms of the social or ecological components of the system, as evidenced
throughout the cases.

Areas for Further Research

Because of the comprehensive nature of this research, multiple questions
flow from the findings, in particular about the application of neoliberal principles
to conservation and related to community-based wildlife management.
Scholars continue to propose that the sales of endangered species can
fund conservation efforts.

Both wild-caught and farmed wild animals supply

products for growing markets. Important questions focused on how marketing,
product differentiation, constant expansion, and competition among suppliers
impact endangered species must be explored.

As media reports illustrate,

products initially marketed as luxury goods inevitably evolve into mainstream
products. This phenomenon can be seen in the production of caviar. Initially
marketed as an elite food, health and beauty products, including shampoo, now
contain caviar, marketed for its moisturizing properties and ability to boost "shine"
in hair.

Similarly, bear bile- once only used sparingly in traditional Chinese

medicine- is now used in shampoo, throat lozenges, toothpaste, wine, and tea.25

25
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While in the case of ivory scale dynamics operating across levels of the
SES are depleting wildlife, in other cases local consumption of wildlife products,
increasingly coveted as status symbols, drives resource depletion.

Forests in

Central Africa are being denuded of animals for the local bush meat trade.
Studies focused on the drivers of trade can highlight how scale dynamics within
nested tiers of an SES impact outcomes and exacerbate challenges.
As governance authorities and conservation organizations continue to
push CBNRM programs as the best solution to conservation challenges, more indepth studies of the power dynamics between groups can help policymakers
anticipate impediments to implementation. Maasai, Baswara, and Batwa peoples,
for example, have been treated as threats to wildlife when in reality these groups'
cultures all evolved within the context of wildlife.

In fact, their continued

existence as peoples in part depends on maintaining their relationships with
wildlife to reproduce culture through myths, stories, and key interactions. At the
same time, these groups are all marginalized, and have experienced evictions
and dispossessions to protect wildlife. Considered backward and anti-modern by
African governments, programs which devolve authority and control over
increasingly valuable resources to these groups are unlikely to succeed.
A common refrain from critics of conservation in Africa focus on the role of
western NGOs in driving policy. However, local activists, journalists, and political
leaders across Africa have emerged as important advocates for wildlife.
Research focused on how local activists successfully drive change can inform
western NGOs and assist in developing best practices for the transfer of norms.
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Conclusion

After the last poaching crisis in the 1980s, the international community
agreed on two approaches to fighting poaching- an ivory trade ban, which
worked until it was undermined by the two “one-off” sales through CITES; and
the adoption of community based natural resource management, or community
based conservation, which was never really accepted or fully implemented by the
African governments examined in this study. These are the same exact
strategies now being bandied about as solutions to the crisis facing wildlife, with
little real discussion over the challenges to both. The social-ecological systems
framework was designed by Ostrom to allow researchers and policymakers to
move beyond panacea approaches to resource crises, such as a sales ban or
CBNRM, applied without full understanding of the social-ecological dynamics
operating across levels and scales in the system.
Applying the SESF, cross-scale and multilevel challenges help explain
why the sales ban and CBNRM have failed to safeguard much of the SES.
Challenges to the ban, explored in Chapter 4, include uneven implementation at
the sub-state level, meaning a legal domestic trade continued after 1989 in many
countries; Chinese government policies promotion of ivory sales; the emergence
of ivory investors and speculators; and the emergence of transnational organized
crime, operating in the context of vastly increased global trade. Challenges to
CBNRM, examined in the case studies, include elite capture of revenues;
government resistance to devolution and loss of authority over communities and
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resources; deep seeded resistance to conservation authorities; population
expansion into wildlife buffer zones and dispersal areas; and the global/local
arbitrage on land values in the international market.
While the tide is turning against “one-off” sales, with reversals in support
from Tanzania and Botswana in particular, support remains for the expansion of
CBNRM. Yet little evidence exists suggests the two outcomes expected from
CBNRM programs- the “maintenance of wildlife habitats and preservation of
species, and improved social and economic well-being of the communities”- have
been achieved on a large scale.26 As evidenced by the case studies, after about
two decades of operations across multiple countries, the ability of CBNRM to
achieve either of these goals is highly questionable. Governments have resisted
the redistribution of authority to local communities over resource use or the
revenues generated. As Swatuk points out, typically the blame for project failure
is pushed onto receiving countries and communities, ignoring power dynamics
between donors, NGOs, governments, local communities.27 However, as the
case studies indicate, socio-cultural dynamics and interactions between resource
users, resource units, and the governance systems, occurring over decades and
in some cases centuries, has hampered the implementation of these programs.
Dynamics which have occurred over the last century between resource users,
units, and governance authorities in the system also impact ecological outcomes,
not simply the rise in demand in Asia. Centralization of authority; exclusion of

26
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local peoples; distrust of conservation officials; the perception that wildlife and
conservation are “for the whites;” perceptions of dispossession; weak laws and
enforcement; and unmet expectations have been factors in the interactions
between users and the system. In theory, CBNRM addressed these challenges
to conservation, though in practice communities are not closely involved with
management or land-use decisions; revenues flow to elites or, in the case of
Tanzania and Botswana, back through the central government; and resource
users express a disconnect with wildlife and feelings of intense completion with
animals and conservation authorities over their basic rights.
Solutions must acknowledge scale dynamics and scale challenges.
Stopping the illegal trade in ivory will not solve the larger problem of wildlife
crime. Wildlife crime must be rigorously and vigorously pursued. The market for
wildlife products is growing, not only in Asia, but in the west. Any approach to
wildlife crime must acknowledge the scope and scale of the crimes, and look past
charismatic species. The global market moves very fast. By the time regulators
recognize a new trend, wildlife populations will be depleted.

An ivory only

approach that seeks to stop one traffic, but continues to ignore others, will result
in a cycle of crisis as species after species is forced into crisis.
Applying the SESF to the cases revealed that poaching is not necessarily
the greatest threat to each system. In Kenya the SES is bests by challenges due
to overcrowding, the small size of its system of protected areas, ad hoc
development, lack of rules and regulations on land use, and the added
challenges which will likely emerge as CBNRM programs become more
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widespread. Similarly, in Tanzania- assuming poaching can be addressed- the
SES will still struggle with weak conservation norms, distrust of wildlife officials, a
sense of acute competition between resource users and authorities, deep
resentment towards wildlife, and a broken governance system. Botswana’s
primary challenge is reconciling development priorities to align with social and
economic goals, while staving off encroachment of transnational organized
crime, now operating in neighboring states.
Solutions must acknowledge scale dynamics and scale challenges.
Stopping the illegal trade in ivory will not solve the larger problem of wildlife
crime. Wildlife crime must be rigorously and vigorously pursued. The market for
wildlife products is growing, not only in Asia, but in the west. Any approach to
wildlife crime must acknowledge the scope and scale of the crimes, and look past
charismatic species.

The global market moves fast.

By the time regulators

recognize a new trend, wildlife populations will be depleted.

An ivory only

approach that seeks to stop one traffic, but continues to ignore others, will result
in a cycle of crisis as species after species is forced into distress and possible
extirpation.
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